

COUNTERING EXTREMISTS' NARRATIVE IN PAKISTAN

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Abstract

This paper examines the current confrontation between Pakistani state and militant Islamist groups through the lens of social constructivism. Based on the core constructivist belief that 'ideas matter', this paper critically examines some popular narratives in Pakistan which support the militants' worldview. It attempts to identify the factors which inspire Pakistani public to sanction the extremists' narratives. This paper also explores the alternative ideas within the shared paradigm of religion in Pakistan, which, if promoted through education, may reduce the growing religious radicalism in the country.

Key Words: ideology, narratives, extremism, Islamism, peace building.

"Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed." - UNESCO Constitution 1945.

Ideas and ideologies have played a key role in shaping the identity of Pakistan as a nation. The internal war Pakistan faces today has been described as an existential threat to the country as it hits the core of the ideological construction of Pakistan. A military operation like *Zarb-i-Azb*¹ is unlikely to counter religious extremism in Pakistan which remains the root cause of the current ideological conflict retaining a wide popular appeal.² The importance of belonging to religious rather than secular ideals for Pakistan is evident by the name given to the military operation against the self proclaimed Islamist militants.³ Religion remains a potent force in Pakistan. This paper makes a case for devising a counter extremist narrative in Pakistan.

The phenomenon of religious radicalism in Pakistan has been a subject of intense academic discussion in recent years.⁴ Among the various factors identified as the causes of growing radicalism in the country, connection between popular notions defining the national identity and militants' stated aspirations have been pointed out.⁵ One of the key strengths of the militants is their ability to manipulate the religion-based popular narratives to their advantage. An effective counterterrorism strategy must aim to counter this strength of the militants and challenge them in the realm of ideas. This paper examines the ideological dimension of the conflict between the religious militants and the state of Pakistan. Using the social constructivist lens, this study explores answers to the following questions: a) Why do the people of Pakistan endorse the narratives of extremism propagated by the Islamist militants; b) What alternatives may be constructed to counter the narratives of extremism in Pakistan? It argues that a major factor that enables extremists to use religion to their advantage is the state's inability to promote the intellectual, liberal and compassionate aspects of Islam. Due to a variety of political and historical factors,⁶ popular discourse⁷ and public education⁸ in Pakistan largely ignores these dominant themes of religion which if promoted through education, may serve as a key to resolve the problem of extremism in Pakistan. This paper argues that since religion provides the power to the extremists' narratives, it is only through religion that they can be effectively countered.

The proposed argument is embedded in social constructivist approach in international relations theory which deems that humans' behaviour is determined by their identity which itself is shaped by society's values, norms, history, practices and institutions.⁹

The term 'narratives of extremism' in this study, refers to the shared ideas and stories which form the public opinion in Pakistan and promote a particular worldview which tends to be confrontational. 'Countering' the narratives of extremism refers to exploring ways to effectively counter the popular

confrontational notions and replacing them with ideas that promote peaceful coexistence.

Pakistan and the Rising Religious Radicalism

A number of recent studies express concern about the growing religious radicalism in Pakistan. Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi, a noted Pakistani political analyst, ranks militancy and extremism as the top most challenge faced by Pakistan today.¹⁰ According to him, the growing religious orthodoxy has caused 'irreparable damage to Pakistan's social fabric'.¹¹ The youth is especially vulnerable to the growing radical ideology which is weakening the bond between state and people, as loyalty to a transnational Muslim community replaces the notions of citizenship and civic obligations. The emphasis of radical Islamist discourse for total transformation of society has given rise to a culture of defiance leading to societal anarchy.

Moeed Yusuf, another key political commentator in Pakistan, presents a study showing with empirical data that religious and national identities remain inherently linked in Pakistan.¹² The statistics show that the majority of youth wants to see Pakistan as an Islamic state, and strongly relate themselves with their respective religious sect. They are vulnerable to conspiracy theories and popular discourse based on emotions rather than logic. Fair and Shapiro present the result of polling data obtained in 2009 showing that nearly 70 percent Pakistanis want *sharia* to play a larger role in Pakistan's law and most believing that *sharia* means good governance.¹³

Haider terms this phenomenon as 'Talibanization' of Pakistan which in his view is 'an existential militant Islamist threat' to the country.¹⁴ Haider advocates not only a military but an ideological response to this threat by taking Islamic parties on board and promoting the traditional Sufi Islam which has historically remained popular amongst the masses with its inclusive and flexible teachings.

