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# **OPINION**

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**A JOURNAL OF THE  
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**NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY, PAKISTAN**

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Chief Editor, OPINION  
Armed Forces War College  
National Defence University  
Sector E-9, Islamabad  
Pakistan  
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## MESSAGE OF PATRON



The depth of knowledge and maturity of thought is a hard earned end-state of one's professional and personal undertakings. The real benefit of such an end-state is accrued at the rung of policy and strategy formulation. Pakistan's challenges have become very complex and diverse; necessitating continuous reflection and analysis. During the year long intellectual and professional pursuits at Armed Forces War College (AFWC), members engage in an unparalleled activity of researching on host of issues including global and regional affairs, internal dynamics and defence and security. These studies are presented in the shape of seminars, military history presentations, strategic thoughts and theories, evolutionary process of modern day strategy and operational art, which provide frames of reference for the future leaders.

I am extremely happy to see that research work and quality efforts of the faculty and participants of NSWC 2012-2013 is now being documented for the first time in the form of an e-Journal of AFWC (OPINION). The aim is to benefit a larger group of researchers and scholars, further improve the standard of research and consequently enhance the knowledge base of the future leadership of Pakistan. I congratulate all participants of NSWC 2012-13, the faculty and the editorial board for a job well done. Also my special thanks to ISSRA and FCS for being forthcoming through their quality inputs and in making OPINION a more valuable production. And I am grateful to President NDU for providing an enabling environment for meaningful intellectual pursuits.

**Major General Javed Iqbal HI(M)**  
**Commandant, Armed Forces War College**  
**NDU, Islamabad**

## CHIEF EDITOR'S CORNER

Welcome to the *Premier Issue* of the Pakistan Armed Forces War College (AFWC) Journal (OPINION). An initiative and vision of the Commandant AFWC with the view to documenting the research work of members of the course and making it available for larger readership. I take great pride for being part of this maiden effort that has brought us to this stage of academic development that now we have the AFWC journal available on our NDU web Site.

And now on the contents of this maiden issue, the research work of the panels has been arranged into four distinct parts. Part-1 covers the global/regional issues; Part-2 discusses the national security aspects, while the third part focuses on the military strategy. The last part highlights the views of individual writers on current challenges that we confront today vis-à-vis needs of the domestic / global policy constructs.

From here on, I am confident that as we move forward, the research work reflected in the OPINION would continue to develop and subsequent issues of this journal would contribute effectively within the academic circles.

Finally, happy reading and all the best until next time to all our readers.

**Commodore Muhammad Shafique TI(M)**  
**Chief Editor OPINION**  
**AFWC Journal**

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## **PART – 1**

### **Global / Regional Issues**

- South and Central Asia
- Al Qaeda and the Muslim World
- Coercive Statecraft
- Rising India - A Critical Appraisal
- Rising Powers and Global Balance of Power
- Arab Uprising – A Critical Appraisal

## **SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA**

### **Introduction**

The regions of South and Central Asia share a rich historical legacy, that stretches back several millennia to at least 1500 BC, and have interacted over centuries until it was interrupted by the competition for dominance over the area between the British and Russian Empires. In the world of interdependency, the need for cooperation between South Asia and Central Asia is reinforced by the common challenges faced by the two regions. These challenges are threat of terrorism and extremism, narco-trade, economic development, rising demand of energy in South Asia and need for diversification of trade and energy export of Central Asia. Working together, the two regions stand a better chance to meet these challenges. However, good neighbourly relations between Pakistan and India, and peace and stability in Afghanistan are pivotal to building linkages between South and Central Asia.

### **Aim**

To identify the prospective areas of cooperation between South and Central Asia, focusing on economy, energy and security, with a view to bringing out opportunities and challenges for Pakistan.

### **Scope**

The paper will encompass following major aspects:-

- Geo-strategic Perspective and Inter-regional Cooperation
- Economic and Energy Cooperation
- Regional Peace and Security
- Role of External Players and Organizations
- Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan
- Recommendations

## **GEO-STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE AND INTER-REGIONAL COOPERATION**

Rudyard Kipling is reported to have observed in 1901 that the “fate of the great game in Central Asia would be won by the country that succeeded in building the largest network of railroads”. In the contemporary version of this great game, pipelines appear to have replaced the railway network in strategic significance.<sup>1</sup>

### **Geo-Strategic Perspective**

The South and Central Asian region has a combined land area of nearly nine million square kilometers. Besides lying at the fulcrum of Asia, region also derives its strategic significance from the fact that it borders two of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council – China and Russia. South Asia comprises eight countries Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The region is home to around one-fourth of the world population and has an area of five million square kilometers. Its geo-strategic salience is supported by proximity to resource rich Persian Gulf, Central Asia and rising China, control over important sea routes in Indian Ocean, access to warm waters of Arabian Sea for Central Asia, emerging economies of the region and large consumer market and current security dynamics in Afghanistan. Central Asia consists of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The region has an area of four million square kilometers. The economic significance of region has

added to its geo-strategic importance. The salient aspects are; huge oil and gas reserves in the region, transportation hub for gas and oil pipelines and communication corridors, especially connecting China and Russia and located at the crossroads between Asia and Europe.

### **Inter-Regional Cooperation**

In this world of increasing interdependence under the tide of globalization, no country is in a position to achieve the goal of economic development without cooperation from other countries. South Asia is experiencing a demographic boom. South Asian countries receive bulk of their oil imports travelling over sea routes. From a pragmatic perspective, natural resources of Central Asian Republics (CARs) present next-door sources of energy for South Asian countries. Similarly, the land-locked countries of Central Asia would benefit greatly from accessing Arabian Sea ports. From the security perspective, both the regions face host of challenges to include security situation in Afghanistan, terrorism, border security and flow of opiates. The nature of these threats is trans-national and certainly warrants an integrated response.

### **Greater Central Asia Concept**

With the underlying idea of integrating South and Central Asia, the two opinions about this concept are noteworthy **firstly**; improving connectivity between South and Central Asia is a key element of the concept of a “Greater Central Asia”. The two regions are, or can become, a single integrated unit committed to economic growth.<sup>2</sup> **Secondly**, in January 2006, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced reorganization of the US State Department’s South Asia Bureau to include the Central Asian states, and a new US “Greater Central Asia” scheme.<sup>3</sup>

### **Significance of Pakistan in Inter-Regional Cooperation**

Significance of Pakistan is best illustrated by a well-known Indian scholar, Raja Mohan, who writes, “Whether we like it or not, normalization of relations with Pakistan holds the key to a successful ‘Look West’ policy. Whether it is in gaining overland access to Afghanistan and Central Asia, ensuring India’s energy security, expanding ties with the Gulf, or limiting the threat of Islamic extremism and terrorism in the subcontinent, cooperation with Pakistan is essential”.<sup>4</sup> Pakistan serves as a bridge between South and Central Asia providing the shortest access to the sea for all landlocked countries of Central Asia. The country also serves as a natural gateway for India to Central Asia.

## **ECONOMIC AND ENERGY COOPERATION**

There are good prospects in the South and Central Asian region for regional economic cooperation in the fields of energy and trade which will help in bringing robust growth of economic activity throughout the region.

### **Potential of CARs**

**Economic Growth.** The economies of CARs have grown steadily over the years primarily due to the returns from their natural resources. The GDP growth rate of CARs in 2011 is indicative of the economic growth of these countries:-

<b>Country</b>	<b>GDP growth Rate (%)</b>	<b>World Ranking</b>
Kazakhstan	6.5	35
Turkmenistan	9.9	4
Uzbekistan	7.1	18
Kyrgyzstan	7	24
Tajikistan	6	46

*Source: CIA World Fact book 2012.*

**Energy Reserves.** Central Asian region has the third largest global reserves of oil and gas. The region's oil and gas production in 2011 was:-

Country	Oil Production World Ranking	Oil Production (bb)	Gas Production World Rankin	Gas Production (m <sup>3</sup> )
Kazakhstan	11	30,000,000,000	14	2,407,000,000,000
Turkmenistan	44	600,000,000	6	7,504,000,000,000
Uzbekistan	47	594,000,000	19	1,841,000,000,000
Kyrgyzstan	81	40,000,000	90	5,663,000,000
Tajikistan	88	12,000,000	91	5,663,000,000

Source: CIA World Fact book 2012.

**Mineral Resources.** Besides oil and gas, Central Asian region is blessed with rich reserves of minerals. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are major producers of Uranium; together they produce 20% of the world's uranium ore.<sup>5</sup> Region also has huge reserves of coal. Kyrgyzstan has eighth largest goldmine in the world. Tajikistan has good potential for aluminium export.

**Hydropower Resources.** Tajikistan is the largest producer of hydroelectricity in Central Asia. Its estimated potential is 40,000 MW.<sup>6</sup> Kyrgyzstan is the second largest hydropower. It has a potential of producing 26,000 MW.

### Energy Profile in South Asia

**Pakistan's Energy Matrix.** Energy consumption in Pakistan has grown by almost 80% over the past 15 years.<sup>7</sup> Since 2006/07 country is facing serious energy shortage. Currently, the estimated cost of power crisis to the economy is approximately Rs. 380 billion per year, around 2% of GDP.<sup>8</sup> Around 38% of population is without modern **electricity services**.<sup>9</sup> There is a shortage in access of 5000 MW in summers. In the winters of 2011/12, Pakistan faced a **gas shortage** of around 1.1 billion cubic feet per day.<sup>10</sup> Pakistan imported 68.1% of its **oil demand** during 2010-11.<sup>11</sup>

**Indian Energy Matrix.** Being the sixth largest energy consumer in the world, India's crude imports are expected to double in a decade.<sup>12</sup> India imports 70% of its oil demand and about one third of natural gas.<sup>13</sup> India is likely to become the largest coal importer in 2020s.<sup>14</sup> Around 25% of Indian population is without electricity.<sup>15</sup>

**Afghanistan.** Access to public electricity supply is limited to about 16% of the population in Afghanistan.

### Existing Economic Cooperation

**Pakistan.** The current volume of trade Between Pakistan and CARs is just 0.1% of the total trade of Pakistan.<sup>16</sup> To institutionalize cooperation, Pakistan has established joint economic commissions with all CARs. The National Bank of Pakistan has branches in Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. **Tajikistan** currently imports most of its cement from Pakistan. Pakistan and Tajikistan have also eased travel restrictions.<sup>17</sup>

**Uzbek** President signed four agreements and six Memoranda of Understanding with Pakistan during his visit in 2006, to expand economic cooperation. In 1995, an agreement

among Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan and China (Almaty-Bishkek-Kashgar-Karakorum-Islamabad-Karachi network) on traffic-in transit was signed and is operative since 2006.<sup>18</sup> Currently, it is not functioning due to blockage of Karakorum Highway.

**India.** India currently has only around \$400 million trade with CARs which accounts for merely 0.1% of total volume of Indian trade.<sup>19</sup> Its cooperation with **Uzbekistan** includes Indo-Uzbek Centre for promotion of Scientific and Technological Cooperation, Jawaharlal Nehru IT Centre in Tashkent, and purchase of six Uzbek-manufactured IL-78 air-to-air refuelling aircraft including repair agreement. With **Kazakhstan**, India has joint ventures and investment in the oil and natural gas sectors and collaboration in textile industry.<sup>20</sup> In **Tajikistan**, India has built a hospital cum military base in Farkhor and has also constructed an airfield at Ayni. In 2006, five documents were signed for cooperation in energy, trade, security, science, technology and culture. In 2009, India announced plans for investment of \$16 million in the cement industry and \$12 million to develop gas fields.

**TAPI.** Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan signed an agreement in 2002 for transmission of Turkmen gas. India later joined this project in 2008.<sup>21</sup> The estimated cost of project is \$7.6 billion which has been promised by ADB. The pipeline will be 1,680 kilometres long and will transit 90 million cubic meters gas per day for 30 years and will become operational by 2018.<sup>22</sup>

**CASA – 1000 Project.** Initiated in 2006, CASA-1000 would transmit 1300 MW electricity from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan (300 MW) and Pakistan (1000 MW). The starting date for the project is 2014 and is likely to be completed within five years.<sup>23</sup> As per estimates the project would cost \$873 million.<sup>24</sup>

## **Infrastructural Development**

**Existing Infrastructure.** There has been a strong emphasis on investments in transport infrastructure in the region. The recent developments include a \$36 million US-funded bridge which opened in 2007 over the Panj River between Tajikistan and Afghanistan.<sup>25</sup> In Afghanistan, the 2700 kilometers ring road connecting all major cities is near completion. The work on its last section of 233 kilometers started in August 2012.<sup>26</sup> China-Tajikistan highway across Kulma Pass has been developed.<sup>27</sup> This road joins with the existing Almaty – Karachi route. Additionally, the Gwadar deep sea port has doubled the capacity of Pakistani oceanic trade and also reduced the distances by approximately 500 kilometers for Pakistan-Central Asia traffic.

**Proposed Transport Corridors / Routes.** Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan have agreed on a route of 1,306 kilometers connecting Pakistan with Tajikistan through Afghanistan from Chitral. Revival of old Silk Route was first propounded by ex Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto during visit to CARs in mid 1990s. However, lately US has reinvigorated the proposal by terming it as ‘New Silk Road’ (CARs – Afghanistan – Pakistan – India). As regards rail network, the transport links with Central Asia need to be supplemented by the railway. The Pakistan – India link can be extended via Afghanistan to CARs. Pakistan has already announced development of rail link from Chaman to Spin Boldak.

## **Challenges to Economic and Energy Cooperation**

**Political and Security Factors.** The most important among the factors which inhibit inter-regional cooperation relate to the political and security issues including prolonged political tension between India and Pakistan and war like conditions in Afghanistan.

**Constraints to Trade and Transit.** Besides political and security factors, few identified constraints to trade and transit can be divided into three categories i.e. **Physical Constraints** including insufficiently developed inter-regional infrastructure and high infrastructural development costs. The **Policy Constraints** are restrictive trade policies, different transit and tariff policies of countries in the region and lack of proper legal and regulatory systems. Similarly inadequately harmonized trade and customs procedures, insufficient port capacity on the borders, lack of transparency and corruption, poor border management, large informal or illegal sector, a weak private sector and absence of vital services<sup>28</sup> are some of the **Institutional Constraints**.

### **Emerging Favourable Environment**

**Economic Development and Trends.** Despite the above constraints, the economic development and certain trends, both at the global and regional levels, create favourable environment to strive for better inter-regional cooperation. The quest for economic development and rising energy / trade pursuits has forced the governments to look for new avenues.<sup>29</sup>

**Indo-Pak Economic Relations.** In the recent past there have been series of discussions between the two countries to improve bilateral trade arrangements.

**Pak-Afghan Cooperation.** Over \$2.5 billion<sup>30</sup> trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan and replacement of Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA) of 1965 with Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) in 2011 are the significant indicators in improved Pak-Afghan cooperation. Under new agreement, Afghan goods are being exported to India.

### **Economic Cooperation Potential**

The analysis of economic dynamics of both the regions brings forth a number of prospective areas of cooperation. CARs are energy rich, whereas South Asian countries like India and Pakistan, and also Afghanistan are energy-deficit. Tajikistan and Kyrgyz Republic have large surplus generation in spring and summer and supply deficits in winter due to lack of fossil fuels. The export of electricity could be a key driver of their economic growth. Rising demand for coal in India and its availability in Central Asia create another area for trade. Collaboration in the field of cotton with Uzbekistan can be beneficial for South Asian countries.

## **REGIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY**

**Afghan Situation.** Afghanistan, the main hotbed of conflict over the past several decades, is the main source of regional instability. The peace and stability in Afghanistan remain elusive in the foreseeable future due to host of factors.

**Situation in South Asia.** The deep rooted hostility between India and Pakistan is a key reason behind prevailing regional insecurity in South Asia. The quest for regional stability is further shadowed by Indian attitude towards other smaller nations of South Asia.

**Internal Dynamics of CARs.** When becoming sovereign in 1991, the newly independent states of Central Asia proclaimed as their strategic goal the transformation into free democratic societies

based on market economy and integrated in the international community. However, confronted with the authoritarian legacy of the former regimes, with the challenges of simultaneous multi-faceted transition in political, economic and social areas, and with waves of instability resulting from violent ethnic, religious and social conflicts, CARs have had enormous difficulties in making headway towards these goals.<sup>31</sup> The rise of Islamist forces in the post-Arab Spring transition in the Middle East and North Africa may have an impact on CARs. With countries like Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan ranked among the world's worst violators of basic freedoms, the region is feeling the impact of the revolts in the Arab world.<sup>32</sup>

**Militancy in Central Asia.** The Ferghana Valley, which runs through the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, is a region with significant conflict potential, where radical Islamic groups have stepped up their presence due to counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan and FATA.<sup>33</sup> The main organizations carrying out militant activities in Ferghana Valley are the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and an offshoot called the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU).

**Militant Organizations.** Militant organizations in South and Central Asian region pose a critical threat to the national and regional security. The militant groups have shown the capacity to shift their focus from one hotspot to another closely following the regional flash points.<sup>34</sup>

**Miscellaneous Issues.** Some of the other regional issues include ethnicity, sub-nationalism, nexus between criminal gangs and militant organizations, narco-trade and smuggling.

## **Security Outline**

A scrutiny of the security situation in the region indicates that a stable and peaceful Afghanistan is crucial for regional peace and also for desired cooperation between the two regions. Continuing bilateral conflicts in South Asia affect the regional stability and will hamper creation of enabling environment towards building cooperation with Central Asia. In order to avoid further deterioration of the situation, with a real risk of social explosion, political collapse and outbreak of large-scale violence, CARs need to proceed with profound reforms in order to move towards good governance, political transformation and social stability, though CARs have tried to formulate structures for multilateral cooperation in order to deal with trans-national threats. Issues of militant organizations and extremism necessitate development of an integrated response. To help combat various trans-national threats, there is a need to consider the initiatives like intelligence sharing, better border monitoring measures, extradition treaties and joint investigation mechanisms.

## **ROLE OF EXTERNAL PLAYERS AND ORGANIZATIONS**

### **US Interests**

US interests in Afghanistan appear to be security-driven in the short term and economic in the medium to long term. One of the principal reasons the US would like to stay in Afghanistan is its strategic location.<sup>35</sup> US wants to implement drawdown plan by 2014 after a semblance of peace in Afghanistan. However, US will continue efforts towards achieving peace and stability by virtue of her stay beyond 2014 with an enhanced Indian cooperation. Pak-US relations are passing through a turbulent phase, however, both realize the importance of cooperation for peace and stability. Strategic partnership with India is aimed at maximizing US interests in the region, mainly countering China, which further complicates the geo-political situation. Indo-US nuclear deal disturbs the balance of power in South Asia. US aim of diversification of export avenues of CARs is to break Russia's monopoly over energy sector and minimize their dependence on SCO / China.<sup>36</sup> For USA, promoting economic interests in Central Asia is based on what might be termed

an 'equal access' policy for American firms seeking energy exploration and marketing<sup>37</sup> and keeping a check on Iran due to nuclear factor.

### **Russian Interests**

Russia supports peace and stability in Afghanistan, however, is wary of long term US presence. It wants to retain her monopoly on the resources of Central Asian region. Through CSTO, Russia aspires to maintain her influence in the region and also collectively tackle the fallout of Afghan situation. Recent overtures to Pakistan are indicative of her desire to play a more assertive role in Post-2014 Afghanistan and also be part of any regional economic arrangement.

### **Chinese Interests**

China continues to follow the policy of peaceful rise, nonetheless, acts proactively to mitigate security threats emanating from the region. It has adopted a multi-lateral strategy in South Asia by improving relations, mainly economic, with all countries of the region and has grown her signatures in Indian Ocean littoral states of South Asia. It keeps a cautious eye on US attempts of her 'strategic encirclement'. China is now a serious competitor in the previously Russian dominated energy market of Central Asia. Most of the oil / gas pipelines from Central Asia are now running to China where it is also a leading investor. China is on the path to diversify her energy sources in view of rising dynamics of Indian Ocean. It is broadening relations with Afghanistan and also investing heavily there which will gradually increase her stakes / leverage.

### **Role of Regional Organizations**

**Regional Organizations.** Countries of South and Central Asia are part of regional organizations such as SAARC, ECO and SCO. However, the level of cooperation is below potential. Since regional peace and prosperity is affected by Afghan situation, a regional effort is necessary to play a proactive role in Afghanistan. Sincere efforts are needed by SAARC members to vitalize the organization and also implement SAFTA through fast-track measures for effective inter-regional cooperation. The main challenge for ECO Member States is to build a collective will and cooperate on the basis of mutuality of benefits. SCO, with all main players within its fold, wields maximum influence in the region as an organization.

**Implications on Inter-Regional Cooperation.** A further analysis of the interests of various players, both individually as well as through existing organizations, highlights certain diverse interests with regards to cooperation between South and Central Asia. The prominent ones are:-

- US favours a better cooperation between the two regions. Her long term presence in Afghanistan will increase her influence on the regional dynamics.
- Russia wants to retain her erstwhile control over energy resources of Central Asia; nevertheless, visualizing the inevitability of southwards opening of CARs, has decided to be part of it. Yet, predominantly it remains Central Asia oriented.
- China probably views the economic development of both the regions as complementary to her own objectives.
- Indian investments in Iranian infrastructure do not go along with the envisioned cooperation between South and Central Asia. Iran, a member / observer of all organizations, appears to have differing aspirations with regards to cooperation between South and Central Asia.

- All the regional organizations aim to improve cooperation between the member states, however, with respect to fomenting integration between South and Central Asia, SAARC and SCO could drive the cause better collectively. However, in view of the past successes, SCO has the biggest potential to bring to realization the integration between two regions. Views of influential players about ECO relegate its place in this context. While agreeing to the idea that all these organizations could function in their own right, the member states need to find out a mechanism to put the things on right track.

## **CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR PAKISTAN**

### **Challenges**

**Afghan Crisis.** The major challenge is worsening security situation in Afghanistan. Being the direct and largest affectee of Afghan situation, Pakistan faces a serious challenge on the western borders.

**Indo- Pak Rivalry.** Indo-Pak rivalry is another stumbling block in not only integrating South and Central Asia but more seriously within South Asia. Its various dimensions with respect to the subject under discussion could be:-

- Negative competition in Central Asian markets will be detrimental to both.
- Any race in Afghanistan will run tangent to the peace efforts.
- Without genuine implementation of SAFTA, real progress towards integrating both the regions will be difficult.
- Indian meddling in Balochistan with repercussions on providing CARs access to Gwadar port.
- Agreement between India, Iran and Afghanistan on the margins of NAM summit in Tehran in August 2012 to promote an ambitious trilateral economic partnership.<sup>38</sup>

**External Factors.** Few challenges posed by the interests of external players are:-

- Indo-US collaboration, including nuclear deal, and anti-China strategy.
- US long term stay in Afghanistan due to resultant implications on Pak-US relations and internal stability.
- Russian aspirations to retain her influence over CARs.
- Though Pak-Russia relations are improving, these are still far from friendly.
- Possible competition with Iran (Gwadar vs Chabahar).
- A viable mechanism to achieve inter-regional cooperation.

**Additional Challenges.** Few other challenges are:-

- Evaluation of trade terms with India – implications of granting MFN status.
- Existing constraints to economic and energy cooperation in the fields of physical, institutional and policy measures.
- Development of communication infrastructure linking Gwadar.
- Regional approach to address the problem of militant organizations.
- Border security issues.

## **Opportunities**

**Regional Context.** In the regional context, major opportunities are:-

- Using the SCO's platform, a proactive regional role can be mustered for peace and stability in Afghanistan.
- Pakistan provides the shortest routes from Central Asia to the sea ports coupled with an enhanced cargo capacity at Gwadar.
- Pakistan's membership and association of all regional organizations lends us a unique position to facilitate inter-regional cooperation.
- Being member of SAARC and ECO, Pakistan could facilitate the extension of ECO's Transit Transport Framework Agreement to South Asia.
- CASA-1000 and TAPI can create a track-record to enhance inter-regional cooperation.
- APTTA can be extended to all CARs.
- Transport corridor of Almaty-Karachi road has the potential to attract the attention of CARs.
- The already agreed Pak-Afghan-Tajik route can become a trade corridor.
- Inter-regional trade will generate lot of transit revenues.