Although, rising extremism has become clearly visible in recent years, many authors trace its roots to the troubled decade of 1980s. Two important books on this subject refer to the Mecca uprising in 1979 as the starting point of a new wave of Islamist radicalism in the Muslim world.¹⁵

Shahzad¹⁶ and Husain¹⁷ point out that the idea of rejecting Muslim ruling elite as Western agents and transforming Muslim society by force, began to take root after the Mecca incident in 1979. Husain explains the impact of the shockwaves created by this incident across the Muslim world. Shahzad describes in detail the ideological roots of the radical movement in the work of medieval ideologue Ibn Tamiyyah. Both authors agree that the 1979 incident was the beginning of the culture of defiance in the Muslim world.

Ahmad takes a deeper view of the ideological conflict in the country pointing out the ambiguities inherent in Pakistan's constitution and construction of national ideology.¹⁸ He describes how the insistence on a 'fixed ideology' has brushed aside the voices of dissent. Even powerful voices like that of Javed Iqbal¹⁹ to modernize traditional sharia have been completely ignored in the past, allowing a dogmatic ideology to take root in the popular mindset. Disregard of the intellectual tradition in Islam in favor of a fixed ideology created conflicts which were later exploited by the militant extremists.

Basit and Rathore offer an empirical study showing various trends and patterns of radicalization in Pakistan.²⁰ This study presents a mix picture showing public opinion as divided on the question of favoring Taliban. However, on the question of struggle for implementation of *sharia*, majority consider it a *jihad* thus accepting unwillingly and perhaps unknowingly the justification of violence by the militant Islamist groups.

Siddiqa studies the trends among urban and educated youth of Pakistan concluding that educated Pakistani youth has embraced radicalism not because they really understand the underlying ideology but because the popular discourse

promotes such a worldview and alternative discourse is not visible.²¹ The popular stereotypes of 'us vs. them' have been adopted by young minds without much conscious thought. Sial and Anjum conclude that Pakistanis remain confuse over the issues of extremism, jihad and radicalization due to their inherent religiosity which in the absence of education and critical thinking creates uncertainty and confusion.²²

Waseem describes how the public life in Pakistan since 1950s has been increasingly shaped by an alternative religious discourse.²³ Religious parties especially Jamat-i-Islami used education to promote its ideas and influence. Waseem outlines three stages of 'Talibanization' of the country. From the state support to Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 1990s to post 9/11 operations in Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and finally the intensification of conflict between state and militant Islamist groups after the Jamia Hafsa incident. According to Waseem, Pakistan Army has been unable to control internal militancy because it has been cultivating and mobilizing some of these forces itself and wants to keep these elements alive against India. Militant discourse, therefore, has not been controlled and remains freely accessible to the general public.

Khan points out how the Islamist organizations in Pakistan have effectively built on prevalent narratives in Pakistan to promote their worldview.²⁴ The counter terrorism strategy in Pakistan does not take into account the powerful impact of these narratives and ways to counter them. According to Khan, the 'right' message must be crafted and promoted, to effectively counter the militant discourse.

Why do Pakistanis Approve the Militant Islamist Narratives?

As the academics express concern about the widespread support for militant Islamist narratives in Pakistan, examining the factors which constructed this phenomenon becomes imperative. Some key structural factors that gradually built the social consensus towards religious radicalism in Pakistan,

are briefly examined below with reference to the popular narratives they support.

Historical Overview

The 9/11 episode was the culmination of a clash which began centuries ago with the advent of Western modernity in the Muslim lands. Muslims in many parts of the world experienced the invasion of Western modernity as 'aggressive, invasive and exploitative'.²⁵ During the early modern era the relative decline of the Islamic world and the challenge of European colonial rule instigated various debates in the Muslim world. Muslims sought explanation of their decline which gave rise to three different perspectives in the Muslim world.