**Bilateral Context.** Following are the major opportunities for Pakistan:-

- Indian growing energy demands have strengthened Pakistan's prospect of serving as a trade and energy corridor. Indo-Pak cooperation in trade and energy sector can facilitate both countries in terms of socio-economic development and promotion of peace and stability in the region.
- There is vast scope for economic cooperation between Central Asia and Pakistan. Pakistan can import various natural resources and, in return, can offer assistance in the areas of banking, textiles, footwear, sports, hydropower, construction, agricultural products, hotel industry and pharmaceuticals.
- We can offer services of NADRA, other education and training facilities.
- Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan offer more opportunities for joint industrial ventures.
- Pakistan's expertise in defence equipment offers another opportunity.
- Central Asia presents lot of avenues for the role of private sector.

**Possible Scenarios.** Given various internal and external drivers, few scenarios which could emerge in the context of inter-regional cooperation in 10 – 15 years timeframe are:-

**Scenario – 1 (Most Likely).** ‘No war and no peace’ like situation persists in Afghanistan. The efforts to effect inter-regional cooperation will bear partial results. CASA-1000 is likely to materialize, while TAPI remains in doldrums; trade may increase by 20 – 30% from the current level. The Iranian route will fetch better trading activity for CARs. However, the Almaty – Karachi route will also pick up motion. Though Gwadar port will enhance its operational capacity, true potential will not be actualized without opening of trade routes for CARs.

**Scenario – 2 (Most Desired).** Better peace and stability in Afghanistan will give impetus to the inter-regional cooperation in trade and energy cooperation. With infrastructural development completed, most of the constraints and security threats largely mitigated, the trade volume may go as high as 100%. The TAPI project, besides CASA-1000, will materialize. By virtue of Gwadar port running at full capacity, Pakistan will serve as the main trading route for CARs.

**Scenario - 3 (Most Dangerous).** Despite improved infrastructural development in Pakistan and Central Asia, the inter-regional cooperation and all projects will be stalemated by the worsening security situation in Afghanistan. Iranian routes will pick up more trade traffic from Central Asia.

#### **Rider Clauses**

- US, though with reduced combat role, will continue staying in Afghanistan.
- China will become a leading investor and foreign stakeholder in Afghanistan.
- Pak-Russia relations continue to improve.
- Core issues between Pakistan and India remain unresolved; however, trade improves gradually with a cautious Pakistani undertone. Indian involvement in Balochistan etc is largely dropped.

### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **Peace and Security**

- With the Chinese and Russian support, under the banner of SCO, Pakistan should mobilize efforts to achieve reconciliation in Afghanistan.
- Pakistan should engage more proactively with all Afghan factions.
- In Indo-Pak context, Pakistan should increase her leverage over India by providing trade / energy transit as it may afford an opportunity to narrow the trust deficit and help advancing towards resolution of chronic disputes.
- Mechanism should be found for sharing intelligence among countries and developing a regional approach to deal with the militant organization.
- Countries of both the regions should enter into bilateral / multilateral treaties on extradition and also formulate a joint investigation mechanism.

- Effective border management is required to increase the costs for criminal activity, smuggling and narco-trade.
- Capitalizing on the long term US interests in the region, Pakistan should seek active US involvement in achieving inter-regional cooperation.
- Pakistan should continue pursuing membership of SCO.

### **Economic and Energy Cooperation**

- To ensure trade facilitation, it is required to harmonize tariffs and customs, improve coordination between border enforcement agencies, increase port capacity at borders, institute legal and regulatory system and relaxation in visa restrictions.
- CARs may be engaged for extension of APTTA to Central Asia.
- More effective use should be made of the existing Task Forces on Regional Energy and Electricity Cooperation.
- Joint industrial ventures may be initiated with CARs, especially Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
- With governmental encouragement, Pakistani entrepreneurs can set up industrial units in CARs.
- Increase the participation of private sector in trade / business.
- Bilateral cooperation should be enhanced in services, education and culture.
- Enlarged mandate of SCO may be exploited for achieving greater inter-regional cooperation.

### **Infrastructural Development**

- It may be more appropriate to collectively identify particular transport corridors where maximum countries could benefit.
- Already tested Almaty – Karachi route should be utilized for trade with Central Asia as well as China. Its current blockage at Hunza and future expansion needs attention.
- Construction of infrastructure linking Gwadar port with inland networks needs no emphasis.
- Efforts be geared up to construct jointly agreed Pak-Afghan-Tajik route.
- Expansion and improvement of existing railway network is essential for cheaper trade.

**Formulation of Regional Body / Mechanism.** There is a need to allay the fears of some of the regional states and formulate a separate mission-specific regional body and mechanism, with members from all states of South and Central Asia.

### **Meeting External Challenges**

- All stakeholders should be taken on board before a final decision is taken on the trade terms with India.
- Extra efforts are required to build Pak-Russia relations, in line with the national interests.
- Iran needs to be engaged through bilateral as well as regional arrangement to ward off any competition between Gwadar and Chabahar.

### **Regional Organizations**

- ECO should be made more effective by capitalizing on the already treaded path based on the principle of mutuality of benefits.
- **Reorganizing SAARC.** The countries of South Asia should implement SAFTA and animate SAARC, including mandating it to resolve disputes.

## Conclusion

The fact of the matter is that unless the security matrix is improved and persisting conflicts are resolved, the complementary synergies between the Central and South Asian regions cannot be successfully harnessed. These synergies are centered on the creation of a cooperative economic, energy and security grid. Another reality is that improved economic activity contributes towards regional peace and stability. It is beyond doubt that inter-regional cooperation in all its manifestations will present immense opportunities to Pakistan.

*Researchers:* Chaudhry Zafar Amin, Cdre Raja Qamar, Brig Gen Shamsher (Nepal) and Lt Col Shahbaz  
*Supervisor:* Cdre Hamid Hussain

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## AL QAEDA AND THE MUSLIM WORLD

### Introduction

Brand name Al Qaeda continues to haunt the world since last two decades. It is evading its elimination despite employment of the World's collective war effort. Anti Al Qaeda war effort led by US has yet not been able to evolve a consensus policy and strategy to eradicate Al Qaeda's co-opting strategy. Al Qaeda, though weak, has still managed to widen the gap between Muslims and the West. Furthermore, its ingress in the literate Muslim community is evident from the availability of pro Al Qaeda literature in libraries and internet.

This twenty three year old religious militant organization, despite losing its top leadership, masterminds and hard-core militants, is still simmering in Muslim world waiting for its re-emergence. In last two decades, Al Qaeda has been successful in selling their brand through their ideology as the most inspirational militant organization. Most of its co-opted militant organizations in different parts of the world draw strength for just being associated to them. This article is aimed at analyzing the evolution of Al Qaeda and its impact on the Muslim world in general and Pakistan in particular, so as to draw pertinent recommendations.

### Evolution of Al Qaeda

#### Genesis

Al Qaeda, meaning "the base", was created in 1989 in Afghanistan. Bin Laden himself had security training from the US and its allies. After differences with Saudi government in 1991, Al Qaeda leadership moved to Sudan where they operated until forced out under world pressure in 1996. Al Qaeda's limited choice could only select friendly Taliban led Afghanistan for pursuance of their Ideology. Afghanistan remained their operational base until late 2001 when US campaign in Afghanistan dispersed them in Pak-Afghan border area and remaining Muslim world. Al Qaeda is a loosely knit organization; which operates across continents as a chain of interlocking networks with little more than shared aims, ideas and methods, with high degree of autonomy.

#### Evolution of Al Qaeda's Ideology<sup>1</sup>

To understand the mindset of Al Qaeda's volunteers one must appreciate their belief system and the group's ideology, which as per them was based on *Islam and pursuit of Jihad*. Its founding ideologues include *Ibn Taymiyyah* and later *Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab* who claimed that Islam was corrupted a generation or so after the death of Holy Prophet (MPBUH) and professed "*bringing back the purity in Islam*". *Abdul Ala Maududi* was the first to instrumentalize the concept of "*Jihad in a political context*"<sup>2</sup>. *Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb* developed the idea further in the Middle East, primarily against Israel and the Jews. Conceptualization of Jihad was marked by "*Takfir*" whereby willingness to kill apostate was propagated declaring western civilization the enemy of Islam and denouncing leaders of Muslim nations for not following Islam closely enough. Jihad as a political concept returned to Asia with the influx of Arab mujahideen to Afghanistan from 1979 onwards where Abdullah Azzam conceptualized it in a struggle to defeat Soviets. Later, to legitimize Al Qaeda's campaign against US and West, Osama based his arguments on selective choice from his mentor's writing. One of the key reasons why Osama and Abdullah Azzam parted ways in the late 1980s

was the latter's firm contention that terrorism was not an acceptable act. At that point Egyptian veterans of the Afghan campaign were planning to turn to terrorism on their return home, and having lived in Egypt Azzam understood the implications of their decision. As an activist as much as an ideologue, Osama and subsequent mentors (*al-Zawahiri, al-Turabi, Omar Sheikh*) developed and broadened the appeal of Al Qaeda's ideology to attract the widest possible support.

### Aims and Objectives of Al Qaeda<sup>3</sup>


Aims and objectives of Al Qaeda are:-

- Unite all Muslims and re-establish an Islamic Caliphate.
- Topple pro-Western dictatorships around the Middle East.
- Remove American military, economic and cultural influence from the Middle East and Islamic countries.
- Destroy Israel.

### Organization and Hierarchy

It seems that although there is a prominent operational activity of affiliated loose entities, Al Qaeda's role as the operational center for "Global Jihad" is still surviving and waiting for re-emergence.<sup>4</sup>

Al Qaeda's infrastructure is the main factor which enabled it to absorb the setbacks after 9/11 attacks. Organogram of Al Qaeda is given in the figure below and its main components are Amir, Deputy, Command Council and six committees<sup>5</sup>.



## **Psychological Operations**

Al Qaeda terrorist network have conducted a sophisticated public relations and media campaign over last ten years. Al Qaeda has been able to seize the power of Web to spawn an army of online followers who will prolong Al Qaeda's war against the West long after its demise<sup>6</sup>.

Al Qaeda's media production arm, As-Sahab<sup>7</sup>, produces professionally edited documentaries or television news broadcasts that are distributed by Al-Fajr, the group's online media organization, to major militant websites. There are now thousands of members on the exclusive online password-protected chat rooms. It also published "Inspire - English translated magazine" aimed at US and western readers.

Besides satellite television and the Internet, Al Qaeda also uses low-tech methods of distribution of audiotapes, written sermons, and CDs or DVDs<sup>8</sup>.

## **Al Qaeda Today**

Osama bin Laden was replaced by Ayman al Zawahri after his assassination in Pakistan on May 2, 2011 by US Navy SEALs in a Central Intelligence Agency led "Operation Neptune Spear". The killing though a huge blow to the organization, yet could not affect its decentralized structure, which still has the potential to re-emerge due to its connectivity and cohesion with local segments in different regions.

## **Chronology of Major Events**

The chronology of attacks committed by Al Qaeda and its affiliates is as under<sup>9</sup>:-

### **Attacks by Al Qaeda**

- Al-Qaeda's first attack in Aden, Yemen targeting American soldiers – 29 Dec 1992
- Attack on World Trade Centre - 1993
- Attack on US Embassies in East Africa - 1998
- Bombing of USS Cole - Oct 2000
- Attacks in mainland USA – 09 Sep 2001
- Bali bombing - 2002
- London bombings on trains and bus service – 09 Jul 2005

### **Attacks by Pakistani Affiliates**

- Two attacks on ex-President Pervez Musharraf - 2003
- Spate of attacks in Pakistan (post 2003) against military and civilian targets resulting into over 40,000 deaths, including ex PM Benazir Bhutto and senior Military / Police Officers.
- Attacks on,

- Police Training Centres
- GHQ
- Mehran Naval Base
- Kamra Air Base
- Malala Yousafzai

## IMPACT OF AL QAEDA ON MUSLIM WORLD

### Al Qaeda's Footprints in Muslim World

In two decades Al Qaeda tried to infiltrate in as many Muslim countries as possible by exploiting various fault lines. Generally, Al Qaeda had been successful in initial acceptance; however, in most of the countries as soon as its devastations and actual agenda became obvious, it started losing public support. At present, most of the bases of Al Qaeda are destroyed, many leaders either captured or killed, assets frozen and has severely degraded their ability to conduct large scale 9/11 type attacks. Al Qaeda is relegated to producing propaganda for guidance and inspiration for other extremist elements through media and internet. More emphasis is now on small scale operations by self-indoctrinated operators or through affiliates and associate groups. However, the core group could re-emerge if the international pressure is eased.

### Current Hot Spots

**Yemen.** Yemen was selected as an alternate base for Sudan and Afghanistan by Osama bin Laden due to its extremely strategic location. In wake of 2011 Yemeni revolution, Ansar al-Sharia (insurgent wing of AQAP) began to seize control of areas in Jaar, Abyan and surrounding governorates and declaring them an Islamic Emirate. There was heavy fighting with the Yemeni security forces and Ansar al-Sharia was driven out of most of their territory with assistance from local tribes and US military advisers/ drones<sup>10</sup>. However, AQAP's ability to launch asymmetric attacks still remains.

**Somalia.** In Somalia Al Qaeda enjoys strong ties with Harkat al Shabab al Mujahideen (Al Shabab) which in February 2012 officially pledged loyalty (Moktar Ali Zubeyr "Godane") to Al Qaeda. In Somalia strong counter terrorism operations duly supported by external forces are in progress including cutting financial resources of Al Shabab by blocking and disrupting financial hub of Kismayo.

**Mali.** AQIM emerged in 2006 from the remnants of Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). In 2007, Ayman al-Zawahri announced a "blessed union" between various Al Qaeda affiliated groups in declaring France and US an enemy<sup>11</sup>. With the overthrow of Mali government in a military coup in March 2012 and takeover of northern Mali by Tuareg rebels the situation in Mali became worse. Tuareg led group, later, lost political and military ground to Ansar al Din led by Iyad al Ghaly. Ansar al Din is considered to be in coalition with AQIM and Movement for Unity/ Tauheed and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA). The current Malian government, in the aftermath of the March overthrow, is unlikely to have the ability to force a military solution to the problem<sup>12</sup>.

**Afghanistan.** In South Asia Al Qaeda aimed at drawing US to fight in Afghanistan where people lived in stone-age where hi-tech meant nothing. Afghanistan was selected as a base to win war against West<sup>13</sup>. Al Qaeda supported Taliban first in their civil war against Northern Alliance and later against US and in turn had significant influence on it. Jallaluddin Haqqani also recognized Taliban and remained loyal to them, however, closer relations developed with Al Qaeda and Taliban when command transferred to his son Sirajuddin Haqqani due to his illness in 2007<sup>14</sup>. Al Qaeda is weakened with most of its camps destroyed and leaders captured or killed, however, it appears to have preserved at least limited means of regenerating inside Afghanistan as US continues to draw down.

### **Al Qaeda Threat in Being (Relatively less Presence / Minor Activities)**

**Syria.** At present different Secular, Islamist parties and Free Syrian Army are operating in Syria and Al Qaeda is also trying to get their share if they succeed in overthrowing Bashar Al Asad regime. Secular rebels and Free Syrian Army are worried that Islamists are pulling the rug from under their feet and expresses their disdain for Al Qaeda and Islamists<sup>15</sup>.

**Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).** Abu Musab al Zarqawi was killed in a US airstrike near Baghdad in 2006, followed by Abu Ayyub al-Masri in 2010. Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali is leading the organization at present and has been seeking to re-assert its might in the security vacuum created by the departing Americans, fragmented government and the surge of Sunni rebels in neighboring Syria. With recent continued unrest and likely chances of Al Qaeda gaining strength again, US is persuading Iraq for presence of some marine troops for counter terrorism support.

### **Muslim Countries with Some Degree of Success against Al Qaeda**

Diverse approaches have been adopted by various Muslim countries against Al Qaeda, however, one thing remained common in all and that was the initial resistance/ closing of eyes to recognition of the problem until it had a severe blow in that particular country which ultimately committed them and gave them the will to eradicate the menace.

**Saudi Arabia.** Saudi Arabia is one of the few countries where fight against extremism has yielded real success. It effectively adopted a combination of hard approach, a soft approach<sup>16</sup> and increased international cooperation.

**Indonesia.** In Indonesia the turning point was 2002 Bali bombing until which Indonesian government was reluctant to cracking down on local militants suspected of ties with Al Qaeda. Indonesian government also started cooperation with US and Australian officials in their attempts to disrupt terrorist networks in Southeast Asia<sup>17</sup>. A strong counter terrorism force was organized, equipped and trained<sup>18</sup> which effectively eradicated Al Qaeda's cells and support from its affiliates. Besides international cooperation, a domestic cooperation within and between government agencies engaged in fighting terrorism and extremism was ensured. This helped in segregation of violent and remaining groups and ultimately is involved towards non violent peace process leading towards a political solution of the problem.

**Bangladesh.** In Bangladesh, Harkat ul Jihad al Islam and Jamaat ul Mujahideen Bangladesh worked in 1992 to recruit volunteers to fight in Afghanistan and Kashmir supported by Muslim NGOs (Servants of Suffering Humanity International etc). However, Media and Intellectuals thereafter played a very active role against extremism. Ban was imposed on extremist political parties and strict check on inflow of money in the country. US also assisted in training police forces in countering terrorism. At present, Islamist extremist organizations generally do not enjoy mass support.

## **Impact on Muslims**

**Muslims Opinion about Al Qaeda.** As per polls by Pew Research Center in 2012, Al Qaeda is left with little support in the Muslim world. Majority of people in Muslim countries like Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey and Lebanon expressed negative views about Al Qaeda<sup>19</sup>. However, complexity comes in once we see Muslim's view towards few of Al Qaeda's goals like withdrawal of foreign forces from Muslim countries, keeping western values out of Islamic culture, concept of Sharia, atrocities on Muslims in Palestine and Kashmir etc where Al Qaeda does enjoy substantial support from Muslims especially in context of US/ Israel nexus<sup>20</sup>.

**Image of Islam.** What Al Qaeda has hurt the most is the image of Muslims in the world. Even Israeli Prime Minister found an opportunity to look for new excuses to evade pressure on the subject of peace negotiations, saying that Israel is also a victim of "Islamic Terrorism"<sup>21</sup>. This brings in question as to what good Al Qaeda has done to resolve the issue of Palestine. Similarly, the indigenous freedom movement of Kashmir is a victim of Al Qaeda.

**Main Sufferers of Al Qaeda.** The overwhelming majorities of Al Qaeda's sufferers are Muslims within Muslim countries. Only 15 per cent of the 3010 fatalities resulting from Al Qaeda attacks between 2004 and 2008 were westerners and the remaining 85 per cent of those killed were local inhabitants. And between 2007 and 2011 **Muslims suffered even up to 97 per cent of casualties**<sup>22</sup>.

**Muslims in US and West.** Muslims in US and West have increasingly become the targets of state authorities through policies and practices that result in racial profiling. They are subject to animosity in the form of hate crimes and discrimination.

**Weaponization and Drugs.** Al Qaeda and its militant affiliates also brought in weaponization and induced drugs due to easy source of earning money and aggressive denial of women rights to basic amenities including destruction of schools.

## **AL QAEDA IN SAUDI ARABIA**

**Background of Al Qaeda's Activities in Saudi Arabia.** The first Al Qaeda planned terrorist incident in Saudi Arabia took place in June 1996, when Al-Khobar Towers were attacked. However, Al Qaeda based terrorism started becoming serious around Saudi Arabia, especially in Yemen which being instable, provided a sanctuary to those militants who had to leave Afghanistan and Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) due to crack down against Al Qaeda in the wake of US operations in Afghanistan in 2001. In the aftermath of US operations in Iraq in 2003, effects of extremism spilled over in Saudi Arabia. May 2003

bombing in Riyadh was really very alarming and around 30 terrorism related incidents took place in Saudi Arabia from May 2003 to June 2005.<sup>23</sup>

**KSA's Struggle in Countering Al Qaeda.** With combination of soft and hard measures, Saudi Arabia succeeded in countering the agenda of Al Qaeda under Ministry of Interior led by Prince Muhammad bin Naef, with the following measures: -

**Strategy of Prevention (Soft Strategy)<sup>24</sup>.** The National Solidarity Campaign against Terrorism conducted over a period of several weeks to promote true Islamic values of tolerance and moderation, as a strategy to combat extremist ideas. Contours of this strategy are:

- Encouragement of recreational activities
- Winning hearts and minds by engaging on internet
- Scholars and intellectuals' campaign against extremists
- Monitoring and screening the preaching of religion
- Employing of national media against extremism
- Reorganization of anti-extremism public education
- Countering of clash of civilizations theory
- International counter terrorism workshops
- Employment of UN forum to generate harmony among nations and cultures
- Countering terrorism by tightening financial noose
- Cyber-crime law against terrorist activities

**Strategy of Rehabilitation (Advice and Reform).** Under Rehabilitation strategy, an Advisory Committee in the Ministry of Interior administered the Counseling Program. This Advisory Committee consisted of following sub-committees<sup>25</sup>:-

- Religious sub-committee
- Psychological sub-committee
- Security sub-committee
- Media sub-committee

**Post Care (Incarceration or Reintegration) Strategy.** Post care strategy is based on following steps to bring the rehabilitated persons on positive and constructive path of life<sup>26</sup>:-

- Prisoners who have successfully completed the rehabilitation process to the satisfaction of the program sheikhs, doctors, and psychologists are transferred to a specialized external rehabilitation facility called the Care Rehabilitation Center

- Once an individual has satisfactorily renounced his previous beliefs, assistance is provided in locating a job and receiving other benefits
- Once released, former detainees are required to meet periodically with authorities
- Rehabilitated prisoners are encouraged to settle down, marry, and have children
- The success of the program is further secured by the Advisory Committee's involvement of a prisoner's larger family network

**Hard Measures to Counter Terrorist Elements.** Following hard measures were also taken against extremism<sup>27</sup>:-

- Saudi Arabia in 1994 froze the assets and rescinded the citizenship of Osama bin Laden
- The Kingdom took steps to facilitate the extradition of terror suspects and upgrade intelligence gathering capabilities
- Following the bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000 and the attacks of September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia intensified its efforts to go after the men, money and mind-set that support terrorism and extremism
- Dismantling the physical presence of Al Qaeda and the ability of militants to operate from or within the Kingdom
- Saudi security agents work with their international counterparts to conduct missions and exchange information
- To confront threats in the Kingdom's dense urban areas, neighborhood police units engage and work directly with community members, encouraging citizens to provide tips and leads about suspicious activity

**Lessons for Pakistan.** As compared with Saudi Arabia which has just 28 million populations which is homogeneous to a greater extent, Pakistan's population is around 180 million with bigger ethnic, cultural and sectarian fault lines. Following lessons may be relevant for Pakistan:-

- Centralize the sermon system in the mosques under a central religious authority
- Bring a uniform system, especially in FATA by establishing government writ to start a de-radicalization program on Saudi pattern
- Engage Pakistani religious scholars, intellectuals and psychologists on the pattern of Saudi soft program to counter extremist ideologies
- Rehabilitate the extremists on the pattern of Saudi Arabia by offering employment opportunities as well as monetary assistance

## **AL QAEDA IN PAKISTAN**

**Al Qaeda's Ingress in Tribal Region and Pakistani Mainland.** Though, an Arab organization, Al Qaeda did not choose any Arab country for the launch of its struggle. It rather chose South Asia as its base of operations. The region has traditional religious ideologies and

customs that are very fertile for the growth of religious militancy<sup>28</sup>. Main reasons of its ingress are:-

### **Historical Reasons**

**Bhutto's Recruitment.** Bhutto's recruitment of dissident Afghans in 1970s against Kabul's Soviet leaning government was the start of tribal areas utility by foreign militants as springboard and the training ground.

**Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.** After Soviet invasion, the legitimacy given by US to these holy warriors then known as "Mujahideen" gave moral superiority of engaging state power and made this area center of Islamic militants from all around the world.

**Post-Soviet Retreat from Afghanistan.** Many of these fighters decided to stay in this region after Soviet retreat. They bought property and permanently settled here after inter marriages thus actualizing in Pakistan.

### **Current Reasons**

**Need for Safe Haven.** Retreating Taliban and Al Qaeda forces after their defeat in Afghanistan needed a safe haven from where they could incite the guerrilla war and trap US and its Western Allies in Afghanistan<sup>29</sup>.