- The Conservative activists; like Rashid Rida, Hasan al Banna emphasized the revitalization of religion and political change. In South Asia the *ulama* of *Deoband* and the *Ahl-i-Hadith* typically belonged to this group.
- The Secularists; who argued that it is the 'continuing influence of the backward tradition in Muslim society' which is the cause of its decline. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was a representative of this school.
- The reformists who advocated reform of the medieval scholasticism which has slowed down the growth of Muslim thought.

They sought innovation and dynamism in Islamic thought which is demanded by the modern age. Jamal ud Din Afghani and Muhammad Abduh belonged to this group.²⁶ In South Asia, Allama Shibli Nomani (1857-1914) a well-known Indian Muslim scholar from early 20th century, whose scholarly work and contribution to *Nadwatul Ulama*, a university dedicated to Islamic reform, left a profound impact on modern Islamic thought in India,²⁷ and Muhammad Iqbal, the inspirational poet, philosopher and a leading intellectual of the 20th century, belonged to this school of thought.²⁸

These three strands of thinking continued in the Muslim world. Pakistan, since inception, inherited these debates which were prevailing in other parts of the Muslim world as well during the twentieth century. The tensions between liberal, conservative, Islamist and reformist elements have dominated the discourse on ideology and identity of Pakistani nation up to this day.²⁹

The struggle for Pakistan began when India's Muslim minority sought protection against the Hindu majority domination. The 'Islam in danger' narrative is thus embedded in the public mindset strengthened by the shared experiences of a religiously charged freedom movement, colonial subjugation, Hindu egoism, and a violent partition. Religiously motivated political activism was inherited by the country since its inception in 1947.

The Cold War Milieu

The cold war atmosphere charged with ideological debates, in the later part of the twentieth century intensified the ideological arguments within the Islamic world. Pakistan with its stated claim to be an 'ideological state' remained at the centre of such debates.³⁰ Arguments for the Islamic 'ideology' against Communist, Capitalist ideologies began to shape the public discourse³¹. The urban educated Pakistanis being religiously conservative and emotionally attached to their faith readily engaged with this discourse which gradually became a part of their collective psyche.³² The idea of Islam as religion and tradition gradually gave way to the idea of Islam as an ideology.³³ Ideologies in twentieth century context were essentially radical, confrontational and political. Hence, religious radicalism evolved in Pakistan, accompanied by a host of other factors which steered public perceptions towards this direction.

A central feature of global politics during cold war was the Islamist-capitalist nexus; the Islamist movements of the 20th century joined hands with Western capitalist bloc especially during the last decade of the cold war to wage jihad against

communism. The growth of Islamist militancy is the legacy of this era.

Pakistan's direct involvement in America's cold war politics and battles, as the 'most allied ally'³⁴ in 1950s and 'the frontline state'³⁵ in 1980s and later after 9/11, provided sufficient credibility to the following narratives described by Khan as Al-Qaeda's master narratives, which were sold like hot cakes in Pakistan.

"There is a war going on against Islam, and the West is a major enemy. Muslim rulers are agents of the West".³⁶

The Geography

The perception of being under a constant threat was strengthened in Pakistan by geostrategic concerns as well.³⁷ Surrounded by archrival India in the East, an unstable and often hostile Afghanistan in the West, the enduring Kashmir conflict in the North, which led to at least three full scale wars with India, Pakistan remained preoccupied with security concerns since its inception.³⁸

It is again due to its geostrategic location that Pakistan remained at the centre of world politics during the cold war and later during post 9/11 war on terror. On a number of occasions, geostrategic compulsions got the country entangled into unintended wars. Pakistan remained on the frontline during the wars in Afghanistan in 1980s and 2000s. Owing to its geographical location the country rarely had a choice to stay away from these international battles which left a deep mark on its political and social landscape.

The US Factor

The shared perception of the 'US interference' in Pakistan's affairs has been built over the years due to the strategic and military partnership between the two countries earlier during the cold war and later during the post 9/11 era. Markey describes US Pakistan relations as 'tortured', comparing it

with Sartre's depiction of three sinners doomed to torment each other forever.³⁹

The roller coaster history of US Pakistan relations ,the post 9/11 'War on Terror' , the continuing drone strikes in the country , have intensified anti-US sentiment in Pakistan, providing perfect justification to the militants' struggle against Pakistani state and army for fighting an American war. The reported high civilian casualty rate during US drone strikes, which according to one estimate, goes up to 24%, generates sympathy for militants' worldview and support for militant narratives.⁴⁰ The liberal US aid to Pakistan has done little to improve US image in the country. The aid relationship between the two states remains complex as both tend to have varied perspectives on key issues despite their mutual interdependence.⁴¹The trust deficit at top level is reflected at popular level.

Moreover, the enduring Palestine issue, atrocities committed by Israeli troops on Palestinian soil and the perceived American support to Israel, is another major factor that breeds hostility against the Western hegemony in places like Pakistan. According to Khan;

'A paradigm has developed as an extension of the " war against Islam" narrative which encourages the audience to see events through "us vs. them" lens, with the 'world of Islam' on one side and 'the West' on the other...(this paradigm)...creates a certain tolerance of extremism on the Pakistani streets, which counter- extremists struggle to dispel.'⁴²

Regional and Domestic Dynamics since 1979

The dramatic transformation of the regional scenario post 1979 left a lasting impact on the public perceptions in Pakistan. The Iranian revolution with its powerful anti US sentiment was an unprecedented development in modern history.⁴³ The jihad in Afghanistan invited Mujahideen from all over the world and later the defeat of a superpower in

Afghanistan gave a new life to the rhetoric of Islamic revival and renaissance.

The domestic political environment of Pakistan post 1979, was another major factor which supplemented religious radicalization. The politically motivated Islamization policy of Zia regime led to a notable rise in religious intolerance and sectarianism.⁴⁴

Education was used as a political tool to promote a particular worldview. This led to a series of changes in national curriculum which included distortion of historical narratives, factual inaccuracies, inclusion of rhetoric, hate material and glorification of war etc.⁴⁵

The militant madrasas are also a legacy of this era which changed the nature and character of this traditional institution of learning. Pakistani madrasas were extensively used for the training and recruitment of *Mujahideen* for Afghan jihad. The United States was also involved in radicalization of education in Pakistan during this time to help the cause of Afghan jihad.⁴⁶ For example, it has been reported that textbooks from USAID and University of Nebraska, promoting a militant worldview were distributed in Pakistani madrasas during the Afghan war.⁴⁷ The national education, for many years in Pakistan for various political reasons, promoted radical views which greatly influenced the minds of the subsequent generations.

The Security Paradigm

The military establishment in Pakistan has set the direction, priorities and policies of the country for most part of its history. The dominance of military establishment on country's affairs has earned it the title of a '*parallel state*'.⁴⁸ The military dominance weakened the democratic institutions in the country and undermined the authority of a constitutional state.⁴⁹ Moreover, the security paradigm created by the military got Pakistan involved first in the Cold War and then in the US War on terror. The military strategy to

support militant groups like Taliban in Afghanistan, *Harkatul Mujahideen* in Kashmir⁵⁰, empowered the non-state militant actors and created a risk for country's security by enhancing internal radicalization and inviting external intervention.

So it was a complex mix of global, regional, domestic and historical circumstances that gradually transformed the traditional conservatism of Pakistani society into hostile radicalism, which is willing to buy the extremist narratives that militant groups sell in Pakistan today.

Exploring Alternative Narratives for Pakistan

On an ideological ground, searching for an alternative paradigm for Pakistan which not only effectively counters the extremist paradigm but is also acceptable to the people requires a re-look to the original vision of Pakistan with a fresh perspective. Islam is the answer.⁵¹ The ideas of Iqbal, the man who originally visualized Pakistan, deserve special attention. Iqbal's renowned work '*The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*' offers religious ideas which are an antithesis of fixed religious ideology propagated by radicals. Iqbal presents the idea of religious dynamism asking; 'Is the law of Islam capable of evolution?'⁵² He cites the work of Horten⁵³ declaring that a *Muslim has always adjusted his religious outlook to the elements of culture.*⁵⁴

The following ideas highlighted by Iqbal in his lecture need to be highlighted in our national curriculum and political discourse;

The spirit of Islam is so broad that it is practically boundless. With the exception of atheistic ideas alone it has assimilated all the attainable ideas of surrounding peoples, and given them its own peculiar direction of development.