**Policy Change against Religious Militant Organizations.** After joining GWOT, Pakistan disassociated itself from religious militant organizations and left these potent organizations unsponsored and easy target for Al Qaeda to assume their patronage.

**Need for New Al Qaeda Affiliated Leadership in Pakistan.** The need of new Al Qaeda affiliated leadership due to collapse of its own leadership's arrest, could be easily addressed in recognition of commoner young militant leaders of FATA.

**Lust of Power by Young Tribal Commoner Leaders.** The lust of power of young tribal commoner leader was long awaiting to scrap old fiefdoms of the tribal elders and could be legitimized with affiliation with Al Qaeda. The tribal chiefs were either killed or fled to the cities. Their fiefdoms fell into the hands of this new generation, who were totally committed to Al Qaeda.

**Availability of Affiliate Militant Organizations and Sympathizer Political Parties.** Al Qaeda already had affiliate religious militant organizations and sympathizer religious political parties in Pakistan, which proved to be the main recruiting source for furthering Al Qaeda's mission.

**Indigenous Affiliated Religious Militant Organizations.** Al Qaeda works with partners as a conglomerate that exports and imports resources and tactics to survive and grow. Certain Pakistani religious militant organizations affiliated with Al Qaeda also have differences amongst each other and with Al Qaeda's grand strategy; however, Al Qaeda is trying to keep them on board by compromising interests and bringing consensus. Major affiliates include:

- Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
- Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
- Harkat ul Jihad al Islami (HUJI)
- Lashkar-e-Taiba and Co (LeT, SeS & JeM)

**Funding of Al Qaeda in Pakistan.** There is little proof available on the foreign funding for Al Qaeda and its affiliates in Pakistan, but based on circumstantial evidence it is possible to point out the possible bankers. Al Qaeda and its Pakistani affiliates are suspected to be funded through foreign countries from Middle Eastern affiliates of Al Qaeda through hundi / hawala system of payment, which has been checked to quite an extent, but is still operational. Local and foreign funding through madrassas and trusts is also believed to be in the list. Additionally, narco money, criminal activities of Al Qaeda and its affiliates in shape of bank robberies and kidnapping for ransom, timber mafia and transporters and extortions paid by locals out of developmental funds and compensations are known to be the sources of funding for Al Qaeda in Pakistan.

**Al Qaeda's Pakistan Strategy.** Al Qaeda's strategy in Pakistan remains intentionally opaque, wherein it would use Pakistan as logistic base and safe abode for its fighters; it has now gone onto an increased confrontation with the Pakistani state. A review of Al Qaeda's statements pertaining to Pakistan, militant activity in the country and the alliances Al Qaeda has fostered among Pakistani factions reveals that their strategy to shape Pakistan's militant environment and promote hostilities against the Pakistani government<sup>30</sup>.

**Pakistan's Counter Terrorism Strategy against Al Qaeda and its Affiliates.** The political developments with regards to Pakistan's counterinsurgency efforts can broadly be divided into two phases as under:-

**President Musharraf's Era.** Strategic framework during the previous regime was, "*All elements of national power particularly political, socio-economic and military be effectively articulated within national and international context to eliminate the menace of terrorism*".

**Post 2008 Elections Period.** Newly elected government came up with National Counter Terrorism Policy in the shape of 3Ds, i.e. *Dialogue, Deterrence and Development*. In support of this strategy, the Army's employment was based on four distinct stages of *Clear, Hold, Build and Transfer*. Within this purview, the Army devised its 'Concept of Engagement', cardinal aspects of which are:-

- Military means must be politically driven backed by popular support
- Convergence of military and political components
- Conduct effect based operations using minimum essential force to achieve well-defined objectives
- Reduce own and exploit terrorists' vulnerabilities
- Enhance faith in cause and keep morale in focus

**Operational Framework.** Pakistan's counter actions can be divided into various stages:-

**Beginning (2001 – 2003)**

- Capturing many senior Al Qaeda operatives
- Operation Al Mizan, in 'No Go Areas' of Khyber and Kurram Agencies

- Al Qaeda infiltration in southern and northern agencies of FATA

### **Fighting and Talking (2003 – 2009)**

- Kinetic operations and peace deals
- Peace deals provided breathing space to Al Qaeda and its affiliated religious militant organizations
- Debated as unsuccessful period

### **Confronting the Devil (2009 Onwards)**

- Termed as a watershed year in Pakistan Army's efforts against Al Qaeda and its affiliates
- Strategy for the "clearance" phase of the concept i.e.: "depopulate, clear and repopulate"
- Army seems to be struck in holding phase due to slow pace of political prong
- Great success as evident from the shrinking areas under control of Al Qaeda and its affiliates

**Short Falls in Addressing Al Qaeda and its Affiliates.** The efforts made by the Pakistani Government to control Al Qaeda's terrorist threat have produced some concrete results. However, some missing links are as under:

**Consensus Building.** Primary shortfall of Pakistan strategy was that besides taking decision to cooperate in GWOT, it could not build the correct perception through consensus about the menace of terrorism.

**Harnessing FATA.** Pakistan could not harness FATA through its tribal culture before al Qaeda dissected it and brought substantial change in it by empowering the commoner militant young leadership<sup>31</sup>.

**Capacity to Tackle the Militant Outflow due to US Invasion of Afghanistan.** Pakistan could not assess its own capability of tackling Al Qaeda/militants outflow from Afghanistan after US invasion, which led to creation of safe haven for active and sleeping cells of Al Qaeda.

**Reactive Strategy against Al Qaeda.** Although all important catches of Al Qaeda were done by Pakistan but could not read the actual proactive strategy of Al Qaeda, which started from active cells in urban populace, shift to FATA, consolidation in FATA through commoner militant leadership, extending affiliation with indigenous militant organizations, expansion to remaining country, and truce through indigenous militant organizations peace deals<sup>32</sup>.

**Drawing Lines between Al Qaeda and Indigenous Militant Organizations.** Pakistan could not recognize the actual face of militant organizations, which turned their loyalties towards Al Qaeda after 9/11, and still trusted them from time to time.

**Energizing Political Will.** Pakistan has still been unable to synergize political will against Al Qaeda and its affiliate militant organizations. All political leaders are not yet on one page in abhorring terrorism.

**Perception Management.** Pakistani leadership has been unable to shape the perception of the stakeholders against Al Qaeda and its affiliates, to incorporate them in the overall counterstrategy.

**Inability of Civil Government to Rehabilitate the Affected Areas.** Civil government is unable to take over the areas cleared by Army and rehabilitate them in mainstream.

**Addressing the Root Cause.** Though out of the purview of Pakistan at international level, we have not been able to address the root cause of terrorism at least in Pakistan.

**Al Qaeda's Future after US Drawdown from Afghanistan in 2014.** According to projections made on present indicators Al Qaeda's future appears to be as follows:

- Hard core Al Qaeda leaders and members are likely to fall back to Afghanistan being more secure base for them
- Pakistani affiliated militant organizations may also transit to Afghanistan, in case of more pressure from Pakistan LEAs, but will increase the pace of their operations in Pakistan
- After Taliban's due share in Afghan Government Al Qaeda will try to fillip to the notion of Pan-Islamism and replicate it in Pakistan through their affiliate religious militant organizations and sympathizer religious political parties
- Al Qaeda will try to keep its ideology alive through proxies, compromising at different places on different issues with its affiliates
- Al Qaeda's international literate ideologue will try to gain expertise in cyber warfare which will be more effective in continuing their war against the West

## RECOMMENDATIONS

### Global

**Attack the Ideology.** Ideology of Al Qaeda is embedded in local history and culture developed by states. Nation-specific narrative to spearhead the effort of attacking the ideology with religious scholars on the same page.

**Countering Al Qaeda and Affiliates through Multi-Pronged Approach.** A mix of hard and soft approach along with international cooperation with the predominance of non-kinetic soft approach should be followed to accrue long-lasting dividends.

**Sincerity of Purpose without Double Standards.** Trust deficit amongst allies fighting Al Qaeda and affiliates need to be removed and pursuance of divergent agendas in the fight against terrorism must be avoided to be able to make some real progress against the combined enemy.

**Reduction of Discrimination and Sense of Deprivation Amongst Muslims.** To reduce discrimination and sense of deprivation amongst Muslims the core issues of US and West influence on Muslim world should be reduced besides resolution of Palestine and Kashmir issues through international community.

**Strengthen the Capabilities of Frontline States to Confront Al Qaeda and Affiliates.** West, led by the US, must help friendly countries achieve their counterterrorism objectives by providing assistance to improve the technical capabilities of border control force, counterterrorism police, military and intelligence services.

**Chocking Domestic Fault Lines.** All states with Al Qaeda and domestic affiliate organizations must address their fault lines in short to medium term with the cooperation of international community to reduce the space of co-opting for Al Qaeda.

**Addressing Financial Support.** The concerned institutions and banking system must be synergized with international support to monitor and choke flow of money to Al Qaeda and its affiliates generated from transnational organized crimes besides addressing narco trade, human trafficking / smuggling, money laundering (hawala/ hundi), terrorist financing and cybercrimes.

**Real Time Intelligence Sharing.** Intelligence sharing mechanism between the allies should be improved to execute proactive counter actions.

### **Pakistan Specific**

**Political Will and National Consensus.** Political will with consensual national support should be mustered for Whole of the Nation approach against Al Qaeda and its affiliates, to ensure their defeat and deny re-emergence.

**Deny Space to Al Qaeda.** A proactive media campaign should be launched to inculcate sense of responsibility and educate the populace on the necessity and importance of their cooperation in the drive against common enemy-Al Qaeda and its affiliates. FATA and PATA should be brought into main stream, besides providing job opportunities to the locals through ROZs in order to deny space to Al Qaeda and its affiliates.

**Sealing of International Border.** Pakistan should seal its porous border with Afghanistan to check the cross border movement of Al Qaeda and its affiliates, weapons, drugs and inflow of illegal money.

**Strict Adherence of Disassociation Policy with Religious Militant Organizations.** Existing policy of disassociation with no patronage to the religious organizations with militant agendas should be strictly adhered and monitored.

**Overhaul of Intelligence Agencies.** The intelligence agencies need to modernize their system of intelligence collection, analysis, investigations and interrogations. Besides improving intra-agency efficiency, the efficacy of all domestic intelligence agencies should be improved by inter-agency integration and incorporation of International Agencies.

**De-weaponization.** A de-weaponization policy should be carefully crafted and implemented keeping in view the local security and cultural environment while remaining above political allegiance.

**De-radicalization.** Proactive de-radicalization campaign must be moved with following strands:-

- Harnessing the madrassas through registration, standardization of syllabus and teaching staff as per madrassa reforms.
- Excessive debates on religious issues commonly exploited by Al Qaeda and its affiliates.
- Energize Islamic education industry by incorporating higher education facilities and later offering employment opportunities utilizing existing infrastructure in the long term.

**Rehabilitation and Reintegration.** The slow process of rehabilitation and reintegration should be pursued rigorously to reduce burden on military and evade re-emergence of Al Qaeda and its affiliates.

**Media Policy.** Although a tall order, however, a Media Policy which safeguards the national interests should be formulated and implemented to avoid further damage to national opinion building.

**Improvement of Law Enforcement Agencies.** Capacity of LEAs specially police and para-military forces should be increased substantially in order to de-induct Armed Forces and reduce psychological effect on the nation in the war against Al Qaeda and its affiliates.

**Deportation / Repatriation of Illegal Immigrants and Refugees.** Strict implementation of already existing mechanism with regard to illegal immigrants and refugees living in Pakistan be ensured. Moreover, determined efforts need to be made by National Aliens Registration Authority (NARA) to register all foreigners who are still unaccounted for. Integrated border management system (IBMS) shall be employed on all entry / exit immigration check posts to regulate international passengers.

**Capability Enhancement of National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA).** There is a dire need to enhance the capability of NACTA, where systematic research and analysis could be carried out on all aspects related to terrorism with the mandate to advise LEAs through GoP with due input of think tanks.

**Breaking the Linkage.** With all these recommendations, addressing strengths and exploiting weaknesses of Al Qaeda the overarching and predominant recommendation is to hit their co-opting ability by breaking their linkage with local affiliate militant organizations.

## **Conclusion**

The panel has tried its level best to cover the threat of Al Qaeda and its affiliates, being the most predominant concern of the world today to the security of future generations. However, the vast and complex nature of subject still leaves many stones unturned and it gives lead to many more research questions. Al Qaeda and its affiliates though on the run needs to be completely eliminated otherwise it will re-emerge from its ashes.

*Researchers: DIG Zafar, Lt Col Shakir, Lt Col Moeed and Lt Col Ibrahim (KSA)*  
*Supervisor: Cdre Zain Zulfiqar*

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## COERCIVE STATECRAFT

*"The most complete and happy victory is this: to compel one's enemy to give up his purpose, while suffering no harm to oneself."*

*Byzantine General*

*Belisarius*

### Introduction

Coercive statecraft is rooted in history. A history in which man has tried to minimize force: not so much to avoid the loss to the opponent, but more to avoid the loss of one's own energies, resources, efforts and potential. Therefore this, in a way, can be termed a selfish approach, albeit with ultimate positive results.

Coercive statecraft has many dimensions and states have used various methodologies to coerce the target state into compliance: some successful, others not. Coercive statecraft needs studying because, if successful, the strategy can prevent conflict escalating to full-scale war. Secondly, policy makers can learn from previous crises, thus lending policy-relevance to current and future governmental decision-making. Thirdly, building theory in the political and decision sciences becomes a distinct possibility. Fourthly, these statecraft applications enrich our understanding of past and current approaches from Pakistan's point of view, along with learning the art of crisis management and national security decision-making.

### Aim

To provide an understanding of coercive statecraft in contemporary politics, by analyzing future coercive modalities, with a view to recommending pertinent lessons.

### Scope

- An overview of coercive statecraft.
- Applications of coercive statecraft.
- Future of coercive modalities.
- Lessons learnt.

## AN OVERVIEW OF COERCIVE STATECRAFT

### Instruments of Statecraft

Statecraft employs and combines pressure and persuasion to achieve political aims and uses military, political and economic instruments of power to advance a state's interests. Diplomacy applies this power by persuasive measures short of war, but there is a long history of coercive force associated with negotiation and diplomatic leverage. It therefore follows that coercive statecraft is a challenging yet prevalent practice. Australian analyst Coral Bell called it "no-man's land that lies between defence and diplomacy."<sup>1</sup> The instruments of statecraft can be divided into three categories:-

**Persuasive Statecraft.** Persuasive tools are used to get other nations to alter their stance, even when such a change is believed to be against their interests: the tools persuade them otherwise. Persuasive tools attain this by power of argument and not by using threats or offering any benefit in return.

**Cooperative Statecraft.** Cooperative tools include luring a nation by offering benefits and at the same time exercising influence over that nation or state. In simple terms, it is the policy of offering ‘carrots’. Practical manifestation of this will be via economic, military and technical help to entice other state.

**Coercive Statecraft.** Coercion is about forcing a state to act involuntarily by the use of threat or intimidation or some other form of pressure and force. The history of coercive tools can be traced back to the origin of statecraft. Coercive tools are used when states are entangled in a situation where persuasion and incentives have totally failed to achieve end results and coercion is the only tool left for achieving their objectives.

### **Basic Instruments of Coercive Statecraft**

Practical manifestation of coercion starts from an individual and goes beyond the boundaries of states. But academically, coercive statecraft uses four basic tools: diplomatic, military, economic and informational / media coercion.

**Diplomatic Coercion.** Diplomacy refers to influence, including both persuasion and coercion. Diplomatic coercion is an attempt to alter a state or non-state actor’s behaviour through the threat to use force or through the use of limited force. Diplomatic coercion involves four basic variables: the demand, the means used for creating a sense of urgency, the threatened punishment for non-compliance, and the possible use of incentives.

**Economic Coercion.** Economic coercion can be defined as the use, or threat to use, ‘measures of an economic, as contrasted with diplomatic or military, character taken to induce a target state to change some policy or practices or even its governmental structure’<sup>2</sup>.

**Military Coercion.** Just as warfare is often "diplomacy carried out by other means", military coercion, the threat of combat or the threat of an escalation in combat intensity, is a more subtle method of dispute that shades the spectrum between diplomacy and warfare. In *Coercive Military Strategy*, Stephen J. Cimbala shows that an understanding of coercive military strategy is a necessary part of any diplomatic-strategic recipe for success. Few wars are fought for annihilation, and military power is inherently employed for political purposes, so in any war diplomatic resolution may be possible. To that end, coercive strategy should be flexible, for there are as many variations as there are in warfare. Cimbala<sup>3</sup> shows that although military coercive strategy is a remedy for neither the ailments of U.S. national security nor world conflict, it will become more important in peace, crisis, and even war, in the next century.

**Informational/ Media Coercion.** Informational / media coercion refers to attempts to influence, relying primarily on the deliberate manipulation of psychological instruments. Two developments, which have culminated in the twentieth century, have made information one of the major instruments of statecraft: the development of mass communications and the expansion of potential or actual power base of a society. The

new found power of the masses and the ability of a foreign power to speak directly to these masses have made the informational instrument of statecraft a major one.<sup>4</sup>

## APPLICATIONS OF COERCIVE STATECRAFT

*“To subdue the enemy without fighting, that is the acme of skill.”*

Sun Tzu<sup>5</sup>

### Successful Coercive Statecraft

Success in coercive statecraft depends upon the relative costs and benefits of compliance and non-compliance for both the coercer and the target<sup>6</sup>. Whether the coercer inclines this in its favour, depends on meeting the following criteria<sup>7</sup>:-

**Proportionality.** Proportionality is a relationship between a coercer’s goals/objectives and the force to be applied in pursuit of those objectives. But as Alexander George explains, coercive diplomacy is a strategy of limited means: “coercive diplomacy may, but is not required to, go beyond threats to the actual use of military force; but if force is actually used, it must be limited and should fall short of full scale use or war”<sup>8</sup>. However, a strict relationship between limiting objectives and increasing the chance of success cannot be determined.

**Reciprocity.** Reciprocity is the mutual informal understanding of the rewards offered by the coercer and the concessions sought by the target. Carefully crafted carrot and stick diplomacy institutes the terms of reciprocity. The calibration and sequence of exchanges must build gradually and equitably to a conclusive resolution. At every key step, both sides must believe that they are getting “something for something” rather than “nothing for something.”

**Coercive Credibility.** Credibility is an essential component of coercive statecraft, which convinces the target that the coercer has both the resolve and the capability to carry out its threat.

## CASE STUDIES

### US Coercion of USSR - Cuban Missile Crisis

**The Issue.** In 1962, Soviet-based missiles could only hit Europe, whereas US missiles could reach the entire Soviet Union<sup>9</sup>. To balance this equation, the USSR considered deploying missiles in Cuba, which they thought a legitimate response to the US installation of missiles on their doorstep (Turkey). The US saw it as an overt challenge and emphasized that it was not similar to the US deployment in Turkey, as at no time had the US attempted to hide their deployment. The US President publicly warned the Soviet Union that missiles moving to Cuba would result in serious consequences.

**Coercive Diplomacy.** The US President employed coercive diplomacy successfully, forcing the USSR to remove missiles from Cuba. He kept his options open, employing a

"try and see" approach, avoiding giving any deadline for missile withdrawal. He enforced a gradual naval blockade around Cuba, which put enormous pressure on the Soviet Union, whilst ensuring the risk of war to minimum.

**Proportionality.** The strategy was proportional due to three factors. First, the US President's demands were limited. Second, the means of coercion were also limited: while carrying out the blockade, the US held back from using force. Finally, both countries followed the important principles of crisis management: the US kept the pace of rising confrontation quite slow and showed desire to resolve the crisis peacefully.

**Reciprocity.** The Soviet decision to deploy missiles could have been due to Soviet insecurity and the fear of losing Cuba through invasion. Prime Minister Khrushchev, despite being coerced, did not succumb to US pressure, trying to exploit the situation whilst remaining short of escalation. Although the Soviets gave in, the US pledged not to invade Cuba. A secret deal between both leaders resulted in the US taking all their missiles off Turkey after the crisis finished.

**Coercive Credibility.** US military might, including nuclear warhead numerical superiority, missiles that could strike the Soviet Union from the USA and others just 150 miles from the USSR in Turkey, was a credible threat to the Soviet Union's security.

## US Coercion of Libya

**The Issue.** Colonel Gadhafi led a bloodless coup in September 1969 that ousted the King and expelled the American Military. When Libya failed to help President Carter during the 1979 Iran hostage crisis, hostile relations escalated, resulting in US attacks in April 1986. Libya's quest for a nuclear programme further aggravated relations with the US and the world. The US demanded that Libya discontinue support for terrorism, including settling the 1988 Pan Am 103-Lockerbie case, abandon its Chemical and Nuclear Weapon Programmes, eliminate all other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to carry out inspections.

**Coercive Diplomacy.** Coercive diplomacy began in 1992 when the UNSC agreed to economic sanctions against Libya<sup>10</sup>, with further sanctions in 1993. Separately, the US asked the British to facilitate secret negotiations.

**Proportionality.** President Bush initially sought regime change, but this was later altered to 'Policy Change'<sup>11</sup>, around limited objectives like WMD, Lockerbie and terrorism: with more likelihood of success. This shift was essential in affecting Libya's behaviour. The combination of threats, the application of multilateral sanctions and the drop in oil prices, weakened the regime domestically and isolated it internationally, serving US interests.

**Reciprocity.** After years of bitter conflict, well-crafted carrot and stick diplomacy helped establish trust and reciprocity. The pace of coercion was balanced and steady. EU sanctions were initially lifted partially when Libya renounced terrorism. US lifted her sanctions when Libya, in secret talks, reached agreement on WMD and fulfilling other commitments.

**Coercive Credibility.** Besides economic sanctions, the US's counter-proliferation strategy and the 2003 Iraq invasion sent a strong implied threat to Gadhafi. His regime was convinced about the increasing risk of pursuing a nuclear weapon programme, leading them to conclude that this would threaten their security. Coercer credibility of the ability to react on nuclear proliferation was a key factor.

## **US Coercion of North Korea**

**The Issue.** Since the Korean War, Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) - US relations have been through several crisis situations. The latest began in October 2002 over the DPRK's uranium enrichment programme. The US firmly maintained that the DPRK should not be allowed to possess nuclear weapons and applied pressure through mechanisms such as the Six Party Talks (US, North Korea, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia). However, Pyongyang rebuffed this coercion and ratcheted up its own coercive diplomacy.

**Coercive Diplomacy.** After failure of the Six Party Talks, North Korea conducted first nuclear weapon test in October 2005. Coercive diplomacy was then ratcheted up. The UNSC imposed economic sanctions and threatened further measures. The strategy seemed to have some effect, as North Korea announced a return to the six-party talks.

**Proportionality.** The coercer's demands were too high: they were against the vital interests of the adversary, so the asymmetry of interests favoured the adversary, making it more likely to resist<sup>12</sup>. Both the US and North Korea had certain irreducible objectives, which caused them to stick to their stated positions. The Bush Administration's demands had unclear settlement conditions because the US, chastened by North Korea's secret nuclear programme, refused to discuss concessions until its nuclear weapons programme was dismantled. The regime-change agenda went beyond the fundamental interests of the US, making Pyongyang's resolve stronger and the American threat credibility weaker.

**Reciprocity.** North Korea declared the US/ UN imposed economic sanctions as an act of war<sup>13</sup>. However, the US declined to ease sanctions unless the nuclear programme was abandoned. North Korea demanded direct bilateral talks, which the US thought too much of a concession. North Korea offered some concessions in the October 2002 talks<sup>14</sup>, but these were not up to minimum US demands.

**Coercer's Credibility.** Nuclear weapons, especially the deterrence capability, enable reverse coercion, i.e. by the target state on the coercer. Pyongyang had much less to lose than members of the US alliance in the region (South Korea, Japan and large number of American troops). Coercion in the context of nuclear weapons reduced US coercive credibility.

## **Coercion of Iran**

**The Issue.** Relations between the US and Islamic Republic of Iran have remained thorny since the latter's formation in 1979. Iran's avoidance of nuclear inspections has aggravated the tension. Consequently, President Bush called Iran a member of the "Axis of Evil"<sup>15</sup> in 2002 and applied coercive statecraft.

**Coercive Diplomacy.** The US adopted a two-track policy. On one hand, coercive diplomacy of economic and trade sanctions, Stuxnet<sup>16</sup>, threats of military strikes and attacks on its nuclear scientists, on the other, diplomatic engagement offering incentives.