Iqbal has repeatedly admired and advocated the thoughts of Rumi in his work.⁵⁵ The inclusive spirit of Islam represented in Rumi's thought provides a perfect antithesis to

the exclusivist radical Islam which is plaguing the Muslim world especially Pakistan.⁵⁶ The original values of Islamic faith based on mutual respect, compassion and appreciation of the God's diverse creation must replace the exclusivist, vengeful and radical ideology professed by militant Islamists.

Jinnah's vision needs to be understood better as well.⁵⁷ Ahmed describes the conversion of Jinnah's orientation in politics during the course of his political career.⁵⁸ He credits Iqbal for this conversion stating that Iqbal gave Jinnah an entirely new dimension to his understanding of Islam. Jinnah's vision of an Islamic society was a society that was equitable, compassionate and tolerant.⁵⁹ Ahmed quotes Jinnah as saying;

In any case Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state to be ruled by priests with a divine mission. We have many non-Muslims – Hindus, Christians and Parsees – but they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other citizen and will play their rightful part in the affairs of Pakistan.⁶⁰

Fazlur Rahman⁶¹ was another powerful voice neglected in Pakistan. His work, especially 'Islam and Modernity; Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition' needs to be carefully studied by those looking for counter narratives for Pakistan. In this work Rahman contends that

At the time of its inception, Pakistan's leaders were generally highly liberal, and, while they wanted to inform their educational system with an Islamic orientation, this Islamic orientation, in their eyes, was not only tolerant but positively liberal'.⁶²

He suggests that it was Islamic education, more than Science and Technology education that demanded attention in Pakistan for '...nuclear technology could be acquired from abroad ...but Islamic thought or rather the capacity for original Islamic thought could not be acquired by Pakistanis either in a Western country or in a Muslim one.'⁶³ But

Rahman notes regretfully that as an ideological state Pakistan failed 'to create an intellectual base for itself',⁶⁴ mostly due to a lack of a milieu of intellectual freedom and an ill founded fear of applying modern research techniques to Islamic materials.⁶⁵

A number of scholars in recent years have pointed towards the need to propagate the intellectual and compassionate side of Islam in order to curb the extremist tendencies. *A Letter to Pakistan*, a manuscript by the renowned American scholar of comparative religion Karen Armstrong, specifically addresses the Pakistani people and pleads them to value and practice the compassion inherent in their religion.⁶⁶ Abdullahi Ahmed An Naim, a distinguished Professor of Law and Islamic sharia, argues that the coercive enforcement of Islam by the state or any other institution is against the Islamic principles which clearly give a free choice to man in terms of his beliefs and actions. He asserts that one can only be a Muslim by free choice not by the enforcement of state or other institutions.⁶⁷ Tariq Ramadan, a Swiss academic philosopher, who is also the grandson of Hasan al Bana of Egypt, repeatedly asserts on various forums that there is no war between Islam and the West and the militant Muslims have in fact 'hijacked' Islam.⁶⁸

Fethullah Gulen is a renowned Turkish preacher whose teachings are based on Turkish religious scholar Said Nursi's ideas. He has been actively preaching interfaith harmony, faith based education and service to humanity as key elements of Islamic practice. He inspired a worldwide movement called *Hizmet* movement (*Hizmet* means 'service' in Turkish) which played a key role in Turkey's recent social transformation.