**Reciprocity.** US coercion remains unsuccessful due to its failure to organize a focused and multifaceted programme. Iran signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970, whereby non-nuclear signatory states agreed to remain non-nuclear weapon states provided they got support in establishing civilian nuclear programmes<sup>17</sup>. Iran claimed to be pursuing Uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes. However, demanding 'no enrichment at all' seems excessive and illegitimate<sup>18</sup>. Multilateral UNSC sanctions were, therefore, not supported by Russia and China. Demanding Iran's complete capitulation without relief from sanctions is a maximalist position, with less chance of success<sup>19</sup>.

**Coercer's Credibility.** Unilateral economic sanctions do not sufficiently threaten Iran<sup>20</sup>. Military strikes, due to the secrecy of nuclear facilities, would be disproportionate and therefore not credible. Military action by the USA would destabilize the region against US interests.

### **Indian Coercion of Pakistan – Operation Parakaram**

**The Issue.** On 19 December 2001, an attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi left all six attackers and eight security force members dead<sup>21</sup>. India contended that the group had acted at Pakistan's behest and demanded that Pakistan ban the groups allegedly involved and extradite twenty alleged terrorists, including the supposed mastermind of the 1993 Bombay blasts that killed hundreds<sup>22</sup>. India simultaneously began deploying roughly five hundred thousand troops along the border.

**Proportionality.** Options available to India were limited. Economic and trade sanctions were out, given the low levels of trade between the countries. Limited strikes against alleged terrorist camps would have served no purpose and general war was impossible due to Pakistan's nuclear status. Pakistan could not be isolated diplomatically, given its role in the campaign against terrorism. Only military mobilization could be used to pressurize Pakistan<sup>23</sup>.

**Reciprocity.** India ignored the basic principles of 'stick and carrot' and did not agree to any confidence building measures offered by Pakistan. At the same time, India had nothing to offer by way of reward to induce Pakistan's compliance<sup>24</sup>.

**Threat Credibility.** The credibility of India's threat was compromised by Pakistan's first use nuclear doctrine in the event of a conventional war waged against Pakistan<sup>25</sup>. Furthermore, India's conventional capabilities were not overwhelming enough to support planned military strategies.

### **Coercions US – Pakistan**

**Nuclear Programme.** In 1979, the US tried to force Pakistan to accept IAEA inspections and stop uranium enrichment. Pakistan, noting no such conditions for the Indian nuclear programme, did not agree. The US adopted a carrot and stick policy by offering arms supplies but cutting aid and giving an "ultimatum"<sup>26</sup>. Despite intense

pressure, Pakistan refused to allow inspections. In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan believed Washington was "reconciled to a Pakistani nuclear weapons capability"<sup>27</sup>. However, the US continued to coerce Pakistan, which the latter disregarded, especially after the Indian nuclear test in 1998.

**Post 9/11 Attack.** Pakistan and US had problematic relations, due to issues like Pakistan's nuclear explosions and alleged support of the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan's help was essential for logistics, intelligence sharing and space utilization in the post-9/11 invasion of Afghanistan so the US coerced Pakistan into supporting the war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Despite being coerced, Pakistan made its own demands to gain a better-negotiated agreement: aid to revive the economy, and making it clear that its strategic nuclear/ missile assets and its Kashmir stance would not be negotiated<sup>28</sup>.

**Post Salala Attack.** US-Pakistan relations plummeted again when a US air strike killed 24 Pakistani soldiers on the Salala check-post. US officials claimed the attack was defence against firing across the border. However, Pakistan declared the incident a deliberate attack, ordering the US Army to evacuate a base used for US drones and suspending a NATO supply route. The latter put Pakistan in a strong coercive position. Pakistan demanded an apology from the US, the discontinuation of drone attacks and no future border-post attacks. The US resorted to coercion by threatening sanctions. Due to the proportionate credibility on both sides, the issue was settled by compromising and accommodating each other's demands.

## Conclusions

The Cuban Missile Crisis showed that coercion can only be successful against an equally powerful country if demands are limited and proportional; there is a credible threat and incentives for compliance. Economic coercion succeeds if augmented by carefully crafted carrot and stick policies and credible punitive measures, as shown in the Libya case. A weaker nation can successfully resist coercion if demands lack legitimacy, go against vital interests and the threat is not credible due to the coercer's vulnerabilities, as evident from North Korea's and Pakistan's resolve over nuclear programmes, disregarding US coercion. The success of the coerced nation is linked to the motivation to challenge and the willingness to take risks. Iran and North Korea's successful diplomacy, not submitting to US demands, are cases in point. Coercion can be resisted if the target nation possesses a nuclear weapon and/or strong conventional forces, or if other geopolitical realities strongly favour the target nation. The Indian attempt to coerce Pakistan in 2001 failed due to these factors. A weaker nation can coerce a stronger nation if it can exploit the coercer nation's vulnerabilities and sensitivities. Pakistan successfully did so following the Salala attack; getting a bargain that better served its interests.

## FUTURE OF COERCIVE MODALITIES

### Factors Shaping Future Coercive Modalities

**Multistate Associations.** It is becoming increasingly rare for states to act unilaterally, due to the steady increase in inter-state treaties, associations and understandings. Many states belong to several key organizations that will shape and constrain relations with third party states. This means that any coercive strategy is more likely to need the international support or be multilateral and coalition based. However, the need for

multilateral support may have exceptions, not least when there are advantages to not having it. US coercion against Iraq prior to 2003 is one example.

**Inter-State Conventional War.** The likelihood of conventional inter-state wars is decreasing. Although the UN has limited power, states increasingly recognize the need for a UN mandate. Even powerful states, such as the USA, have seen the consequences of not obtaining such a mandate (e.g. in the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq). This implies that threatening war is more likely to be a hollow threat, as the coerced state will be able to gauge international support for such a threat.

**Proxy Wars.** Concerns about the impact of terrorism are increasing. Not least because of concerns about how deadly terrorist actions could become: in extremis, a credible concern that terrorists could obtain a Weapon of Mass Destruction<sup>29</sup>. Recent history has shown that fighting a proxy war by supporting militant organizations is a dangerous game. Support for the Mujahedeen against the Soviets led to the problems the Taliban are now causing across the region. In many cases, support from external powers of militant groups for short-term gains has led to the spawning of terrorist groups that subsequently become a threat to the sponsoring state.

**International Finance as a Coercion Tool.** It is becoming more possible for powerful states to use financial power as an effective way of coercing weaker states. This new tool has been used by the US against North Korea and is an expansion of traditional economic sanctions through the addition of a more precise economic weapon.<sup>30</sup>

**Worldwide Information Explosion.** A key statecraft skill was to know everything about your adversary's intentions while making sure they knew nothing about yours. The worldwide explosion in information availability, such as Wiki Leaks, has made the former easier but the latter increasingly difficult. There is therefore a trend towards more transparent diplomacy as anything less will have little credibility.

**Resource Security.** While states have used coercion in the past largely for political reasons, to ensure territorial security, or to increase material wealth, future coercion is more likely to be about resource security.

**Stability Maintenance.** Globalization makes it harder for states to isolate themselves from shocks, such as economic failure, in other states. There is therefore a greater willingness to prevent states failing. Another side to stability maintenance is that, in general, as states become more powerful, they become less popular with and more of a concern to neighbours. It is likely that the international community will increasingly work towards constraining both the US and China.

### **A Future Coercion Framework based on Contemporary Analysis**

Several authors on contemporary coercive statecraft have identified these trends. It is possible to construct a framework for developing future coercive statecraft by blending these trends with elements of previous coercive assessment theories. For the basic framework, Alexander George's classic model, as explained by Major Mc Murphy,<sup>31</sup> has been used as the starting point, with the 4 tasks becoming 4 steps:-

#### **Step One: Selection of the Aim**

- Decide the demands/ objectives.
- Determine the time pressure.
- Determine the punishment regime for non-compliance.
- Determine inducements to encourage compliance.

**Step Two: Assessing the Environment.** Situational-contextual factors can be exploited to ensure a flexible coercion strategy. There are no hard and fast rules for assessing the environment and it is dangerous to transfer ‘lessons’ from past coercive strategies if the environmental factors are even subtly different.

**Step Three: Select the Form of Coercion.** Selecting a coercion form is important because it provides clarity of purpose. The factors affecting future coercion mean that opportunities to use George’s classic and tacit ultimatum successfully are diminishing, as they rely on the threat of harsh punishment with little tolerance for non-compliance. The try and see approach is also unlikely, as explained later. Therefore, the most likely of George’s forms in future coercion are incremental coercion and the limited threat. However, in the light of future coercion factors, some other forms have been added:-

- **Underdog Coercion.** A weak state is able to threaten a stronger state if it has some hold over it. This may be an active hold, such as control of a vital commodity, or a passive hold, such as not taking action against internal militants threatening the stronger state. The weaker state takes advantage of the situation by refusing to cooperate unless the stronger state offers something in return. This coercion could be used as a counter-coercive measure or as coercion in its own right.
- **Incentivized Coercion.** This is where a mix of carrot and stick is used, similar to the limited threat, but the inducements are decided from the outset.
- **Baited Coercion.** One state coerces another into something they are unlikely to cooperate on, by offering them the bait of something they want. The coercing state must ‘oversell’ the ‘bait’, to make it sufficiently attractive, whilst minimizing the downstream risks, which may affect the coerced states’ national interests. An example is the core European States who pushed for greater integration by playing up the attractions of a unitary currency, so as to persuade satellite states to join the Euro zone. The downstream risks, such as stringent monetary policies and austerity packages, were deliberately undersold.

**Step Four: Opponent Evaluation.** In this step, you assess the strengths and weaknesses of the target state, ensuring you anticipate likely reactions and responses from the opponent’s perspective. This step is key and Pape’s Punishment theory (for rational opponents) or Engelbrecht’s 2<sup>nd</sup> Order Theory (for irrational opponents) could be used to gauge the viability of Steps One to Three. If they were judged unviable, it would be prudent to return to step one and adjust the variables or to step three to change the form of coercion.

### **The Application of Future Coercive Modalities**

Whichever modality is used, it will have to be considerably more sophisticated to succeed. A way to think through a strategy in detail is to ‘war game’ it, so that contingency plans are developed in anticipation of as many outcomes as possible. ‘War gaming’ is a military concept increasingly used in other spheres and increasingly relies on support tools. A tool for the analysis of strategic interaction, called Game Theory, gained a practical application when the US government financed research into its use for national security purposes in the mid-1960s, to find ways to outmanoeuvre the Soviet Union in the art of statecraft. In 1994, the Nobel Prize in Economics went to three game theorists, the mathematician John Nash, the economist Reinhard Selten, and the strategic theorist John Harsanyi.<sup>32</sup> Therefore, for future success, coercive statecraft will be less about threatening states with war and more about threatening them economically (through smart sanctions, such as finance). Although political concerns will continue, it will be more about ensuring resource security than territorial disputes. It will also be about the end state being cloaked by a more credible and proportionate intermediary state. Coercion is therefore likely to involve many steps (reciprocity, with clarity and over limited time). Additionally, coercive statecraft will be less about threatening to sponsor internal dissidents within a coerced state due to uncertain consequences and more about being coercive with allies, although there will be a balance between universal support and forming a narrower coalition with clearer goals and will. Also it will be more about ensuring the proportionate validity of any threats and the ‘stick’ must not be overplayed because it is unlikely to get international support or be credible. Lastly, it will be more about ensuring stability than risking instability.

### **LESSONS LEARNT AND WAY FORWARD**

Coercive statecraft has a long history, although geographically non-contiguous countries could live in isolation and function in a “business as usual” environment. However, due to globalization, the world is a smaller place. Although wars are still being fought, the frequency has dropped, giving rise to coercion as a preferred statecraft option.

Coercive statecraft is viewed as more effective in asymmetric situations; conventional diplomacy works better amongst equals. But as an indispensable component of contemporary security, coercion merits thorough study, although it is not sufficiently consistent to be captured by theories. Thus, it should be handled carefully and used within a larger toolkit. The case studies indicate that coercive statecraft is more of an art than a science.

Coercive statecraft also emphasizes the intangibles of a state’s Elements of National Power. Most studies agree that success in coercion depends largely on the coerced side, in particular its motivation to challenge and willingness to take risks. The coercer, especially in deterrence, cannot control the situation unless the coerced side has a low motivation to challenge.

In order to obviate the chances of aggravating further the relationship among states, it is recommended that coercion is implemented with positive tools such as conflict resolution or some incentives such as financial help.

Strategic coercion is about the challenger deciding on his terms for using the threat of force or the use of force. Nuclear weapons are neither entirely irrelevant, but nor do they dominate. Likewise, military superiority is not the only key and military balance is often unimportant. Thus decision-making models are central to coercion.

Deterrence, though sometimes overly emphasized, is not always effective in application. On the contrary, “general coercion” with its long-term impact is not studied enough, although it is far more effective.

If a nation is united and motivated to defend its legitimate national interests and ready to bear any cost for pursuing its own goals and objectives, it will have a large capacity to resist coercion.

National decision makers need to accurately assess the art of the possible, both as coercer and as a potential coercion target. States with fully functioning institutions and diplomats, effective intelligence services and think tanks, that can coordinate objective, tailored and multi-layered analyses of regional and global politics, tend to provide such assessments.

There is less chance of employing successful coercion against nations with geostrategic importance or who remain aligned and relevant to great powers. Whenever Pakistan comes under coercive pressure, factors that always emerge are its close relationship with Great Powers and its geostrategic position.

At the first sign of coercion, coerced states have to take difficult decisions about their response. Democratic institutions that constantly take stock of changing global and regional environments respond better to emerging challenges.

A state vulnerable to coercion cannot passively observe events. They should anticipate worldwide developments and proactively influence situations that directly affect their interests. Dynamic, constructive, pragmatic, flexible and proactive diplomacy can avoid or reduce the chances of being coerced.

The role of national leadership during difficult times cannot be underestimated. Leaders with charismatic qualities like vision, character and articulation, sensitivity to national interests, courageous risk taking and unconventional behaviour, can make the nation stand behind him while taking difficult but correct decisions. States with such leadership find themselves in less difficult situations or cruise through hard times more smoothly.

Under the present global information and media revolution, the environment is shaped more by international actors who influence states and masses through narratives, which are becoming a key coercive statecraft tool. States having the vision to strategize narratives that justify their actions against other states, or produce counter narratives, are more likely to succeed. The US narrative of ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’ against Iraq and the recent West-sponsored narrative of freedom, which led to the Arab Spring, are examples.

## **Conclusion**

A nation can turn the disadvantages of being coerced to their advantage, i.e. by becoming coercers themselves, in order to pursue and achieve national interests. But this is possible only when the sum total of its Elements of National Power, i.e. military, economic, political and diplomatic are in tune with its National Aim, purpose, objectives and interests. No further proof of this statement is required other than to cast a cursory glance at the world map and see who are the coercers and who are the coerced states: and for what reasons.

<i>Researchers:</i>	<i>DIG Moazzam, Brig Cartwright (UK), Lt Col Shabeer and Lt Col Riazat</i>
<i>Supervisor:</i>	<i>Air Cdre Wasim Hussain</i>

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## RISING INDIA - A CRITICAL APPRAISAL

### Introduction

More than sixty five years ago, in 1947, the Indian nation was struggling for its very survival. Recovering from the shattered dreams of 'Akhand Bharat' with urgency to resettle eight million refugees; provided with land, homes, employment and a sense of citizenship. Over five hundred and sixty princely states<sup>1</sup> had to be integrated. The question then being asked everywhere was '*Will India Survive?*' Now, sixty-five years down the road, that fearful query has been replaced by a far more impressive one, namely, '*Will India become a Great Power?*'

There are different theories which examine the phenomenon of the Rise of the Nations. Professor Alastair Johnston of Harvard University has suggested following criterion<sup>2</sup>:-

**In material context**, is there an increase in a state's capabilities in either relative or absolute sense?

**In historical context**, is the rising state more powerful than the past?

**In diplomatic context** is the state more engaged in the world than previously?

**In competing context**, how do other states view the rising state having a larger role in the world than in the past?

**In domestic context**, does the state increasingly affect the lives of ordinary people?

**In terms of measures of power**, what are the net capabilities in terms of power projection, control over territory, alliance construction, share of world material capabilities, and the collective will to assume the role of a great power.

Keeping the above criterion in mind, does India deserve the status of a great power by any measure, has to be analysed by close examination of factors like the extent and strategic location of its territory; the size and dynamism of its population; the value and growth rate of its economy; the increased trade volume; the inflow of foreign direct investments; the entrepreneurial drive especially in cutting-edge sectors like information technology; the creation of an ever larger and ever more confident middle class and the strength of its military.

In international arena, United States needs India to become a true global power so as to guard her interests in the region. In the historical context India has all the advantages the United States once had in her infancy: size, diversity, strategic location, a stable government and a thriving economy. Now India aspires to convert these advantages into raw power. Nonetheless, world will not grant India that status because of her size and economic potential alone; India has to reach out and grab it<sup>3</sup>. This article is about a critical appraisal of the Indian competing prospects and problems; enabling or hindering to achieve such a coveted status.

### Important Landmarks from Indian History

In 1950, India's share of global wealth was just over four percent as compared to sixteen percent in 1820<sup>4</sup>; erosion of Indian wealth continued after independence. Marginal growth rates with phenomenal expansion in population made rich richer and poor a bit less poor. Between 1950 and 1980, the socialist model remained applied in India and produced disappointing results. Over a period of 30 years, India's gross domestic product (GDP) grew by an average of 3.7 per cent per annum while the population virtually got doubled from 372 to

689 million people. The per capita annual average growth rate was a mere 1.5 per cent. It came to be known as the '**Hindu Rate of Growth**'<sup>5</sup>.

In 1980s, the Indian Government displayed reluctance to turn back on longstanding policy of curbing and regulating the private sector. Rajiv Gandhi on assumption of office, committed himself to deregulation, import liberalization and access to foreign technology, recognizing the role of private sector in economic development.<sup>6</sup> It was only in the early 1990s that there was an evident radical change in course. The immediate cause for this change was the threat of bankruptcy facing the Indian state in 1991. Major shift in Indian foreign policy was also noticed in 1990s<sup>7</sup>. The cardinal of change included shift from a 'Socialist to building a 'Modern Capitalist Society' with increased emphasis on geo-economics. Here, India also started cherishing status of an emerging global power status with demonstration of flexibility to heed to pro-west alliances; shift from idealism to realism.

The "pro-business" reforms of Mr Rajiv's era were followed by what were known as the "pro-market" reforms spearheaded by Mr Manmohan Singh in 1991. Under these reforms, licence raj system was abolished; government allowed foreign direct investment (FDI) and opened up numerous state monopolies to private sector especially in telecommunications and air transport while the banking and financial systems were liberalized.

However, reforms fell short of being far-reaching, as the '**Inspector Raj**' system and the labour law remained untouched, but India finally opened up to an already globalized world. At the turn of the millennium, 'liberalization, privatization and globalization related economic reforms' surged the growth rate, touching the 8 percent mark for the first time in the financial year 2003-04 and the tempo was maintained in the following years. Given the high economic growth, the Indian media increasingly spread euphoria and the government was prompted to raise the growth target until World Economic Recession struck in 2008. Slogans of '**SHINING INDIA**' and '**INCREDIBLE INDIA**' were coined in the same period and projected to make the world believe what was far from reality.

In Oct 2012, second wave of reforms was approved by the Indian Cabinet, further facilitating FDI (51 percent in multi-brand retail, allowed foreign airlines to buy 49 percent stakes in Indian carriers, and raised the FDI cap in broadcasting services from 49 percent to 75 percent)<sup>8</sup>. The wave has injected some hopes in maintaining the desired growth rates. However, at the same time, it has also stirred the political undercurrents in the Congress led coalition (United Progressive Alliance) and the opposition.

### **India's Strategic Culture**

Indian strategic thought process and Foreign Policy has been influenced by the Kautilya's Arthashastra<sup>9</sup>. Mandala theory of foreign policy given by Kautilya, outlines cardinal principles<sup>10</sup> which are evident in the practice of Indian foreign policy:-

Ambition to increase power and territory should never be allowed to die down.

Always be wary of your neighbouring states. Consider them to be your enemies.

Establish friendly ties with neighbours of your neighbours.

Friendship with other states should always be to acquire benefits from such ties.

Greater powers should be cultivated, equal or weaker powers could be defeated through judicious alliances.

Weaker powers could be attacked, patronized or ignored.

Always be prepared for war using various stratagems and be ruthless in war.

Resort to propaganda, sabotage and psychological warfare against other states.

Infiltrate your agents to act as fifth columnists and all this should be done clandestinely.

Employ bribery and other means leading to economic strangulation of the adversary states.

Buy traitors in neighbouring states at all costs.

Peace should be invoked only when you feel that you are about to be defeated or that your interests will be served better by resorting to peace. Strike as soon as you are in a stronger position or your adversary is in disarray even if you have a treaty of peace with him.

### **Indian Emerging Strategic Orientation**

Presently, India is at a pivotal moment in its history. The extraordinary changes of the last two decades are fundamentally transforming Indian economy and society. The foundations of Indian success will, therefore, depend on its strategic and developmental orientation. Indian core objectives at strategic plane encompass<sup>11</sup>:-

Retain maximum strategic autonomy to pursue her developmental goals.

Deepening economic engagement with the outside world at all levels: trade, labour, technology and innovation. Correspondingly, an increasing range of Indian strategic interests entail, attracting maximum FDI through projection of soft power, securing energy and other vital natural resources, protecting the rights of Indian labour, maintaining and protect sea lines of communication, protecting Indian investments overseas and knowledge and knowledge production, especially the capacity to innovate and to generate new forms of knowledge.

Pacify the immediate neighbours especially China and Pakistan.

Become an indispensable power in the littorals of the Indian Ocean and south-western Pacific<sup>12</sup>.

Increase weight in global governance and eventually emerge as a "rule-maker"; quest for permanent seat at UNSC is crucial in this regard.

Strengthen military muscle for becoming a credible power.

**Indian Vision 2020.**<sup>13</sup> Indian elite has now started believing in 'India Vision 2020' that India should become part of the developed nations of the World. Objectives set forth are:-

India, by 2020 will be bustling with energy, entrepreneurship and innovation.

The country's 1.35 billion people will be better fed, dressed and housed, taller and healthier, more educated and longer living.

Silicon Valley will diversify from IT to biotechnology, medical sciences and other emerging fields of technology.

Economic disparities between the "Haves" and "Have nots" will reduce.

India will be integrated with the global economy and a major player in terms of trade, technology and investment.

Rising levels of education, employment and income will help stabilize India's internal security and social environment.

A socially united, militarily strong and economically prosperous India being far less vulnerable to external threats.

**Driving Factors for Rising India.** The following factors drive the Indian Vision of "Rising India":-

**Geostrategic Significance.** Indian geography is bestowed with abundant natural resources, diversity of landscapes and a dominating location in the Indian Ocean providing her the requisite power potential and geo-strategic advantage. It enables her to influence Indian Ocean as a counterweight to China and remain relevant to future global politics and help rise in the process. It is believed that India's power resides at the convergence of the United States' great interests; winning the war in Afghanistan, finding pivot in Asia-Pacific and the containment of China's growing assertiveness.

**National Political Will.** The fact remains that within last 19 years, India has experienced seven governments, 6 prime ministers but one direction which has managed average of 7.3% growth. According to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, priorities of India are<sup>14</sup>:-

**First,** India seeks rapid economic growth to accumulate wealth for the people.

**Second,** India seeks growth that creates employment and development that is socially and regionally balanced and inclusive.

**Third,** India seeks to build a modern, knowledge and science-based economy to complement agricultural and industrial base.

**Fourth,** India wants development to be sustainable so that the wealth of natural resources is conserved for future generations.

**Fifth,** India seeks a cooperative relationship with her neighbours and other partners so that all can prosper and benefit from each other.

**Sixth,** India seeks to realize its development ambitions within the framework of a plural and secular democracy.

**Democratic Values.** India has been a democracy for over six decades with fifteen General Elections to her credit. In this time, it has achieved some remarkable successes. Despite being severely critical of its politicians, the Indian electorate remains enthusiastic in its political participation especially at the elections with over 60% turnout rates; one of the highest in the world. However, it remains to be seen, whether India can redistribute the fruits of its economic growth to the wider society across the board.

**Macroeconomic Indicators.** India has been one of the world's best-performing economies since late 1990s, claiming to recover millions out of poverty. According to World Bank, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in India was worth 1.847 Trillion US dollars in 2011-12. Historically, from 1960 until 2012, India GDP averaged 368.8 Billion USD<sup>15</sup>. Sheer rise in reserves from one billion USD in 1991 to around 300 billion is a

great indicator of the immense Indian economic potential. India accounts for 1.3 percent of world merchandise trade and ranks 21<sup>st</sup> among leading exporting countries in the world. Among leading importers, India is ranked 14 and accounts for 2 percent of total global imports. India is ranked second after China in A.T.Kearney FDI Confidence Index 2012<sup>16</sup>. UNCTAD's World Investment Prospects Survey 2010-12 ranks India as second most favored investment destination (behind China). Symbols of India's new found wealth and power abound. In 2012, 55 Indians were included in Forbes' list of the world's billionaires, up from 23 in 2006. Indian firms have been going global; in 2006, Indian steel magnate Lakshmi Mittal purchased the French company Arcelor, creating the world's largest mining and steel firm; in 2008, the Indian conglomerate Tata purchased the iconic British Jaguar and Land Rover brands from Ford. India has spent \$514 billion in infrastructure development during the 11<sup>th</sup> Five Year Developmental Plan (2007-2012) and planning to invest approx one trillion USD in current 12<sup>th</sup> Five Year Developmental Plan (2012 - 2017)<sup>17</sup>. India is the leading country for offshore outsourcing. The offshore outsourcing industry started in India and it has been able to capture more than half the world offshore outsourcing industry.<sup>18</sup> One of the most dynamic contributors to the country's economic growth has been the information technology sector, employing 1.8 million workers directly with spin-off effect to other sectors like bio-pharmacy, healthcare and finance.

**English: Language of Success.** India is ranked second after USA with over 100 million population having expertise in speaking English<sup>19</sup>. This factor has greatly facilitated the entrance of Indian companies into position of global market leadership, thereby accelerating India's transition to a position of global economic leadership.

**Demographic Dividend.** India's biggest asset is its people. At a time when the industrialized world is aging rapidly, India has the advantage of a young population. It is expected that, in 2020, the average age of an Indian will be 29 years, compared to 37 for China and 48 for Japan. However, a young population is an asset only if it is educated, skilled and finds productive employment. India's demographic transition is presently well underway, and, unlike in China, the age structure of the population here is likely to evolve favourably over the next two to three decades<sup>20</sup>.

**Excellence in Higher Education Standards.** India has devoted a large proportion of its education resources to higher education, particularly in science and technology. There are 380 universities and 1,500 research institutes; from which 200,000 engineers, 300,000 technicians and 9,000 PhDs graduate every year<sup>21</sup>. Indian government is planning to create 800-1000 new universities in next one decade in collaboration with International Universities<sup>22</sup>. Central government spending on the social sector, including health care and education, has risen from 13.4 percent of the total budget in 2007 to 18.5 percent in 2012.

**Indian Diaspora.** The Indian Diaspora is strong and spread across all continents and most countries of the world. It is a great potential tool for attracting investment, accelerating industrial development and boosting international trade and tourism effort for India. Only in US, Indian Diaspora today stands over 3 million. While the 2012 presidential election drew less than 1 million voters from the community; Indian-Americans are becoming very visible in the political scene<sup>23</sup>. Such an influential Indian Diaspora also provides strong guarantee for developing a long term Indo-US strategic

partnership. Similarly, a large number of influential politicians, businessmen, professional and think tanks are pursuing a supporting agenda for India in major power centres across the world.

**Soft Power.** India's soft power has now been on display for many decades: Indian philosophy has captivated Western minds since the 1960s; Bollywood's impressive celluloid fare has long drawn huge audiences in Asia, Africa, and beyond.<sup>24</sup> Indian government's efforts over the last decade have further helped promote a new and modern image of India abroad. Simultaneously many aspects of Indian culture like music, food, style and religions have become fashionable in many parts of the world.

**India's Military.** Indian military is in the process of modernization and creating force structures that are capable of undertaking network-centric warfare on land, at sea, and in the air. Gradually, but perceptibly, the Indians are upgrading their capabilities, enhancing their kinetic effectiveness and command and control, and improving interoperability. Indian army is preparing to join the navy and the air force in launching intervention operations in India's area of strategic interest.<sup>25</sup> Indian ambitious Maritime Capabilities Perspective Plan seeks to dominate the Indian Ocean region by acquiring blue and brown water operational capability<sup>26</sup> while effectively countering current and emerging threats closer to the coastline. Besides, India's traditional strategic sphere lay between the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Malacca; but with Indian's global footprint expanding, the Indian Air Force is preparing to be ready to serve wherever the country's future strategic interests lie. Indian claim to a world-power status has been greatly facilitated by acquiring nuclear capability having de facto approval of the West.

### **Analysis of Indian Status as a Rising Power**

Despite a spectacular growth story, since 2011, India's growth started slackening. Its national deficit is growing, and inflation is rising after having fallen between early 2010 and early 2012. Indian plans to build a more inclusive nation are in disarray. Income inequality has risen besides accentuating social inequities amongst various segments of society. Access to basic services, such as water, health care, and sanitation, remains woefully inadequate. Meanwhile, the country's democracy putters along, but in the absence of a dynamic leadership, policymaking has come to a halt, few term it as a policy paralysis. That is the reason that Rising India preposition seems to have gone from a near-sure thing to, a 50-50 bet<sup>27</sup>. Interestingly, there are more skeptics in India than abroad, about the myth of India's leap forward to development. Some of them have reservations about the mode of change while others dispute the projected outcome of reforms. Quite a few critics, in particular left-leaning analysts, are prone to seeing India's passage to development as an overblown success story<sup>28</sup>. Indian predicament and fault lines posing obstacle to the global status of India are discussed in succeeding lines.

### **Political Front**

**Plight of Coalition Government.** Getting the liberalized reforms' agenda through the political elite remains a bigger challenge than to craft and implement them. As Mr Manmohan Singh said in March 2012, "**The difficult decisions we have to make, are made even more difficult because we are a coalition government.**" That means, he continued, that "**we have to formulate policy with the need to maintain consensus**"<sup>29</sup>

which otherwise remains a daunting challenge in the purview of respective vested interests.

**Lack of Federal Approach on Foreign Policy**<sup>30</sup> Interesting fact remains that people in the Indian states don't care about global issues while Foreign policy is reckoned as headache for the center alone. Tamil Nadu looks to Far East and especially to Sri Lanka; and cares about the global technology revolution. Mumbai watches and weighs on the Straits of Hormuz and piracy off the west coast of Africa. Gujrat cares about Middle East oil, and joins Jammu and Kashmir in a persistent focus on Pakistan.

**Relations with Immediate Neighbours.** "India is a big country with a small heart"<sup>31</sup>. India has always been suspicious of most of its neighbours, like Sri Lanka, Nepal, Maldives, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Pakistan, for helping powers inimical to India and for aiding insurgencies within India. It should be interesting to note that farther East in the region, India has started actualizing the benefits of her 'Look East' policy in the shape of closer relations with ASEAN countries. Farther West, India is investing and engaging pro-actively with CARs in order to become a relevant player in 'New Great Game', but has not been able to do so in its immediate neighbourhood in true Chankyan tradition. India's inability to come to terms with neighbours is likely to impede her ambitions in the long run.

### **Economic Front**

Recent growth especially in 2011/12 is not only poor but also one of the lowest in the last 9 years<sup>32</sup>. This phenomenon has resulted due to serious deficiencies in terms of infrastructure shortages, large fiscal deficit, high inflation, restrictive labour regulations, poorly reformed financial sector and overall energy shortages. Indian currency has devalued by 20.7% since last one year while Indian Rupee exchange rate against USD declined from INR 35 to 58<sup>33</sup>, and the trend continues. Tax to GDP ratio stood at 11.7%, ranking 206 in the world. Industrial production growth rate have been 4.8% ranking 69<sup>th</sup> in the world. A high level of public debt (63%) limits the ability of the authorities to produce public services.

Despite second wave of economic liberalization in Oct 2012, a whole range of regulations still create a stifling environment for most businesses in India. In addition, the Indian agricultural sector, which accounts for around 15 percent of the country's GDP and employs about 50% of its workforce, is constant cause for worry. Swings in food prices, a heavy burden on India's poor and farmers, has the potential to throw the economy into disarray at any time. India produces more food than is needed for internal consumption, but is nevertheless a net importer of food. This is due to lack of access to local markets, and a huge waste of food.

Besides, with a desired GDP growth rate of at least 7 to 8 percent, the energy requirements of India are expected to grow at 5.6-6.4 percent per annum over the next few years<sup>34</sup>. This implies a four-fold increase in India's energy requirement over the next 25 years and India faces significant challenges to meet this. Similarly, International Energy Agency predicts that by 2020, 327 GW of power generation capacity will be needed, which would imply an addition of 16 GW per year.

### **Social Front**

**Corruption.** It has long been a serious problem in India. Pervasive, major, and high-level corruption and iniquity is identified as a central obstacle to India's economic and

social development. It is seen as a key cause of a steep decline in foreign investment. Long list of mega scams have left the Indian government largely paralyzed and unable to effectively govern to date. The most notorious cases include, the government's sale of broadband licenses at far below market prices<sup>35</sup>, Coal Gate Scam involving Indian Premier and Tata Truck Scam involving Indian Army<sup>36</sup>.

**General Disappointment.** Indian public did have some reasonable economic expectations; the ones set by the Indian government itself through number of economic reforms that were supposed to create a new social contract for the country. Under new initiatives; the resulting growth should have benefit everyone as it would have expanded the country's tax base and led to a boost in government revenues. In turn, those funds could be spent on health care, education, and improved infrastructure for the poor. But unfortunately, Indian social contract has not panned out as planned.

**Poverty and Other Social Indicators.** Despite impressive economic growth, India continues to fare poorly in human development measures; the U.N.'s 2012 Human Development Index ranked India 127<sup>th</sup> among 169 countries. Nearly 380 million Indians still live on less than a dollar a day. Market reforms have focused on creating private wealth rather than expanding access to healthcare and education. Despite India's growing economy, 2.5 million<sup>37</sup> Indian children die annually. In the countryside where 70 per cent of India's population lives, according to official reports, about, 0.25 million farmers committed suicide in last 13 years<sup>38</sup>.

**Caste Discrimination.** India's stratified caste system is as oppressive social division as apartheid was in South Africa. Barring a few exceptions, the lowest of the low castes, now called *Dalits*, could still be described as the 'wretched of the earth.'

**Communal Factor.** Hindus have a preponderant majority (around 81 per cent) and the religious minorities are not in a position to pose a threat to majority rule or its economic power. The religious minorities have been the victims of a raw deal as they have suffered loss of life, dignity and property in the scores of mass riots triggered by Hindu fanatics, apart from facing the ordeal of enduring discrimination, segregation and suppression.

**Fissiparous Tendencies.** Most of the Indian states have some regional movement or demands: Telangana, Vidarbha, Bodoland, Gorkhaland, Khalistan and a host of identical movements represent local caste and class interests which are politically neglected. Though Indian government is successful in handling a number of separatist movements and freedom struggles yet some of them still pose a serious threat including Kashmir, Naxalite Movement and Assam.

## **Military Build-up**

It is a crucial variable in international power politics. Thus when one refers to a 'Rising India,' one cannot overlook the military aspect of its development. However, behind the facade of India's growing military power lies the hard reality that its indigenous defence production has virtually been a non-starter. The hollowness of India's development is best illustrated by its continuing dependence on import of arms, notably from Russia and now increasingly from the western camp.

India has neither been able to produce a locally made tank or a field gun and a similar fate has befallen the efforts to produce an indigenous aircraft for the fast expanding air force which has been shopping around the world to seek higher quality merchandise. India cannot

hope to win universal recognition for what some people call its 'quantum leap' to progress as long as it has 'imperial urge' but is not able to produce at home the arms and equipment it requires to sustain its military build-up.

## **Media**

India has stirred the world imagination more because of its exotic and esoteric qualities than because of its power and influence as a state<sup>39</sup>. The 'charm-offensive' of soft power through vibrant media and diplomacy hide deeper social issues that plague Indian society including human rights violations, abject poverty as well as larger issues like nuclear proliferation. Instead an organized publicity campaign is ushered to project the Rising India in a falsified manner. Case in point is the impressive yet falsified figures of leading Indian Diaspora in US, which were picked up from the hoax internet blogs by the Indian Minister of State for Human Resource Development, and presented in the Indian Parliament claiming 38 per cent of doctors in US are Indians, as are 36 per cent of NASA scientists and 34 per cent of Microsoft employees<sup>40</sup>. Fact remains that there was no survey that established these numbers, Spam has finally found its way into the Indian parliament dressed up as fact and propagated by entire Indian Media.

## **Conclusions**

India is trying hard to become a permanent member of United Nation's Security Council which in turn would certify Indian status as a major power. Paramount requirement to march towards the status of great power is to achieve stability on the domestic front. India's internal security situation is a recipe for disaster.<sup>41</sup> India is a stable democracy though may not be an all inclusive arrangement, yet her visionary leadership has dared the challenges of globalization.

South Asia is characterized by endemic instability; unresolved territorial issues and rivalries limit India's ability to take a more active global role. Without establishing good working relations with all its neighbours especially China and Pakistan, status of a great power seems a distant reality for India. India confronts a delicate balance to either compete or contest with China, while leveraging the attractive US linchpin pivot status; either way India will not accept any leverage on her projected Strategic Autonomy.

India is determined to carry on with the strategic alliance with USA. The Indian-Russian relationship is not as intimate as before, however, relationship has survived and reflects common interests. China and India are having increasingly complex and intertwined relations. India is tempted to keep Iran engaged, however, much will depend on US-Iran relations. Indian stable political institutions with strong democratic processes in vogue give a cushion to absorb economic and social shocks.

India is developing its military machine including the nuclear capability to implement the political policies while being effective across the entire spectrum of all possible conflicts in the region. India will continue to strengthen / modernize armed forces and missiles / nuclear capabilities under the pretext of the Chinese threat. Indian defence spending are by and large pegged around 2 to 2.5% of her total GDP, which is not in commensuration with her ambitious goals. Immediate Indian modernization drive is primarily directed to gain the South Asian hegemony, projecting her as a regional power, while contemplating a global role in near future. Mega scale induction plans scaling up to US\$ 150 billion in

next decade provide additional diplomatic leverage to India in pursuing her relations with Western power centres.

Indian rise has been economic centric, sustained growth rate over 7% in last one decade is a promising potential while projected growth of 8-10 percent does not seem a reality at least in short to mid-term. Indian soft power backed by influential Diaspora and proactive media galvanize increased international interests and foreign direct investment opportunities in India. However, Indian goals set as part of Vision 2020 does not seem plausible and attainable in the given timeframe. Though demographic sweet spot is in sight, yet demography can be a threat to stability if job creation does not keep pace with the population growth. India requires 10-13 Million jobs annually in next two decades as more people are entering into the sweet spot. As long as India suffers from the malaise of mass poverty and unemployment, its economic growth will remain a dubious indicator of progress and development.

India's economic growth has not been comprehensive, but rather uneven and lopsided due to following:-

Job generation, education, health, services like roads, electricity, water supply, etc, have conspicuously lagged behind.

Social change has not kept pace with technological advancement.

India has a conflict-prone society. Communalism, caste difference, rich and poor divide are major source of social strife and violence.

Given the raw deal to minorities, backward sections of the society and the rural poor, a sense of deprivation has set in a process of alienation reflected in insurgencies.

Nonetheless, world is so completely enamoured of India's "growth story" that it seems willing to ignore the simple fact that India is home to the largest population of the poor, hungry and malnourished in any country on the planet.

**Revisiting the Fundamental Criterion.** After browsing different dimensions of Indian power potentials, here is a re-visit to the six criterion questions discussed at the start of the paper.

In material context, "is there an increase in Indian capabilities in either relative or absolute sense?" – **Answer is Yes, however, not enough.**

In historical context, "is India more powerful than the past?" – **Answer is Not exactly, as India has not yet proven her credentials outside India.**

In diplomatic context, "is India more engaged in the world than previously?" **Answer is partially Yes, however, India continues to discriminate her immediate neighbours.**

In competing context, "how do other states view India having a larger role in the world than in the past?" **Not exactly as mere US strategic partnership will not fetch India, the status of becoming a lead rule maker in the world.**

In domestic context, "does the state increasingly affect the lives of ordinary people?" **Answer is No.**

In terms of measures of power, "what are the net capabilities in terms of power projection, control over territory, alliance construction, share of world material

capabilities, and the collective will to assume the role of a great power)?" **India's growing power does not seem reason enough to count her among the 'great powers,' as long as its vast majority of people are forced to live a life of misery, deprivation and social discrimination.**

### **Implications of India attaining a Great Power Status for Pakistan**

Growing Indian international / regional influence will reduce leverage for Pakistan especially in the realm of both conflict management and resolution.

In an idealist scenario, Indian quest to gain great power status may motivate her to pacify Pakistan's concern on bilateral issues, however, in a realistic scenario India is not likely to leave any space which can be exploited by Pakistan.

In case India is unable to mend fences with China, then clash of interests of two giants will seriously affect Pakistan's stability situation.

Growing political clout inside Afghanistan especially Post 2014, will be detrimental to Pakistan's interests in the region.

Increased Indian military capability will accentuate both conventional and strategic asymmetry; it may also affect our strategic capability of 'Credible Minimum Nuclear Deterrence'.

Indian presence in Indian Ocean close to our EEZ / territorial water will present a continuous threat to our SLOCs as well as the coastal belt.

Enlarging threat paradigm would put added pressure on national exchequer to maintain the large standing armed forces.

Indian new found status will be equally damaging to Pakistan defence acquisition especially from the Western bloc.

India is likely to exploit Pakistan's internal vulnerabilities and will induce internal instability to force continued commitment of armed forces in sub-conventional warfare.

In an idealistic scenario, where India may seek an energy corridor through Pakistan besides manifestation of New Silk Road initiative taking roots, Pakistan will definitely get benefited in a big way. However, it remains to be a distant possibility.

Notwithstanding, gradually increasing Indian economic stakes, may it be in the shape of energy corridor or other trade equations inside Pakistan, would facilitate overall stability in the region.

### **Policy Recommendations**

The foremost recommendation is to ensure internal stability of Pakistan because the threat of implosion from within is far more serious than all the external threats including India combined.

Second recommendation is to strive for greater peace in the region through an all inclusive approach with primacy of normalization of relations with India. Three factors motivate this recommendation:-

**First**, regional security is likely to be achieved only if at least some degree of cooperation is attained amongst the primary state actors.

**Second**, Pakistan and India both cannot further their respective developmental agendas without bilateral cooperation.

**Third**, although skepticism prevails yet, there are likely significant security, governance and economic advantages for both countries, should they find more common grounds.

## Conclusion

India has the potential and ambitions too, to secure a key role in the great political struggles of the next decades. Whether it will, and how soon, depends on variety of factors as alluded above. Notwithstanding India is being projected as a roaring capitalist success story; she still needs to address mammoth challenges which are fundamental in nature. At this point therefore, it is too early to call India as a global player.

*Researchers: M/Gen Muhammad, T/R/Adm Rosaryo (Sri Lanka) , Lt Col Sarfraz, Mr Ghulam Qadir*  
*Supervisor Mrs Nighat Mehroze*

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## **RISING POWERS AND GLOBAL BALANCE OF POWER**

*“The inevitable never happens. It is the unexpected always”*

*Lord Keynes*

### **Introduction**

No one can forecast the future with certainty, though immediate future can be predicted with relative correctness based on contemporary realities, tendencies, drivers and trends. The cold war has ended. The US no longer faces the constant threat of aggression from its erstwhile adversary, the former USSR. Did someone ever forecast the demise of USSR, US emerging as the sole super power or the attack on the Twin Towers? Throughout history we can see the “Balance of Power Concept” in action. The clearest example of the balance of power concept can be found in the Cold War wherein two superpowers, the US and the USSR, held world balance between them. Both states sought to deter domination by the other through arms build up and the creation of strong systems of alliances.

In the contemporary world, power is distributed in a complex manner. Militarily the world is largely uni-polar; economically it is multi-polar, while in the third tier we find the transnational relations that goes beyond the borders and also outside the government control. Sequel to the Cold War, the United States emerged as the sole super power in the world. No single state acted as effective counterweight to the US. However, some shifts have been witnessed recently due to globalization, market forces and operation of non state actors without regard for national boundaries and loyalties.

### **HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF BALANCE OF POWER**

#### **Prehistoric and Medieval Periods**

Irrigation systems, bureaucracies, and large armies came into existence in China (403-221 BC) with the development of large and cohesive states. States pursued their interests through alliances. In Greece as well, during the Peloponnesian Wars (431-404 BC), the hegemony of Athens triggered the formation of city-states’ coalition that felt threatened by Athenian power.

#### **Pre World Wars Period**

During the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648), Sweden, England, France, and The Netherlands formed an alliance and defeated the leaders of the Habsburg Empire. In 1815, France was beaten by a broad nexus of European states including Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia. A broad coalition called ‘the concert of Europe’ emerged and balanced the power in the continent of Europe. This alliance between Russia, Britain, France Prussia and Austria maintained balance of power in a manner that no state was able to dominate the other.

#### **Inter and Intra World Wars Period (1914-1945)**

At the outbreak of First World War, all states made endeavours to ensure that balance of power remains intact, however due to irresponsible behaviour of some kings and princes and that of their states, the efforts could not be realized. German rulers floated the idea that her neighbours were harbouring evil designs and thus the sovereignty of Germany was being challenged. On the other hand, the neighbours were of the view that Germany was becoming very powerful and their ideals in the continent were at risk. Therefore a strong and formidable alliance was constituted in Europe. Threat from Germany was so grave that even USA parted

ways with its concept of neutrality and joined the European Alliance. Almost a similar environment was experienced before World War II.

### **Cold War Period**

USA and the USSR entered in a direct confrontation mode however nuclear weapons prevented both from entering into an armed conflict. This state of strategic parity gave birth to cold war. This parity evolved with passage of time in a manner that both sides exercised strategic restraint to the extent that even a signal would be avoided which could trigger a nuclear war between the two and thus the balance of power was maintained. The environment started changing with the collapse of the USSR.

### **Post Cold War**

This period saw the demise of USSR and America USA surfaced as the only super power which had the capacity, capability and resolve to project and demonstrate power in any part of the world. Such contemporary dictates compelled other countries to either totally side with the USA or give their silent willingness on major world issues.

### **Conclusions from Historical Perspective**

Striking conclusions of the post cold war power balance are as under:-

The end of the Cold War and the ongoing integration of economies as a consequence of globalization raise some questions, among others, is the question as to the validity of balance of power concept in today's world.

Concept of Balance of Power has also transformed from linear threats to non traditional and non linear ones. The rise of non state actors is one such phenomenon.

Post cold war era reintroduces the phenomena of colonization with changed face of chaining the third world through economic, trade and technology transfer policies under the umbrella of IMF, World Bank, various technological regimes and UN.

Traditional concept of sovereignty of states has transformed.

## **MYTHS AND REALITIES OF RISING POWERS**

### **Preamble**

Power shifts generate strategic responses by the established powers with a view to ensue protraction of the already established powers. The present world order is experiencing subtle changes. With the rise of BRICS, Turkey, South Korea, Australia etc, there is a greater talk of new powers rising and likely to dominate the world scene in the future. This, however, needs a more critical review. With a wider perception of US decline as the worlds' only super power, there is a sense that the 21<sup>st</sup> century will belong to Asia. Notwithstanding, the popular perceptions about US decline, she still dominates the world. Some pertinent terms are explained below to understand the myths and realities about rising powers.

### **Definitions**

**Rising Power.** Rising power is a 'national power' having certain ingredients to threaten the status quo of global settings. Pedelford and Lincoln have described it as: "Strength composed of economic, psychological, moral, military and political elements, successfully directed to the furtherance of national interests, constitute rising national

power”. Rising power operates in international field in this sense. However, it should be noted that the concept of rising power is **Relative, Conditional and Situational**.