Faith based peace building is an approach which emphasizes the role of religion in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and building peace. The religious ideas of compassion, tolerance and regard for others form the core of faith based peace building.⁶⁹ Qamar-ul-Huda , a scholar of Islamic theology and ethics at United States Institute of Peace, in a book titled 'Crescent and the Dove', focuses on contemporary Islam and peacemaking, exploring diverse

interpretations, concepts and problems in the field of Islamic peacemaking and peace building.⁷⁰ Esposito and Yilmaz examine Fetullah Gulen' opinion on freedom of thought, pluralism, secularism and democracy describing their positive impact on faith based peace-building initiatives.⁷¹

Some key local and international research institutions including United States Institute for Peace⁷² and Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies⁷³ have recently advocated the need to build peace through religion in the context of Pakistan.

There is a rich heritage of Muslim scholarship in modern times which needs to be explored, understood and promoted through media and education in Pakistan. It is only within the shared paradigm of religion that Pakistanis may be convinced to alter their radical perceptions. Counter terrorism efforts have a greater chance of success when they engage with the popular narratives; they are doomed to fail if they remain ignorant of them.⁷⁴

Conclusion

A viable long term counter terrorism strategy in Pakistan must aim to segregate the militants from the common man. The state of Pakistan in order to convincingly win the battle with the militants must challenge them in the realm of ideas. The following recommendations must be considered for this purpose;

- Education remains the key. For de-radicalization of the society the national curriculum, in general, and the Social Science curriculum in particular, must be redesigned to reduce rhetoric, develop critical thinking skills and promote the religious values of tolerance, respect for diversity and compassion.
- For this purpose the government must partner with not only religious scholars but religious intellectuals. The thoughts of Rumi and Iqbal must be studied and promoted through education and media. Faith-based

peace building must be nurtured in Pakistan to reduce radicalism in the long term.

- The electronic and print media can play an effective role to disseminate the moderate and compassionate religious ideas. Electronic media in particular should be used to promote intellectual debates and discussions. Religious scholars of international repute from all over the world should be invited for lectures and interactive sessions with Pakistani audience. The audience must include young students from universities as well as madrasas. Arranging such inclusive interactive sessions and broadcasting them to a wider audience would help people put their faith in perspective and see the broader aspects of it. The impact of extremist narratives would automatically shrink as a result.
- Social media is another medium which must be effectively utilized to reach a broader audience. The medium is already being used by the militant organizations to propagate their ideas. Instant communication and inter connectedness provided by social media can be used to form a broader forum for dialogue. Opening up to constructive discussions and dialogue alleviates the atmosphere of ignorance under which the extremists' narratives thrive.

Pakistan faces an enemy today which has cleverly borrowed from the ideological narrative of the country to promote its radical extremist worldview. The Pakistanis seem confused in a war that is fought in the name of Islam on both sides. Many seem inclined to support the extremist groups who claim to be more Islamic than the state.

A number of factors make Pakistanis vulnerable to the extremist's propaganda; extremist's claim of fighting for supremacy of sharia, the perceived and real US interference in Pakistan in addition to their insistence on continuing drone strikes, the domination of the military mindset on state policy, the regional dynamic and use of education as a political tool in Pakistan has been one of the key factors which allow the extremist narratives to flourish in Pakistan. One important

factor for the ideological success of the militant groups is the absence of alternative ideas to challenge extremist's claim on religion.

Enlightened and compassionate spirit of Islam found in the works of Rumi, Iqbal, Fazlur Rahman and many other intellectuals in the modern Muslim world must be revived. The scholarly voices within Islamic tradition must be strengthened and promoted through education and media to counter the views projected by the militants.

Notes

¹Pakistan Army's operation against the militant Islamist forces in North Waziristan (FATA) including Tehrik Taliban Pakistan, Al Qaeda and Haqqani Network, launched around mid-June 2014.

For details see <https://www.ispr.gov.pk/zarbezab>.

²See Moeed Yusuf, "a Society on the precipice? examining the prospects of Youth Radicalization in Pakistan." *Reaping the DiviDenD* (2012); Moeed Yusuf. *Prospects of Youth Radicalization in Pakistan: Implications for US Policy*. Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, 2008; Smruti S. Pattanaik "'Old' Islamists and 'New' Radicals: Understanding the Politics of Religious Radicalisation in Pakistan and its Implications." *Strategic Analysis* 35, no. 4 (2011): 581-594; Rubina Saigol, "Radicalization of State and Society in Pakistan." *Heinrich Boll Stiftung Pakistan. Retrived on November* (2010); Muhammad Amir Rana, "RADICALISATION IN PAKISTANI YOUTH." *YOUTH AND TERRORISM: A SELECTION OF ARTICLES*: 15.