**Relativity of Rising Power.** It is relative in that it has no absolute dimension. Power is rated by the effect it can bring about. For instance, India is stronger than Brazil but at the same time weaker than China in terms of economic might.

**Conditional.** Rising power is conditional in that it depends on variety of factors, the exact role of which is difficult to assess. States ‘A’ and ‘B’ may have equal resources, military strength etc yet they may differ in effective power. A strong sentiment of Nationalism, for instance, in State ‘A’ may inspire popular support to government action and policies and may prepare the people for greater sacrifices. If any such sentiment is totally absent in State ‘B’ and the nation is torn by intense internal dissensions, this may make it weaker vis-à-vis ‘A’ despite its equal or even superior resources and military preparedness. India and Brazil are cases in point.

**Situational.** Rising power is situational in the sense that it depends on specific international situation. Despite unchanged condition of resources and military might of both, the power equation between States A and B may change because of changed international situation. Development of friendly relations between America and India and the formation of an unwritten alliance between US, India and Israel have affected China and Pakistan equation with her neighbours.

### **Shift in Global Balance of Power - A Myth or Reality**

The question is whether American power is about to see an absolute decline or comparative decline. Whatever shape it assumes, global shift of power to Asia would invariably accompany new contours, challenges and opportunities. Without wishing to predict the future, and instead taking the current situation as a starting point, the international system is characterized by three general tendencies; a new international order which is both uni and multi-polar at the same time, rise of Asia (China) which will come to dominate the 21<sup>st</sup> century in the economic dimensions of world order and the (re)enforcing of the religion.

### **New Uni and Multi-Polar International Order**

#### **Moving Towards Geo-Economics**

The current constellation of global forces and alliances is much less clear than it was in the two previous stages. In this third stage, a world order which is multi-polar and uni-polar at the same time is taking shape. It amounts to an a la carte menu which makes room for both old and new powers as well as old and new alliances. The world is uni-polar in the military and political spheres on account of the clear domination of USA, and multi-polar in all other facets of international relations. The upcoming world economies of the BRICS-countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South-Africa) up to now seem to follow an approach of pursuing geo-economics while avoiding re-opening the existing conflicts, at least for the time being. China is following a comprehensive approach towards national power. India is also pursuing geo economics while simultaneously modernizing its military might for a more dominant and perceived global role.

Sanjaya Baru puts it: *“India’s economic opening up in 1991 created the basis for India’s re-integration with not just the global economy but also its own wider Asian*

*neighbourhood. That was the geopolitical and strategic consequence of India's improved economic performance and greater openness since 1991. India's "Look East" and "Look West" policies were logical consequences of her re-integration into the global economy. The geo-economic and geopolitical consequences of the reforms of 1991 were not an accident. They were well understood at the time based on an analysis of what had happened to the "closed" Soviet and Soviet-style economies in the 1970s and especially 1980s, and the "open" economies of East Asia, including Dengist China."*

### **Contemporary Political Order-Future Trajectories**

Nothing dominates the current global political landscape more than the USA being the sole Super Power. The US is currently the only country that has the military might which influences global affairs and deploys military power across the globe. However, there are other power centres such as China, EU and Russia. NATO also figures out at this power calculus. The current uni-polarism has presented attendant consequences for the world. This has been seen in unprecedented anti US sentiment around the globe. Conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and the US- Iran debacle therefore reflect a current global political system which is becoming increasingly unstable partly due to US unilateralism.

### **The New Hierarchy of International States**

When considering the international state hierarchy, various terms continue to co-exist which have not been clearly defined.

**Superpower and Global/ Great Power.** Besides quantifiable statistics, two components which are more difficult to evaluate are prerequisites: first of all, an efficient diplomacy and foreign policy capable of projecting power and, secondly, the perception and/or recognition of that status of power by the world at large. This qualifies super power like USA or global/great power like China, EU, and Russia etc. The other quantifiable data also allow us to single out a number of influential countries by size, economic weight, growth, military capacity or their contribution to the international system. Apart from these criteria, there are other factors which allow us to reassess certain countries in the international hierarchy, even though these may not be great or global powers, yet their importance is felt around the world for one reason or the other: above all, the demand for energy, which justifies the international importance of Iran, Iraq and even Russia in the international system. To a large extent, oil also explains Middle Eastern countries' strategic position in international politics. After all, a third of all "black gold" is produced in Arab states. Another criterion is a country's technological level, something which explains, amongst other things, China's economic success (electronics industry) and also India's (software). Another more recent element is the use of religion as a political instrument, justifying the international relevance which countries like Israel, Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan have acquired in recent years.

**Emerging Powers, Medium Size/Regional and Smaller Powers.** In terms of quantifiable data, China tops the list along with India and Brazil, in the hierarchy of international power. Other countries (like Mexico, Turkey, Australia, Indonesia or South Africa) are on the waiting list or in the "second row". In line with this, apart from

the so-called BRICS whose basis is economic, other emerging powers with global influence can be identified: in terms of hard or military power, Pakistan (nuclear power) and Iran (potential nuclear power), in terms of economic weight, Mexico and South Africa and, for reasons of population, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nigeria also feature.

## **Emerging Blocks**

It is commonly perceived that some emerging blocks and regional alliances like SCO, ASEAN and BRICS respectively will gradually transform the existing power balance in the future.

**Shanghai Cooperation Organization – SCO.** SCO was originally founded to counter terrorism and separatism on its member states' territory. The security interests of the organization are now increasingly complemented by economic and trade issues. The bloc is expected to counter US influence in areas including Chinese neighbourhood and Russia's 'near abroad'.

**Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS).** The BRICS thesis posits that China and India will become the world's dominant suppliers of manufactured goods and services, respectively, while Brazil and Russia will become similarly dominant as suppliers of raw materials. It is important to note that the Goldman Sachs thesis isn't that these countries are a political alliance (like the European Union) or a formal trading association - but they have the potential to form a powerful economic bloc.

## **Regionalism**

Major regional forums include the European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Organization of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to count few of them. Regionalism appears to be growing rapidly. Regionalism in fact is a by-product of globalization, yet, it offers a collective response to the coercive dimensions of globalization. Therefore, the political unanimity of thought against countries of a particular regional organization such as ASEAN would not be easy to muster when seen in the backdrop of such coercion if applied against a country which is not part of any such regional dispensation.

## **Analysis**

There are three possibilities that could lead to the end of this liberal international order.

Though it is possible that another hegemon would rise at some point, this is unlikely to happen at least in the next two decades. We have had two dramatic transitions in the global system in the last century, but both happened as a consequence of the collapse of major powers. The end of the Second World War saw the demise of not just Germany and Japan but many European great powers, leaving a bipolar order dominated by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 converted that bipolar system into a unipolar one. While there are plenty of predictions of other great powers rising, there are none that suggest the U.S. will collapse. And short of that, what we are likely to witness are gradual rather than dramatic changes in the balance of power, and these will take a lot longer than two decades.

The second possibility, more probable than the first, is the rise of several new powers such as China, Russia, Brazil, India, South Africa, Australia, Turkey and South Korea who are growing strong enough to share the stage with proportional strength with

the U.S., even if they do not necessarily match the U.S. Such a multi-polar order could gradually erode the current international liberal order. But this will not be because these powers do not share the norms of the current liberal international order, but because the coordination and management problems become greater as the number of great powers populating the international system grows.

The third possibility has been little discussed but it deserves greater attention – the likelihood that the U.S. declines as a power with global managerial capacity but no other power rises to take up the slack. This reverses many current expectations: instead of others rising to meet the U.S., the U.S. declines to meet the others at a much lower level of capability. Such a system would not be so much global as regional, dominated by regional hegemony that are strong enough to control their immediate environs but who have insufficient capacity to act globally.

### **Conclusions from the Emerging World Order**

In the face of the growing importance of the Asian continent, Europe, above all, but also the USA, will not see their relevance diminished at the international level. Technological base and incontestable military power will continue to enable USA to influence the military scene, however in the political arena, it is likely to resort to alliances with other power centres to accrue political nuisance. The likely partners are members of ASEAN in East Asia, (Asia Pacific) with an intended lead role for Australia, India in lead role in South Asia (Indian Ocean). Israel will continue to enjoy the status quo in ME. The three Asian countries, China, India and Japan, belong to the reduced circle of great powers. Because of its size, economic weight and military budget, China is already a world power, even if it has not yet reached that status in the international political sphere. India's position is hazy, but it is rising rapidly in the hierarchy of international states, however India's inherent social fault lines are a constant and continuous drag thereby confronting it with more uncertainties. Notwithstanding the above, this century will belong to Asia, under the shared or contested leadership of China, Russia, Japan, South Korea and India, being more prominent. Saudi Arabia will continue to retain its influence in the Muslim World while also balancing its relations with the US and China. It will be the centre of gravity of OPEC. Chinese influence will grow in Africa in the economic arena, however may be at the cost of a contest by some European states and the US. SCO is likely to transform into a more meaningful and productive power bloc. Revival of religion in Turkey will not enable it to acquire membership in EU; however her influence in ME, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan will increase manifold. Russia on its own would achieve enhanced role in world affairs. If in synergy with China, would even challenge US dominance. CARs would remain under Russian influence. The new trade and energy corridors will lead to new alliances.

The resurgence of religion as a political factor is not only tied to Islamic fundamentalism, but can also be found in India (rise of BJP) and the West, particularly in the USA, and some Latin American countries whose governments resort to God and the Bible. This phenomenon increases the risk of creating exclusive, closed nationalisms which live off external enemies. The world order could be; Superpower (USA); Global power (China, Russia, EU); Emerging powers (Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, Korea) and Medium sized powers (Canada, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Australia). It is important to note that Pakistan has not figured out among the countries with progressive and prosperous trajectories.

## **PAKISTAN – 2050: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES**

### **Prelude**

Thus far, we have discussed the existing and probable power centres in the world. In this part, we will focus on Pakistan, envision it in year 2050 and evaluate its challenges and opportunities. Interplay of host of external and internal factors, linear and vertical; generate a mosaic of difficult challenges for Pakistan. Here, an attempt would be made to project future scenarios for Pakistan based on the drivers from international power calculus/ environment to enable us see Pakistan from an international perspective and ascertain its position accordingly. Before it is done, there are some key questions to be raised. Answers to these questions are uncertain and ambiguous. Only time can tell.

**Global**

Will Pakistan be able to ensure relevance to the international community, where would Pakistan figure out in the global context? Will Russia and China synergy leave US behind in assertions on the global issues, if yes, what options will be left for Pakistan, if no, what will Pakistan do? What will be the state of Globalization? What part of globalization will Pakistan benefit from?

**Regional**

Will relations with India significantly improve- Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek, water disputes and issues resolved? Will we see Afghanistan as a stable country, self governing and self sustaining? Will China suffer friendship fatigue with Pakistan or enter into institutionalized strategic partnership? Will China-India relations transform at the cost of Pakistan?

**Domestic**

Will our governance quality and structures improve? Will our economy improve dependence on IFIs reduced and indigenous natural resources tapped? Will terrorism recede and security situation improve, Balochistan imbroglio resolved?

**SWOT Analysis, Trends and Drivers**

The spectrum of Pakistan’s political, economic, and social and security domains are full of vulnerabilities, insecurities, strengths and hopes. The SWOT analysis is as under:-


<p><b>Strengths</b></p> <p>Abundant natural resources, hydro power potential, low cost human resource, Pakistani Diaspora, resilient society, geo-strategic location and relevance and military and nuclear deterrence.</p>	<p><b>Weaknesses</b></p> <p>Poor economy, internal security instability due to terrorism, extremism, ethnicity and sectarianism, absence of HRD, high population growth rate, absence of strategic leadership, poor governance, social injustice and corruption, political expediencies, absence of National Security Policy framework and image deficit.</p>
<p><b>Opportunities</b></p> <p>Relevance in the contemporary international environment.</p> <p>Potential to exploit regional, global energy/ trade links.</p> <p>Exploration of untapped natural</p>	<p><b>Threats</b></p> <p>Economic instability, population explosion and raw youth bulge, Violent Non State Actors, absence of national cohesion, political expediency at the cost of national interests, social injustice, spill-over effects of instability in Afghanistan, kinetic and non-kinetic threats from India, presence of</p>

resources. Continuation of democratic process. Post 2014 Afghanistan. Diversification of geo-economic/geo-political relations with emerging power centres.	ERF in the region, ecological changes and geographic fault lines.
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Major international trends along with key drivers acting as catalyst for change are:

Mega and Domestic Trends	Drivers-Catalysts of Change
Shift from geo-politics to geo-economics. Globalization. Rise of Asia as economic centre of gravity. Anti Americanism. Trade ties with India. Consensus on Afghan led and owned peace process. Media activism. Susceptibility to violation of sovereignty. Religious and sectarian militancy.	<b>Economy.</b> States' international status is being ascertained through its economic prowess. <b>Security/Transnational Terrorism.</b> World's unanimity against terrorism and those sponsoring it, invites a global response. Current environment and terrorism threshold in Pakistan puts it in the eye of the storm at international level. <b>Quest for Energy and Natural Resources.</b> Powerful countries continue to access new sources of energy and natural resources to keep their economic engines running.

**Scenarios.** Four scenarios based on critical drivers; i.e., economy and security are visualised as under:-



## **Scenario 1 - Prosperous Pakistan**

### **Assumptions**

Security situation is improved. Al Qaeda defeated and Taliban emancipated in political process of Afghanistan.

TTP emancipated and marginalized.

Economy improved.

Relations with US are friendly, China has become a strategic partner, India and Pakistan enjoy good working relations, and relations with Russia strategized. Afghanistan has friendly outlook towards Pakistan.

Pakistan's relevance in the geo-political and geo-economic environment has been accepted and actualized.

Dependence on IFIs reduced, FDIs pouring in and exploration of natural resources operationalized to a great extent.

### **Scenario Unfolding**

The fusion of better security and good economy would have eradicated most of Pakistan's social and security problems. Pakistan would have become a productive member of the international community. A new social contract would be regulating the collective behaviour. Foreign direct investments would have enabled Pakistan to explore its true potential of natural resources, energy needs, water management etc. Our core issues with India would have been mostly resolved. Trade links with CARs would have been established and Pakistan would be a thriving market and transit for trade. Tourism would be flourishing and our deserts and mountains would be hotspots for international expeditions. Quality communication infrastructure would be in place. Education would be thriving. Major metropolitans would be hubs of excellence in IT, science and technology. Peace and tranquillity would be prevailing.

## **Scenario 2 - Hope in Sight**

### **Assumptions**

Transnational terrorism reduced. VNSAs being integrated into mainstream social order.

Relations with US are friendly, China has become a strategic partner, India and Pakistan enjoy good working relations, and relations with Russia strategized. Afghanistan has friendly outlook towards Pakistan.

Pakistan's relevance in the geo-political and geo-economic environment has been accepted.

Dependence on IFIs though reduced, yet radiates challenges for policy makers. Confidence of foreign investors is still in the embryonic stages however, some FDIs have started pouring in. Efforts to explore natural resources are in hand, full potential not yet realized.

Trade links and corridors for CARs are not fully actualized.

### **Scenario Unfolding**

The accumulative effects of better security and relatively poor economy would be seen in the shape of setting the course right through strategic orientation. In this scenario, time would

be the essence. The economic dividends would not be experienced in the short term; however it would start appearing in mid to long term perspective. This will be somewhat closer to the Malaysian model in which the essence was to restructure and reform the institutions and systems and put them in line with international pre-requisites. Law and order situation would gradually improve, unrest and crime would recede. Hope would start influencing collective behaviour patterns. Seeing the resolve and competence of political leadership, the FDIs would also gradually but slowly start pouring in. Benefits from indigenous natural resources would become more visible. The country would be on the right trajectory to progress and prosperity.

### **Scenario 3 - Anarchy Reigns**

#### **Assumptions**

Domestic insecurity prevails. VNSAs are ensuring relevance and nuisance through high profile violent activities.

Pakistan's capacity to handle its relations with major regional and world powers has shrunk badly. Resultantly, the country suffers isolation in the international arena.

Pakistan's relevance in the geo-political and geo-economic environment is only restricted to exporting terrorism, extremism and radicalism in the eyes of the global community.

Economy is heavily dependent on IFIs, no FDIs coming to the country.

Population has expanded beyond proportions and absence of human resource development is causing widespread crimes and breeding terrorism.

#### **Scenario Unfolding**

Protracted/ intense insecurity and poor economic conditions would widen the gulf between haves and have-nots. The internal security situation would reach unmanageable limits where anarchy would reign. No one will be safe against no one, state institutions would collapse. Violence would dictate day-to-day life. The extremists would be enjoying power over everyone else. There will be no semblance of nation or statehood. Sovereignty would not exist. Separatists would have wielded disproportionate powers and playing in the hands of regional and international players. Pakistan would be divided on ethnic and sectarian basis. Powerful countries would be yielding benefits from our resources. There would be no signs of ideology or territorial integrity.

### **Scenario 4 - Oligarchy**

#### **Assumptions**

Thar Coal reservoirs tapped to its true potential and energy crisis resolved through larger shares for Sindh government with direct foreign investment orchestrated through institutional bribery, terms and conditions heavily in favour of the foreign partners.

Requ dek project actualized and anomalies not removed at the behest of international powers. Larger shares for Balochistan government and foreign partners with significant shares going to the sub-nationalists.

Poor governance continues, however political process remains uninterrupted. Weak central government is running the projects through monopolization and selected groups of politicians in both provinces. Some international powers continue to support the incompetent political leadership to ensure controlled instability in the country.

Reconciliation with TTP not materialized.

## **Scenario Unfolding**

This scenario will take shape due to an unexpected gelling of insecurity but improved economic base due to some strategic natural resources' activation. However, the select group of politicians remain in power in central and provincial governments of Sindh and Balochistan, who continue to monopolize and control the economy at the behest of their foreign masters. Having exploited the coalition government where partner political parties continue to render support for personal gains. The fruits of relatively improved economic situation do not reach the masses. The state affairs are being run in a mafia style and political expediency overwhelms national interests, with the support of some international players who are benefiting from the natural resources of Pakistan.

## **Recommendations for Pakistan**

After having crafted possible scenarios for Pakistan and major conclusions from international power politics, few policy recommendations are as under:-

### **Economy**

- Minimize dependence on IFIs.
- Broaden the national tax net and revenue base.
- Innovate frameworks to privatize sick public sector enterprises.
- Revitalize the energy sector and eliminate crises.
- Manage water storage issues.
- Control the corruption

### **Security**

- Out of box solutions may be explored for countering terrorism.
- Constitutional reforms with regard to governance in FATA.
- Massive developmental activity be undertaken in FATA and other special areas of Pakistan.
- Legislations on anti terrorism laws, law of evidence and National Counter Terrorism Act be promulgated immediately.
- Mainstream the Madras's into national education system.
- Hold national dialogue on terrorism and develop counter narrative.
- Political solutions to Balochistan and Karachi issues through political ownership.
- Launch incentive based and incremental de-weaponization campaign
- Facilitate Afghan led and owned peace process.

## **Conclusion**

This paper has sought to provide a vision for how the balance of International Power and the International Relations will be organized in the years to come focusing on the possible political and economic rise of large developing countries. It has argued that there are clear indications both in terms of economics and politics that countries such as China, India, Brazil and others are changing the shape of the international political economy, and that their prospects for continuing to do so remain great despite risks to their growth path. The paper explored their ability to take on new roles in global politics, while keeping in mind some potential obstacles such as the environment and resource capacity, domestic peace and the stability of the international financial system. While the implications of such an international

order on smaller developing countries are not clear cut, it appears that there are substantial benefits for smaller countries in encouraging this outcome instead of the more conflict prone possibilities that could arise. The future world will certainly look very different than it does today – and it may not look at all like what has been outlined here. But the broad trend towards new powers looks relatively unshakable and is something that the international community should begin to prepare for.

<i>Researchers:</i>	<i>Mr Amjad Afridi, Brig ZafarUllah, Cdre Sajid Iqbal, Gp Capt Qiao (China), Capt Lafi (KSA)</i>
<i>Supervisor</i>	<i>Brig Syed Haider Ali Naqvi</i>

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# ARAB UPRISING – A CRITICAL APPRAISAL

## Introduction

The Arab uprising that profoundly transformed the Middle East and North Africa originated from Sidi Bouzid, a small town in Southern Tunisia on 17 December 2010, with the self-immolation of a common young man as a protest against highhandedness of an abusive government official. Unable to find a job, Mohammed Bouazizi, the breadwinner for his widowed mother and six siblings, was selling fruit on a road side stand when a municipal inspector confiscated his wares. Within an hour, Bouazizi drenched himself with fuel and self-immolated.<sup>1</sup>

Within weeks of this event, thousands of young men and women took to the streets in many of the Arab countries, chanting a common slogan “regime change.” The Arabs in all the countries were protesting against their authoritarian regimes with a unified narrative and a deep sense of shared destiny. The situation became rather dramatic, when every regime in Arab world proclaimed that their country “was not Tunisia”. But every citizen in their country desired that “it was”.

Within less than a year, regimes were overthrown<sup>2</sup> in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. Under extreme pressure, King Abdullah of Jordan sacked two of his governments. Even in Saudi Arabia, the women have finally been conceded the right to participate in 2015 municipal elections and the right to drive. Significant changes to the existing order are also being contemplated in most of the other Arab countries.

The Arab uprising of 2011, popularly known as “The Arab Spring” has a lot to do with democracy and self-respect because the people have been victim of prolonged authoritarian rule which deprived them of political empowerment, freedom<sup>3</sup> and social justice. The humiliation brought out on them due to nepotism, lawlessness, corruption and abuse of power has finally precipitated in the form of mass uprisings across the entire region<sup>4</sup>. The revolution has been orchestrated by men and women from all walks of life. Aided by technology i.e. cell phones, social media, Facebook and Twitter, the educated and globalized young generation of the Arab world has been the main driving force behind the uprising.

The Arab uprisings have been profoundly appreciated all over the world. However, there has been skepticism and nervousness in the West as to what will finally emerge out of such extra ordinary political events. Is the world going to witness complete political and economic transformation in the Arab countries in line with the aspirations of Arab people or will it lead to emergence of extremist tendencies and formation of Islamist governments or regimes. This article aims to carry out critical appraisal of Arab uprising with a view to analyzing its impact on the Arab world and determining lessons for Pakistan.

## Defining the Historic Moment

For in-depth analysis of Arab uprisings, first there is a need to identify the phenomenon which engulfed the entire region within a few weeks of its eruption. Was it a revolution, rebellion, uprising, popular protest or could it be called as Arab Spring<sup>5</sup>. While some observers foresee a brewing revolution with the potential to completely reshape the political order, the others are skeptical about the final outcome and true democratic change. Yet another view point is that the mass movements are agenda driven by the West which may lead to a new political order still dominated by the West.

Whatever the outcome, the mass protest movements in the Arab world cannot be termed as revolution because complete political order and socio economic system has not been fully altered even in the countries where the governments have been replaced such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. Also, keeping in view the magnitude of protests across entire Arab world, it is equally improbable that the events were engineered through the hidden agenda of the west. With unfinished agenda, it is appropriate to term the mass movements which swept across Middle East and North Africa as “Uprisings” with common aspirations of all men and women of rejecting economic and political deprivation forced upon them by their authoritarian regimes.

## **Chronology of Events in Different Arab Countries**

### **Tunisia**

Self-immolation of Muhammad Bouazizi in Sidi Bouzaid, led to violent protests during Dec 2010 which ultimately resulted in overthrow of President, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali on 14 January 2011 terminating his 23 years rule. The main causes<sup>6</sup> of the protests included Police highhandedness and misuse of public authority, lack of political freedom, growing unemployment, inflation and rising food prices, and corruption and social injustice. On 13 October 2011, Tunisians voted and elected 217 members Constituent Assembly. The leading Islamist Party, Ennahda secured victory with over 40% of votes and formed coalition government with other secular parties. 42 women were also elected to the Constituent Assembly which has been mandated to frame the new constitution for Tunisia.

### **Egypt**

**The Uprising.** Inspired by revolution in Tunisia, the next country inline was Egypt, where the protests began on 25 January 2011. The main causes which lead to the protests were political suppression and lack of freedom, low income, inflation and rising unemployment<sup>7</sup>, and poor governance and corruption

**Change of Regime.** The Egyptian government began crackdown on internet access centers to prevent the contagious effect of the uprising. This resulted in an exceptionally strong reaction and thousands of people, predominantly the youth, took to the streets in major cities and Tahrir Square of Cairo.<sup>8</sup> Consequently, under immense pressure, Hosni Mubarak had to resign, transferring power to Egypt’s Armed Forces. Finally, presidential elections were held and Mohammad Morsi from Muslim Brotherhood was elected as the first civilian president during June 2012.

**Initiatives of New Leadership.** President Morsi faced a number of challenges; framing of the constitution, redefinition of civil-military relations and revival of economy being the predominant ones. He took certain initiatives to address these issues. The constitution was framed by Muslim Brotherhood dominated assembly. However, it attracted country-wide protests during December 2012 as the people believed that the constitution contained provisions which would curtail freedom and women’s rights, etc. Nevertheless, the constitution was approved by 63.8 percent votes in a controversial referendum held on 15 and 22 December 2012, in which only one third of the eligible voters participated, resulting in deep divisions in Egyptian society. Initiates also included appointing General Abdul Fatah Sisi as the new Defence Minister replacing Field Marshal Tantawi. President Morsi also launched a 100-days program to address persisting issues like security, food and fuel shortages, traffic control, disposal of huge piles of solid waste, etc.<sup>9</sup> Most importantly, he initiated “Renaissance Project”

to<sup>10</sup> rebuild political system, rapid and comprehensive transformation of economy, and human resource development and empowerment.

## **Libya**

**The Uprising.** After Tunisia and Egypt, Libya also followed suit. Here, the protests were sparked due to the arrest of a human rights lawyer Fatih Terbil in Benghazi on 5 Feb 2011 which quickly spread to Bayada and Tripoli cities. The main causes of the unrest were political suppression, lack of freedom, corruption, human rights violation by police and lack of housing for the people

**Role of UN and International Community.** Gaddafi sent troops to take control of Benghazi resulting in hundreds of deaths which drew international condemnation. Consequently, United Nation Security Council Resolution 1973<sup>11</sup> of 17 March 2011 authorized a “no flying zone” over Libya, and to take all measures to preserve lives of civilians. France and UK launched a bombing campaign against Gaddafi’s forces. Resultantly, pro-government forces were evicted from Benghazi and by end Aug 2011 rebels captured Tripoli, overthrowing Muammar Gaddafi’s government terminating his 42 years of rule. Gaddafi fled to Sirte which finally fell on 20 Oct 2011 and Gaddafi was killed in the fighting.

**The Elections and Future Stability.** Libyan election is another Arab uprising success story. The people have elected Mr Mohammad Yousuf el-Magariaf as the president. The main question for Libya for the long term, however, is that whether all their oil wealth will be the source of unity or of conflict among various tribal factions, as there are heavily armed militias which so far have refused to surrender to the Libyan government.

## **Yemen**

**The Protests.** The protests started in Yemen in January 2011. The main reasons<sup>12</sup> of the protest were Government’s proposal to amend the constitution against the aspirations of the people, increasing unemployment, poor economic conditions and rampant corruption.

**Regime Change.** Following an assassination attempt in the presidential palace mosque, President Saleh was evacuated to Saudi Arabia. Thereafter, elections were held on 21 February 2011 and Abd-al-Rab Mansur Al Hadi assumed power, ending Saleh’s 33 years rule. At present, a national government is in place, the constitution is being written and elections will be held in 2014

**Tawakkol Karman’s Assessment.**<sup>13</sup> Tawakkol Karman, who became the international public face of Yemeni uprising and won Nobel Peace Prize, explains situation in Yemen as “Revolution is still going on, Salah may have stepped down, but his son and nephew who continue to command large part of military still have family’s influence over the country and continue to threaten political transition.”

## **Syria**

**The Protests.** Protests started in Syria on 26 January 2011 when a common man was assaulted by a police officer in Damascus. Subsequently, the man was arrested and the protesters demanded his release. Then on 6 March 2011, Syrian security forces arrested 15 children in Daraa city on the charges of writing anti-government slogans which resulted in strong protests in Damascus, Aleppo and Daraa cities. The security forces including the military

launched the crackdown in several cities to suppress the protests, killing more than 130 people in the process.

**Fighting Amongst Security Forces and other Groups.** Since November 2011 till to date, intense fighting has been going on between Free Syrian Army (FSA), various rebel groups and Syrian Security Forces. As per CNN estimate more than 37000 people have been killed.<sup>14</sup> In June 2012, UN peace keeping chief in Syria announced that Syria had entered into a civil war. Some observers believe that although Bashar Al Assad is the president of Syria, but his influence has been reduced only to Damascus and a few other areas thereby diminishing his status to one of the warring faction in Syria.

**Involvement of Outside Powers.** Various rebel groups fighting to overthrow Bashar al Asaad are receiving arms and assistance from abroad thereby making Syrian crisis a typical proxy conflict. United States, Europe, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Iran have major stakes in Syria's on-going crisis. However, at this stage none of them is inclined towards direct intervention by committing troops.

**Dilemma, If Assad is Removed.** In case Assad is removed, a violent power tussle is likely between FSA, Salafists and Muslim Brotherhood plunging the country into a deeper crisis with consequences for the entire region.

## **Jordan**

The protests started in Jordan on 14 January 2012 at Capital Amman against government's economic policies with the demand for removal of Prime Minister Samir Rifai. On 1 February 2012, King Abdullah nominated former General Marouf al-Bakhit to constitute the new government with a mandate to initiate political reforms and improve economy. However, protests continued resulting in violent clashes between protesters and pro-government supporters. Consequently, King Abdullah dismissed Bakhit's government as well and appointed Awn Shawkat Al-Khasawneh as the prime minister. As per latest development of November 2012, for the first time in the history of Jordan, the protesters have demanded end of Monarchy, indicating that serious unrest persists in Jordanian society.<sup>15</sup>

## **Saudi Arabia**

**The Uprising.** In Saudi Arabia, the protest was sparked due to self-immolation of an old man in Samtah city. Subsequently, the protests spread to Jeddah, Riyadh, Qatif, Al-Awamiyah and other cities during February 2011.

**Protests by Shia Minority.** Then, small scale protests over labour rights were organized by Shia minority in Qatif and other smaller cities in Eastern province. The protesters demanded release of prisoners, withdrawal of GCC Forces from Bahrain, equal opportunities for Shias in key offices and political reforms.

**Women Rights.** Saudi women launched a face book campaign named "Baladi"<sup>16</sup> and demanded women's electoral rights and right to drive. Subsequently, in June 2011, several cases of women driving the cars were reported. During September 2011, a woman was sentenced to 10 lashes for driving in Jeddah. However, King Abdullah over turned the sentence. The King has also allowed women's to participate in municipal elections in 2015 and they are also now eligible as member of Consultative Assembly.

**Economic Incentives for People.** When Arab uprising began to make headlines, King Abdullah improved economic condition of the people through special financial packages worth US \$ 130 billion first in December 2010 and then in March 2011. This greatly helped in quelling the uprising.

## **Bahrain**

**The Protests.** In Bahrain, the protests started in February 2011. The main causes were alienation of Shia majority being ruled by Sunni government<sup>17</sup>, their frustrations due to human rights abuses and lack of political freedom. Protests remained peaceful until police raided on protesters on 17 February in Manama in which four protesters were killed. The protesters now started demanding end of Monarchy resulting in heavy clashes with security forces.

**GCC Forces Entered Bahrain.** The protests gathered momentum during February and March 2011. Finally, on 14 March 2011, on the request of Bahrain's government Saudi led GCC forces entered Bahrain which was strongly protested by protesters. Simultaneously, King Hamad Bin Isa Ali Khalifa pronounced emergency on 15 March 2011 and ordered the military to subdue the protests. The armed forces used force and suppressed the protests in Manama. Since then off and on small scale protests are being witnessed in Bahrain.

## **Kuwait, Oman, Morocco, UAE, Iraq and Other Arab Countries**

Similarly, protests of varying intensity were organized by the people in Kuwait, Oman, UAE, Qatar, Iraq and other Arab countries of the region. Although, respective governments could quell the protest, at least temporarily, with a mix of measures such as financial incentives, promises for reforms and jobs creation, the unrest is prevailing in most of the Arab countries as is evident from on and off protests in various countries.

## **Middle East and North African Region**

### **Historical Perspective**

**Creation of Middle East States.** Middle East states were created after fall of Ottoman Empire from 1918 onwards. Sykes-Picot agreement<sup>18</sup> between British and France (1916) divided Middle East into different states. Syria and Lebanon became French colonies and Iraq and Palestine came under British control. Palestine was split, Eastern part as kingdom of Jordan and Western part as Palestine under direct British rule. Iraq became the kingdom and son of Sharif Hussain, who led Arab Revolt against Ottomans, was made the king. The Arabian Peninsula fell to another British ally, Ibn Saud who created Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932.

**Creation of Jewish State.** British, via Balfour Declaration (1917) promised to create a Jewish homeland in Palestine which was primarily the Arab territory. Massive Jewish immigration took place from various parts of world to Palestine resulting in Arabs revolts from 1936 to 1939. On 29 November 1947, UN approved creation of independent Arab and Jewish states. Jerusalem was to be administered by UN. The plan was not accepted by Arabs and the violence broke out killing hundreds of people. Amidst violence and civil war, Jewish People's Council declared establishment of State of Israel on 14 May 1948.

**Creation of North African States.** After the middle ages, North Africa remained loosely under the control of Ottoman Empire except for Morocco. The Ottoman's rule was centered on the cities of Tunis, Algiers and Tripoli. During 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, North Africa

was colonized by France, Spain, United Kingdom and Italy. From 1950 to 1970 all North African states gained independence from their European rulers.

**Significance of the Region.** Throughout its history, the Middle East has been strategically, economically, politically, culturally, and religiously a sensitive area. It is the birthplace and spiritual center of three “monotheist religions” such as Christianity, Islam and Judaism. Today, a number of long established ethnic groups including, Arabs, Turks, Persians, Jews, Kurds and Egyptian Copts live in Middle East.

### **Geography**

Middle East and North Africa are situated at the juncture of Europe, Asia, and Africa and of the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea. Asian part of the Arab world is called Mashriq, which includes countries such as Iraq, Palestine, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon and Syria. The Maghreb is defined as most of the region of Northwest Africa, west of Egypt and includes countries such as Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania.

### **Natural Resources**

The region has immense strategic significance due to abundance of natural resources. More than 50 % oil and 40% gas reserves of the world are concentrated in Middle East and North Africa.<sup>19</sup> Middle East accounts for ten times more of oil reserves than North Africa. Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait and Libya lead in terms of oil whereas, Iran and Qatar have abundance of natural gas. Middle East and North Africa account for 35 per cent of world production. Only five countries i.e. Saudi Arabia, Iran, UAE, Iraq and Kuwait each produce more than two million barrels per day.

### **Demography**

Total population of Middle East and North Africa is 381 million, which makes about 6% of the world population. Approximately half of this population comprises less than 25 years youth. Overall unemployment rate in the region is about 10 per cent. However, youth unemployment rate is about 26.5 per cent which is the highest of all the regions<sup>20</sup> in the world. Literacy Rate<sup>21</sup> of Arab countries indicates that most of the population is educated and aware of political realities; a contributory factor towards Arab uprisings.

### **Main Causes of Arab Uprising**

#### **Ideological and Geo-Political Causes**

**Creation of Israel.** Entire geopolitical paradigm of the Middle East revolves around history of creation of Israel. Since her creation, Israel enjoyed unstinted support of the US and West for all her actions, both illegal and legal. Since 1948, there have been 12 wars or conflicts between Israel and Arab countries in which mostly the Arabs have been at a loss. Besides, the sufferings of Palestinian people in the hands of Israel with the support of US or the West and helplessness of their leaders have never been approved by the Arabs. Even today, Israeli atrocities continue against unarmed Palestinians before silent international community, resulting in discontentment amongst Arab people.

**Arab Nationalism.** Arab Nationalism is in the genes of Arab nation. To prevent revival of Arab nationalism, the colonial powers created states in Middle East and North Africa by drawing lines on the region’s map and appointed leaders of their choice in these countries to

serve their interests. Such political arrangements were against the Arab nationalism resulting in frustration amongst the Arabs; a major cause of uprisings.

**Western Support to Authoritarian Regimes.** Relationship with Arab authoritarian regimes has been perceived as the compulsion by the West against fundamental Islam and to contain aggression against Israel. Western support to autocratic leaders started with the foundation of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928, an ideological Islamist organization with an agenda of establishing an Islamic state<sup>22</sup>. 1979 Iranian revolution and increasing influence of Islamists in Algeria also compelled the West to strengthen alliances with Arab regimes despite strong contradiction to democracy. People in the Arab world disapproved such alliances which became one of the main reasons leading to Arab uprisings.

**National Pride**

Arab people disapproved the nature of relationship between their leaders and their counter parts in US and the West. In particular, Israeli atrocities against Palestinian people with the tacit connivance of US and the West and complicity of their leaders disappointed the Arab people. In fact, Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrullah has an elevated standing in the Arab world. Asserting policies of Turkey are also viewed with admiration across the region. The Arab people, therefore, protested to regain the lost pride and dignity of their states in the comity of nations.

**Geo-Economic Causes**

Discovery of oil in the Middle East in early 1950s added economic dimension to the relations of the West with Arab leaders. Continuous supply of the cheap oil for sustainable economic development has been the core national interest of Europe and the US in the Middle East.

the

Serial	Country	Democracy Rating	Press Freedom
a.	UAE	74	116
b.	Kuwait	76	86
c.	Jordan	81	102
d.	Oman	85	116
e.	Egypt	106	107
f.	Pakistan	106	95
g.	KSA	111	133
h.	Syria	135	136
j.	Yemen	139	133
k.	Libya	145	145
l.	Tunisia	120	139

If

interests were best served by the kings, Western support was guaranteed to them, despite strong contradiction to democracy. Economic conditions and per capita GDP<sup>23</sup> of oil- producing countries are much better. Accordingly, the uprisings and their effects were quite different in oil producing and non-oil producing countries.

**Oil Producing Countries.** Oil producing countries such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar etc. with higher GDP have relatively better economic conditions and standard of living. Grievances of the people primarily point towards unequal distribution of oil wealth. These countries were able to quell the uprisings with economic incentives to their people. In particular, Saudi Arabia launched special financial package of US\$ 130 Billion<sup>24</sup> for the welfare of people in Dec 2010 and Mar 2011.

**Non-Oil Producing Countries.** Most of Arab countries are facing similar economic problems, as faced by Tunisia and Egypt. Recent worldwide recession has affected such countries resulting in high inflation, high food prices, rising unemployment, poor wages

and declining living standards. Youth has been hit hard due to high unemployment and bleak future prospects. It was in fact, this middle class youth which spear headed the uprising.


**Exceptions.** There are, however, some exceptions as well. For example Libya and Bahrain are both economically strong countries (GDP US\$ 18720 and US\$ 23980 respectively) but saw extreme violence. Here, the masses were more concerned with unequal distribution of wealth, lack of opportunities, nepotism and issue of sectarian divide in case of Bahrain. In Tunisia the large young lower middle class was instrumental in uprising despite the fact that Tunisia has the lowest poverty rate in the region (3.4%). Here, the people perceived little chances of fulfilling their ambitions.

## Politics

Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, UAE and Morocco are the Monarchies. All other Arab countries are republics. Elections throughout the Arab world are considered compromised due to intimidation of opposition parties, vote rigging and curtailed civil liberties. Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen and Saudi Arabia had poor democratic credentials which resulted in political deprivation and consequent uprisings. Saudi Arabia has also not made any significant progress towards democracy. UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Oman and Morocco have encouraged some political reforms. Democratic credentials of different countries as per world Audit Report<sup>25</sup> are given in the following table.


## Freedom of Press

Media and press enjoy relatively open and free environment in Egypt, Oman, Jordan, Kuwait and UAE amongst the Arab world. On the other hand, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, Syria and Saudi Arabia have the least free media. Ranking of various countries with regard to freedom of press<sup>26</sup> are also given in the table.



## Human Development Index (HDI)

Similarly, Arab rulers did not pay much of attention towards human development aspects in their countries which also created sense of deprivation and alienation amongst masses. HDI<sup>27</sup> of different Arab countries is shown opposite.



## Corruption and Governance

Corruption was a very serious issue in most of the Arab countries which strongly reverberated during the uprisings. Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International report for the year 2011 for various countries is as shown in the graph placed opposite.

## External Factors

**Training of Young Dissidents.** Some of the observers have indicated that the young Arab people were able to articulated mass protests with the help of new technologies i.e. cell phones, and social networks like Facebook, Twitter etc. for which they received some kind of training in the West.

**Role of Google, Yahoo and Twitter.** Different observers have also pointed towards the involvement of Google, Yahoo and Twitter in promoting pro-democracy thinking and training to young Arabs to articulate mass protests using internet and social media. It may be recalled that Google provided satellite access codes to Egypt's activist bloggers when government tried to stop internet activity in Egypt. However, Google declined to provide same access codes to Syrian activists.

## Sectarian Divide

Analysis of sectarianism points towards religious and political divergence between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran, the mutually defiant regional rivals. Some of the facts are as follows:-

**Iran, Iraq and Bahrain** are Shia majority countries. Yemen, Lebanon and Kuwait have significant Shia population (30-40 %). Saudi Arabia has 10-15 % Shias. In Syria, 15-20 % Shias control the government. Qatar, UAE and Oman have 10 % Shia population.<sup>28</sup>

**In Saudi Arabia**, repression of timid uprising in the East was portrayed by the rulers as the struggle against Shia led sedition. In Bahrain, sectarian violence between Shia majority and Sunni minority regime during Arab uprising extended on a wider scale. In Syria, sectarian clashes between Sunnis and Shia Alawites assumed an alarming proportion and the Syrian regime extended harsh repression of Sunnis on the pretext of foreign conspiracy. In Lebanon, sectarian strife between Sunnis and Shia Alawites has resurfaced in Beirut and north of country.

**Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and other Gulf countries** often raise concern regarding Iran's growing influence in the region<sup>29</sup> due to her alliance with Syrian regime, Hezbollah and present government in Iraq.

It may, however be noted that while sectarian strife is a serious issue in the region, it has no relevance with Arab uprising. The Arab people have clearly demonstrated that the political and socio-economic deficiencies were their real issues. Whatever tribe, clan, religion, sect, ethnic group they belonged to, citizens demanded "dignity" and "socio-economic justice" before anything else.

## Major Conclusions

**The Root Cause of Uprising – Political Deprivation and Suppression.** The root cause of Arab uprising is embedded in the history of creation of Arab States and subsequent collusion of Western leaders with Arab counterparts who wielded power by serving interests of the West at the cost of freedom, rights and dignity of their people. Temporary suppression of uprising through force or incentive notwithstanding, long term stability in Arab world can be achieved only if this paradigm is reversed through genuine democracy.

**Poor Economic Dispensation.** Despite substantial oil wealth, the Arab regimes could not develop vibrant economies in their respective countries. This resulted in unemployment, poor living standards, and inflation and limited future prospects for their people, particularly the youth which ultimately lead to the uprisings.

**A Non Extremist Phenomenon.** Arab uprising has clearly not been the work of Islamists. Neither in Tunisia or Egypt, nor in Jordan, Libya or Yemen.<sup>30</sup> In fact concerns and aspirations of young Arabs are totally different from the agenda of Islamist movements and extremist like Al- Qaeda.<sup>31</sup> The people in all Arab countries only demanded democratic and economic reforms, job opportunities, women's rights, freedom and dignity.

**An Indigenous Movement.** The Arab uprising has indisputable indigenous character in line with desires and inspirations of millions of young men and women in the Arab world. External factors, if any, had only the marginal effects on its character so far.

**An Altered World's Perception.** The uprisings have changed world's perception about the Arabs who rose up against authoritarian regimes peacefully for universal democratic values such as freedom, justice and democracy. The non-violent uprising with no political or religious affiliation is being viewed as a step towards greater harmony and understanding between East and West due to a common vision of freedom and democracy.

**Irrevocable Change.** Arab uprising has been a watershed event, with the Arab world irrevocably changed. Regime change has already taken place in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya. Rulers of other states, including oil rich countries (who could temporarily pacify people with financial incentives) are under immense pressure to initiate genuine political and economic reforms. It is a matter of time that young Arabs would effectively challenge such regimes, encouraged by their successes in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen.

**Arab Uprising – Hijacked by Islamists.** Genuine, nonviolent uprising of young Arab men and women seems to have been hijacked by organized Islamist parties such as Ennahda in Tunisia and Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.<sup>32</sup> Democratic reforms as cherished by young revolutionaries are nowhere in sight as yet. On-going unrest in Egypt and dissatisfaction in Tunisia and Yemen suggest a long way to true freedom and democracy.

**Youth Factor.** Marginalized and unemployed Arab youth played the key role in uprising and emerged as a common denominator. Educated and well connected to each other, the youth will keep the spirit of uprising alive till the regimes embark upon genuine political and economic reforms.

**Role of Technology and Social Media.** Social media has emerged as a powerful tool to instigate or motivate people for uprising. Cell phones, internet, Facebook, Twitter etc. have displayed an immense potential to coordinate collective events, protests and mass movements with the capacity to achieve political objectives such as regime change.<sup>33</sup>

**Interests of US and the West.** For US and the west, democratization of Arab world has never been the end in itself. What matters to them are their economic interests and influence in the region, as clearly evident from their uneven response to the Arab uprisings. Under the given circumstances, US will encourage democratic change as per people's aspirations where absolutely essential (Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Libya) and continue to support monarchies where uprisings could not make a big dent.

**A Threat to Israel.** The Arab uprising which has induced the urge for democracy among the Arab nation has increased the sense of insecurity for Israel as it may lead to a genuine peace process. It also appears that US will have to re-orientate<sup>34</sup> her policy vis-à-vis Israel-Palestinian conflict.

### **Possible Scenarios Emerging as the Result of Uprising**

**Utopian Scenario.** The outline of such a scenario reads equitable economic development taking place in the Arab world, watering down the appeal of militancy and extremism. Democracy seems to be taking roots and bringing dividends such as human rights, good governance and prosperity. Reconciliation of the differences between Islam and the West and within the Arab world takes place. Resolution of conflicts within the Arab world and with Israel through peaceful means seems a possibility.

**The Best Case Scenario.** Democracy prevails but remains dysfunctional in many respects. Gradually moves on to improve like in Pakistan. The outcome seems to become conceptual battleground between competing extremists and modernists' agendas. Constitutionalism takes roots. Greater freedom resulting in promotion of domestic and foreign policies as per aspirations of the people. Economy and governance improves. Oil prices remain within reasonable limits. Image of Islamic world in the West gradually improves.

**The Worst Case Scenario.** Tribalism, sectarianism and extremism neutralize non-violent roadmap to reforms. Instability acquiring a degree of permanency. Civil war starts. Externalization of internal conflict like in Libya and Afghanistan. Maps are redrawn. Armed Group reign and take on established armies. War between KSA and Iran ensues. Oil Prices sour & economies taking nosedive. Humanitarian catastrophe and refugees culture appear

**The Most Likely Scenario – A Mixed Situation.** The situation is still fluid and evolving in the Middle East and North African region. At present, a mix of all the scenarios could be predicted. Oil rich countries (Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain and Libya) blessed with natural resources could be converted into vibrant economies subject to institution of true democratic and economic reforms, leading to the best case scenario. Similarly Egypt and Jordan though not oil rich, have the potential for reform and progress in line with the aspiration of their people. On the other hand, situation in Syria is fast deteriorating and region could experience a much deeper crisis due to sectarian strife within Syria and in the region, which could result in the worst case scenario. Deepening Syrian crisis would lead to increase in sectarian tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Although the ingredients and the potential for utopian scenario exist in the region due to abundance of energy resources and educated youth, it is still a distant dream because of so many other deficiencies within most of the Arab countries as highlighted in preceding paragraphs.

### **Way Forward for the Arab World**

**Time to Seize the Opportunity.** Arab Muslims enjoy a unique opportunity to reclaim their identity based on their own history, traditions, values and strengths. It is the time to reject all types of conspiracy theories and unproductive debate between secularists and fundamentalists. Attention must be focused on the way forward towards true democracy and freedom with the help of civil society, intellectuals, scholars and above all the Arab people.

**Reality Check.** The Arab world blessed with abundance of natural resources and yet so weak and marginalized, has to analyze her weaknesses and inadequacies pragmatically.