³'Zarb- e- Azb' is an Arabic word, Azb was the name of the sword of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) which he used in the battle of Badar; source: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/722202/army-launches-operation-in-north-waziristan/>, June 15, 7.19 pm.

⁴Clint Lorimore, "Obama's challenge: addressing Muslim radicalization in Pakistan." (2009); Mohammad Waseem, *Patterns of Conflict in Pakistan: Implications for Policy*. Brookings Institution, 2011; Moeed Yusuf, "a Society on the precipice? examining the prospects of Youth Radicalization in Pakistan." *Reaping the DiviDenD* (2012); Yusuf, *Prospects of Youth Radicalization in Pakistan: Implications for US Policy*. Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, 2008; Pattanaik, "'Old' Islamists and 'New' Radicals: Understanding the Politics of Religious Radicalisation in Pakistan and its Implications." *Strategic Analysis* 35, no. 4 (2011): 581-594; Saigol, "Radicalization of State and Society in Pakistan." *Heinrich Boll Stiftung Pakistan. Retrived on November* (2010); Rana, "RADICALISATION IN PAKISTANI YOUTH." *YOUTH AND TERRORISM: A SELECTION OF ARTICLES*: 15.

⁵See Amil Khan *Pakistan and the Narratives of Extremism*. No. 327.US Institute Special Report, 2013; Rana, Muhammad Amir. "Counter-ideology: unanswered questions and the case of Pakistan." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 2, no. 3 (2010); Abbas, Hassan. *A profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan*. MILITARY ACADEMY WEST POINT NY COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER, 2008.

⁶ Listed in the text , p. 6-11.

⁷See Ayesha Siddiqa, "Red Hot Chilli Peppers Islam—Is the Youth in Elite Universities in Pakistan Radical?." *Paper for 'Foreign-Security Policy Series' of Heinrich Boll Stiftung* (2010): 19-20; Nazya Fiaz, "Policy Intervention in FATA: Why Discourse Matters." *Journal of Strategic Security* 5, no. 1 (2012): 49-62.

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⁹See Constructivism ; International relations , Encyclopedia Britannica . <http://www.britannica.com/topic/constructivism-international-relations> accessed June 23, 2015.

¹⁰ Hasan Askari Rizvi, " At the Brink?" in *The Future of Pakistan*. ed. Stephen P. Cohen, Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2012 : 187-192.

¹¹ Ibid

¹² Moed Yusuf , " Youth and the Future" in *The Future of Pakistan*. ed. Stephen P. Cohen, Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2012 : 264-268.

¹³ Jacob N. Shapiro and Christine Fair. "Understanding support for Islamist militancy in Pakistan." *International Security* 34, no. 3 (2010): 93.

¹⁴ Ziad Haider, "Ideologically Adrift" in *Pakistan beyond the crisis state*. ed. Maleeha Lodhi, London: Hurst & Company. 2011: 126-128.

¹⁵ Nov-Dec 1979 Seizure of Masjid al Haram in Mecca by Islamist insurgents to overthrow the House of Saud.

¹⁶ Syed Saleem Shahzad, *Inside al-Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond bin Laden and 9/11*. London: Pluto Press, 2011: 145-148.

¹⁷ Irfan Husain. *Fatal faultlines; Pakistan, Islam and the West*. New Delhi: Harper Collins. 2012: 112-114.

¹⁸ Akbar S. Ahmed, " Why Jinnah Matters" in *Pakistan beyond the crisis state*. ed. Maleeha Lodhi, London: Hurst & Company. 2011 : 21-30.

¹⁹ Javed Iqbal is a prominent intellectual in Pakistan and the son of the national poet and philosopher Muhammad Iqbal.

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- ³⁵ A title earned by Pakistan during the Afghan war of 1980s.
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