Instead of criticizing US or others, it is time that Arab people must acknowledge their weaknesses and shortcomings as a prerequisite to embark upon the process of corrections and reforms.

**Psychological Subservience of West- A Major Obstacle to Change.** The Arab people must reject the notion that the fate of their country is decided by the West. Such a notion could lead to inaction which will prove fatal to the spirit of popular uprising. Therefore, if the Arabs want to transform their countries into real democracies, they will first have to overcome this major obstacle to change.

**Framing the Constitution.** The functioning of the state has to be governed through a well thought out constitution framed by democratically elected representatives in line with the aspirations of the people. Religion could be the guide but the constitution and the laws have to be framed in accordance with prevailing environment and situation of each country. For this, the intellectuals, religious scholars and the civil societies will have to overcome their differences and idiosyncrasies to frame a consensus document which could protect citizen's fundamental rights and guide the rulers to administer the state affairs.

**Objectives of a Democratic Government.** Democratically elected governments in Arab countries need to define their milestones as per aspirations of people. The leadership must focus on initiating processes for political and economic reforms, broadening access to education, women's rights and empowerment and above all development of a harmonious society based on good governance and social justice.

**Islam and Democracy**<sup>35</sup>. Principles of democracy i.e. rule of law, equality, right to vote, accountability etc. are absolutely according to the teachings and the spirit of Islam. Therefore, the teachings of Islam which emphasize ethics in all aspects of human life including politics, could become source of true guidance. The main issue to understand is the requirement to differentiate the authority of the state from the religion, and not to separate politics from ethics.

**Economic System Reforms.** Globalization, capitalism and free market economy are the dominant economic orders too difficult to ignore for economic progress in today's environment. Yet, the time has come for attempting a policy shift. Economic reforms in Arab world must focus on management of oil and gas resources, shift towards emerging new economies like China, Turkey, Russia, Brazil and redefinition of relationship with World Bank, IMF using natural resources as the bargaining reference.

**Addressing Long Outstanding Critical Issues.** To be credible, the new political order will have to reform the existing dysfunctional system and empower the people. Serious issues such as corruption, uneven distribution of wealth, nepotism, poor governance, misuse of public authority by police must be addressed at the top priority with resolve and deep sense of sincerity. Long neglected issues such as healthcare, education, social uplift, employment and poverty must also be tackled immediately to provide relief to the people.

### **Impact of Arab Uprising on Pakistan**

**Pakistan's Special Relations with Arab World.** Pakistan enjoys visceral bonds with Arab World due to many commonalities but mainly the religion. Pakistani people and leadership identify themselves with the Arab causes alike (for example Pakistan's support on Palestine issue). Arab countries are also a major source of strategic, political and economic

strength to Pakistan. Arab countries are the main sources of energy, labour employment overseas (3-4 million) and foreign remittance.

**Similarities – Pakistan and Arab Countries<sup>36</sup>.** The similarities between Pakistan and Arab World include:-

**Youth Bulge.** 60 per cent of Pakistan's population comprise less than 25 years youth, like the Arab world.

**Lack of job and Economic Opportunities.** Like the Arab world, Pakistani youth have limited job and economic opportunities which is a major source of discontentment.<sup>37</sup>

**Poor Governance and Corruption.** Governance and corruption are the common issues being faced by people of Pakistan and Arab world.

**Proliferation of Social Media.** There are over 29 million internet users in Pakistan. The data gives a close resemblance to the use of social media by the Arabs to coordinate mass demonstrations.

**Dissimilarities – Pakistan and Arab Countries.** The dissimilarities between Pakistan and Arab World include:-

**Democracy.** Unlike Arab countries, the democratic government is in place in Pakistan for the last 5 years and the country is about to go for general elections in 2013.

**Constitution of Pakistan.** The biggest strength of Pakistan's politics is "1973 Constitution" which is a consensus document.

**Assertive Judiciary.** Pakistan's judiciary is independent and asserting to safeguard the interests of the people.

**Vibrant Free Media.** Unlike Arab world, Pakistani media with over 90 TV channels and about 100 FM licensed radio stations is vibrant and free to openly criticize the government policies.

**Likely Effects of Arab Uprising on Pakistan.** Following are the likely effects of uprising on Pakistan:

**Restriction on Travel.** Growing instability could lead to restriction on travel to and from Middle East and North African countries.

**Diplomatic Challenges for Pakistan.** Increased instability may lead to reverse flow of Jihadists from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Arab countries resulting in diplomatic difficulties for Pakistan. Also, conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran may lead to increased diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to make the choice or take sides.

**Reduction in Foreign Remittances.** Persistent instability in the region may lead to economic meltdown thereby affecting income of Pakistani Diaspora resulting in reduced foreign remittances.

**Oil Prices.** Similarly, a surge in oil prices is likely in case of prolonged unrest and conflict in the region.

## Lessons for Pakistan

Democratically elected government, free media and assertive judiciary of Pakistan notwithstanding, Pakistani people continue to suffer from identical (if not worse than Arab world) socio- economic problems. Therefore, similar uprisings cannot be ruled out in Pakistan. In fact in the recent past, the people have been able to bring about meaningful changes such as resignation by president in 2008 under public pressure, restoration of judiciary in March 2009 through nationwide protests and public demonstrations against electricity shortage in summer 2012.

## Recommended Areas for Immediate Attention by the Government

At present, the people of Pakistan have high hopes with newly elected government. If the governance does not improve, the people are likely to react by coming out on the streets and launch massive protests. Nevertheless, following areas have been identified<sup>38</sup> for attention by the next government to avert Arab uprising like situation in Pakistan:-

**Equitable Socio-economic Development.** Equitable socio economic development of all the regions of Pakistan is of paramount importance. For this, we have to reset our budget allocation priorities and revenue generation methodology. Social justice, health, education, housings, affordable food and clean drinking water are the most critical issues which are adversely affecting the morale of the nation and need immediate attention.

**Governance.** Poor governance in Pakistan has in fact affected every facet of our national undertaking. Emerging governments in the Arab world, after the uprisings, are keenly studying the Turkish model where the government has been able to create balance between various state institutions through consistent good governance over the past decade. Pakistan also has the potential to develop at a faster pace provided we improve governance, eradicate corruption and ensure across the board accountability.

**Employment Opportunities.** Approximately, three million Pakistani youth enter the job market every year. Providing them with jobs means high rate of growth sustained over a long period. Only a robust private sector can provide bulk of jobs so critically required by our youth. One of the Arab countries that has developed a robust private sector is UAE and it was least affected by the Arab uprisings. Therefore, instead of spending billions of Rupees on sick public sector enterprises, our focus should be on strengthening the private sector.

**Resolution of Energy Crisis.** This is the single most critical issue which has impeded the economic growth of the country, discouraged foreign direct investment and resulted in flight of capital from Pakistan. The issue needs to be tackled on war footing.

**Internal Stability and Cohesion.** The main threat to Pakistan today is from within. Therefore, the leadership of Pakistan must make a sincere effort and use all the means available to nurture internal peace, harmony and cohesion, through socio economic justice, end to nepotism, promotion of merit and the process of national reconciliation.

## Conclusion

The Arab world has come out of deep slumber and the people have demonstrated that collectively they wield power to overthrow the regimes. The Arab men and women from different walks of life particularly the educated young generation have played the key role in the uprisings and continue to do so in different Arab countries. They have shown tremendous potential, political understanding and clear vision for the future. Now, the job of the civil society, intellectuals and emerging leadership is to focus on political and economic reforms while steering clear of the conspiracy theories and pointless debate and confrontation between secularists and fundamentalists. In view of socio economic inadequacies of Pakistan similar to that of Arab world, Pakistan's leadership must draw relevant lessons to improve governance and all the facets of people's life for better harmony in the society, so essentially required for development and prosperity of the country.

*Researchers: Brig Qaiser, Amb Khalid, Col Abidi (Jordan), Gp Capt Abdulelah (KSA) and Col Shafiq (Egypt)*

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## **PART – 2**

### **National Security**

- Globalization – Opportunities and Challenges for Pakistan
- Afghanistan – Pre and Post 2014: Implications for Pakistan
- Pakistan, Demography and Climate Change

# GLOBALIZATION – OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR PAKISTAN

## Introduction

Mankind is in a constant process of evolution. Through the ages, world-order has changed from one form to the other. While the Industrial age was still a veritable phenomenon, mankind was exposed to yet another revolutionary change which was a by-product of industrialization, i.e. globalization. Globalization is the integration of the world's economies, cultures, people, goods, knowledge, services and infrastructures, through transnational investments and rapid proliferation of communication. It connects individuals, communities, businesses and governments around the world through business of influential Multinational Corporations (MNCs). Jet airplanes, cheap telephone services, computers, internets, shipping and rapid capital flows have made the world more interdependent and interconnected, virtually transforming the world into a global village. The phenomenon of globalization has created a dichotomy in perceptions dividing the world in to a plethora of apprehensions and appreciations due to challenges and opportunities it offers. With the advent of globalization, a sense of euphoria prevailed since its proponents professed that the misery to human life had come to an end since globalization was about shared prosperity. Its critics however argue that the vision of shared fortune of reduced violence and equality amongst nations appears to be a far-cry and that human misery has actually increased. It then leaves us with the question as to whether the concept has been applied in a misconstrued manner or this was another ploy of the wealthy and powerful to thrive on the resources of the under-developed countries – a question not yet answered.

The region that we are in has peculiar socio-economic and security dynamics. There is immense trade potential at the regional and global level which can turn the fortune of South Asian countries. Pakistan sits at the confluence of East and West, which gives it a unique opportunity to act as a trade link between many countries. But broadly speaking, the two largest countries of South Asia have a legacy of animosity and mistrust which precludes any bold economic initiative by either side. These are the challenges which Pakistan is facing today and which must be met with realistic approach to reap the benefits of globalization. Therefore, there is a need to analyze the phenomenon of globalization and its implications for Pakistan with a view to suggesting measures to address the challenges and exploit the opportunities.

## Phenomenon of Globalization – A Holistic View

The term “globalization” has been defined by many informed scholars, groups and organizations. **Merriam Webster** defines it as, “Development of an increasingly integrated global economy marked by free trade, free flow of capital and the tapping of cheaper foreign labour markets.”<sup>1</sup> **IMF** refers to globalization as, “The growing economic interdependence of countries worldwide through the increasing volume and variety of cross-border transactions in goods and services and of international capital flows, and also through more rapid and widespread diffusion of technology.”<sup>2</sup>

## Evolution of Globalization

For thousands of years people have been trading goods and travelling across great distances. The overland Silk Road that connected Asia, Africa and Europe is a good example of the transformative power of international exchange. Philosophies, religions, language, arts and other aspects of culture spread and mixed, as nations exchanged products and ideas. In the 15<sup>th</sup>

and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries, Europeans made important discoveries in their exploration of the World Oceans.

The great German statesman of 19<sup>th</sup> century Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck once said “If there is to be revolution, it is better that we should make it rather than to be its victims”<sup>3</sup>. The Islamic golden age added another stage of globalization, when Jewish and Muslim traders and explorers established trade routes, resulting in globalization of agriculture, trade, knowledge and technology. The advent of the Mongol Empire, also facilitated travel along the Silk Road. The modern age of globalization started with the Industrial Revolution at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. In the Early 19<sup>th</sup> century, the development of new forms of transportation and telecommunications that compressed time and space, allowed for increasingly rapid rates of global interchange. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, road and air links made transportation faster, and the advent of electronic communications connected billions of people, setting a stage for IT revolution in 21<sup>st</sup> Century.<sup>4</sup>

After the Second World War the victorious nations during Bretton Woods Conference agreed to collectively manage the world economy through control of effective international institutions. This led to the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in 1944, and subsequently to the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) in 1947. The GATT's successor was the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995.<sup>5</sup> At the end of the second World War the economic centrality went to North America from where the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) became the economic headquarters of the world. The end of Second World War also ushered in the period of rivalry between two economic systems “capitalism & communism”.<sup>6</sup>

## **Dimensions of Globalization**

**Economic Globalization.** Economic globalization refers to increasing economic interdependence of national economies across the world through a rapid increase in the cross-border movement of goods, services, technology and capital. It can conveniently be termed as the oldest and the most enduring form of globalization.<sup>7</sup>

**Political Globalization.** Although technology is often considered the driving force behind the globalization process, politics or 'ideology' is the main driver, because the word 'globalization' only gained currency after the demise of communism.<sup>8</sup> As the conflicts between the nations intensified, there was a growing need for lasting contacts and consultative bodies. Diplomats and embassies were the first step in that direction, followed by an exponential growth in inter-governmental organizations and institutions to deal with international problems.<sup>9</sup>

**Cultural Globalization.** This is an important aspect of globalization which is greatly assisted by the media and information blitz. The phenomenon referred to as the westernization of our consumption and entertainment culture is implied by the globalization of the market economy, and thus of consumer society. The media revolution is now so persuasive and pervasive that it can erode national cultures and traditional values.<sup>10</sup>

**International Political Economy.** This is about the inter-play of economics and politics in the world affairs. The traditional approach to the IPE is based on three concepts i.e. Liberal, Mercantilist and Marxist traditions. In Liberal traditions, the idea is that in a free market economy, profit will automatically flow towards the investment where it is most profitable to invest. This is a utopian concept and is almost oblivious to the political dimension of the

Realists' world. In Marxist, the world economy is seen as an arena of competition, but not among states. Capitalism is the driving force in the world economy. In the Mercantilist theory, globalization is an arena of inter-state competition.<sup>11</sup> The contemporary mainstream approaches in international political economy are as under:-

**Realism.** Realists assert that principles are subordinated to policies and that there can be no community beyond borders and that the state is the supreme good. The concept revolves around the 3 Ss, i.e. Statism, Survival and Self-help.<sup>12</sup>

**Liberalism.** It is a political philosophy or worldview founded on the ideas of liberty and equality, which supports international integration and cooperation.<sup>13</sup>

**Constructivism.** The constructivist view assumes that the domain of international economic interactions is not value-free, and that economic and political identities, in addition to material interests, are significant determinants of economic action.<sup>14</sup>

**Role of Media and IT.** Today's media has tremendous potential in affecting the social, cultural, religious and human aspects of any item of information. The Arab uprising is a case in point. Both a product of globalization as well as a catalyst, the internet connects computer users around the world. From 2000 to 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2012, the number of Internet users globally rose from 394 million to 2.3 Billion<sup>15</sup>. Some of the effects of Media include greater awareness of international affairs, cultural impact, speedy flow of information and tools to shape the opinion of the masses.

### **Drivers of Globalization**

**International Trade.** International trade means that countries become more interconnected through the exchange of goods and services. Between 1950 and 2010, world trade grew 34-fold in volume terms<sup>16</sup>. MNCs are major traders and account for a large proportion of international trade. International trade is aided by the concepts of trans-border transactions, trans-border production, trans-planetary money and trans-planetary security. For example, Ford makes gearboxes in its factory in Bordeaux and exports them to its assembly plants in other European countries.

**Financial Flows.** The financial flows are in two forms:-

**Foreign Indirect Investment.** This is also called portfolio investment. This occurs where money is used to purchase financial assets in another country, comprising foreign stocks, bonds and currency.<sup>17</sup>

**Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).** This is the second form of capital movement and occurs when a firm establishes, acquires, or increases production facilities in a foreign country. FDI usually takes place in poor countries to exploit natural resources such as oil or other minerals, to take advantage of cheap labour or, sometimes, to penetrate a market. MNCs are responsible for FDI. The companies like ExxonMobil, BP, Shell, and Total, and others such as Vodafone, and Procter and Gamble, all generate more than 50% of their turnover from foreign sales.<sup>18</sup>

**Migration.** The economic boom of the late 1950s and the 1960s caused countries like Germany, France, and UK to run short of labour. Initially, they looked to other European countries like Italy, Portugal, and Spain. However migration later took place from South Asia and Africa. For instance the US population includes 38 million people born abroad and almost

one of every 10 persons living in the more developed regions is a migrant. In contrast, only one of every 70 persons in developing countries is a migrant.<sup>19</sup> Tourism is another dimension of globalization which itself incites trade and cash flow. In 2011, there were over 983 million international tourist arrivals worldwide, with tourism receipts of US\$1.03 trillion.<sup>20</sup>

## **Globalization and the Changing World Order**

**Post-Cold War Era and the Emerging World Order.** Significant conclusions from analysis of contemporary geo-politics and emerging world order are as follow:-

- Political capacities and responsibilities are displaced from the national and regional levels to genuinely global level, through the development of global governance.<sup>21</sup>
- Politics and economics are inseparable within social relations; economic centrality is the core issue which defines inter-state relations.<sup>22</sup>
- Association among the nation states in post-cold war era has been on the basis of cooperation and collaboration with major powers.<sup>23</sup>
- Uni-polarity has sustained over decades; however, economic multi-polarity is causing dilution in US dominance.
- Geo-economics and geo-politics are not exclusive from each other rather go hand in gloves; however, economic interests drive political relations.
- Global issues like nuclear proliferation, climate change, have transcended the borders of nation-states, requiring global realization and collaborated response.<sup>24</sup>
- The character of war has significantly shifted from geo-political dominance to grasp for natural resources. The emerging world order will witness severe competition among the major world powers over the energy resources.
- Unfair trade practices and monopolistic policies of IFIs and MNCs have generally restricted space for equitable economic growth.
- Threat driven by ethnicity, religious extremism and terrorism hold no boundaries and has global influence and implications.<sup>25</sup>

**Effects of Globalization.** The phenomenon of Globalization cuts both ways; it houses both welfare enhancing prospects as well as detrimental and negative consequences.

### **Benefits**

**Globalization: A Welfare-Enhancing Munificent Force.** Economic globalization has influenced developing economies to achieve “income convergence”.<sup>26</sup> Growing integrated economies are giving rise to productivity of “resource and input utilization”.<sup>27</sup> Different countries and regions have started exploiting their comparative advantages at their “lowest opportunity costs”.<sup>28</sup>

**Globalization and Poverty Alleviation.** Growth of economy stimulated by globalization, benefits poor in better housing, food, education, welfare services and job opportunities.<sup>29</sup>

**Globalization and Off-shore Outsourcing.** Incorporation of low-pay countries into global work force has given rise to new techniques of organizing production and trade. Outsourcing, leads to macro and micro-economic benefits, to the firms as well as to consumers and linked economies.<sup>30</sup>

**Benefits of Globally Networked Production.** Due to enhancement of expertise, capabilities and demand, the old model of vertically integrated and centralized production has transformed into sub-contracting operations through a “build-to-order supply chain strategy”.<sup>31</sup>

**Expanding Global Middle Class.** The growth of the global middle class, as a result of globalization has influenced global distribution of income and spending power. 70 million people have been globally entering this group annually; to be increased to approximately 2 billion by 2030.<sup>32</sup>

**Silent Revolution: A New Trend of MNCs.** Existence and power of MNCs producing affordable, attractive, and world class products and services is on constant rise world over.<sup>33</sup>

**Other Benefits.** Some of other benefits of Globalization are shrinking distances, interconnectivity and global awareness.

### **Drawbacks of Globalization**

**Asymmetric Benefits of Globalization.** Evidence indicates that benefits of globalization are mostly asymmetric; owners of MNCs and capital market disproportionately get the fruit at the expense of the economies providing the workforce.<sup>34</sup>

**Widening Gap between Haves and Have-Nots.** Poor are mostly affected disproportionately as a consequence of globalization-driven crises, while they do not get equitable share during globalization driven upsurges; thus widening the gap between haves and have-nots.<sup>35</sup>

**Exorbitant Economic Powers and Influence of MNCs and IFIs.** Due to exorbitant economic powers and influence, MNCs gains disproportionate percentage of global wealth. IFIs, do not really comprehend “what grass-roots economic development is really about and generally remain in a state of institutional denial”.<sup>36</sup>

**Increasing Materialism.** Expansion of MNCs and glitters of foreign products are giving rise to materialism in the developing countries. Luxuries are being turned into necessities. Credit and loans are promoting culture of living beyond means.<sup>37</sup>

**Globalization and Cultural Identity.** Globalization also threatens diverse cultural identities. Some consider it as a new way of sustaining Western domination of global society;<sup>38</sup> causing cultural conflict, giving birth to extremist tendencies and threatening core values.

**Brain Drain.** Foreign market economies are attracting talented youth of poor and developing countries with attractive pay packages and benefits, resulting in ‘Brain Drain’ of educated and professional elites.<sup>39</sup>

## **International Security and Nation-State**

### **Common Premises – Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism Theories in Contemporary World.**

The Neo-Liberals believe that the future lies in globalization; however, Realists assert that it undermines the sovereignty of nation-states and is the continuation of the colonial policies under a new name and different outlook. However, on the other hand both also share common analytical premises, on six focal areas, characterizing the current geo-politics:-<sup>40</sup>

**The Nature and Consequences of Anarchy.** Although both do not deny that the international system is anarchical to a degree but the difference of opinion lies in its interpretation and the effects.<sup>41</sup>

**International Cooperation.** Both agree that international cooperation is possible; however, "difference lies in ease of agreement and probability of happening."<sup>42</sup>

**Relative versus Absolute Gains.** The Neo-Liberals stress on the absolute gains from international cooperation, while the Neo-Realists emphasize relative gains.<sup>43</sup>

**Priority of State Goals.** Both agree that national security and economic welfare are important, but they differ in relative emphasis on these goals.<sup>44</sup>

**Intentions versus Capabilities.** Neo-Realists emphasize on the capabilities more than intentions; whereas, Neo-Liberals maintain that capabilities count only insofar as they affect the preferences and intentions of states.<sup>45</sup>

**International Institutions and Regimes.** Both recognize international regimes and institutions; however, differ in their significance and role in world politics.<sup>46</sup>

**Is Globalization Causing Demise of Nation-State?** There are two opposing views among the contemporary theorists; some argue that globalization is a direct threat to the sovereignty of the nation-state, while others believe that globalization has no effect on the autonomy of independent states. Depending on how these approaches are viewed, "the glass can be seen as half full or half empty".<sup>47</sup> Changes linked with globalization have substantial effects on the states; however, the argument of the demise of the nation-state doesn't seem to be happening at least in foreseeable future.<sup>48</sup>

**Regionalism vis-à-vis Globalization**<sup>49</sup>. As opposed to Old Regionalism based on the concept of blocs siding super powers New Regionalism is an outcome of post-cold war era and is continuously shaping in the emerging multi-polar world order. In the globalized economies, IFIs policies and agreements make member countries limit their ability to follow macroeconomic policies at domestic levels. On the contrary, Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) provide secure markets and bring more stability in economic policies through raising mutual stakes. Globalizing market system affords less leverage with independent states to control capital exchanges, which limits their role in managing internal economies. Conversely RTAs give enough time to domestic industries to first adapt and then gradually move towards global free trade in a graduated manner. Another dimension to the complete argument is that regionalism is made only possible by wide dimensions of globalization and it cannot replace the overall system in which it breaths. Thus it wouldn't be wrong to conclude that regionalism is a by-product of globalization and a building block of achieving a successful globalized world.

**Terrorism and Globalization.** Globalization and resultant proliferation of technology affords terrorist groups greater access worldwide, thus making terrorism easier and deadlier. Socio-

economic deprivation, cultural assaults and insensitivities to religious sentiments perpetuated by certain dimensions of Globalization are some of the major influencing factors thriving extremism in poor countries.<sup>50</sup> It can be concluded that negativities of Globalization give reason to terrorism, while technological advancements facilitates terrorist activities.

**Effects of Globalization on Nature of Warfare.** Globalization's effect on nature of warfare has been significant in following aspects:-

**Varied Dimensions of War.** Warfare has expanded to include the fields of diplomacy, economics, finance, cybernetics, media, and information. Modern wars involve full spectrum of conflict.<sup>51</sup>

**Effects of Alliances.** In their quest for their own interests, bigger powers often force smaller aligned states to join a conflict even though the later might not be directly affected by it.<sup>52</sup>

**Short and Intense.** Involvement of stakes of other players has made Wars short and intense with both sides making their best effort to achieve maximum gains in minimum time.

**Transparency.** Due to the information blitz and penetration of international actors a fair degree of transparency exists in conduct of wars.<sup>53</sup>

## **Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan**

**The South Asian Environment.** South Asia has peculiar geo-political, economic and social dynamics which are diverse and intricate in nature. The region is home to 1/5<sup>th</sup> of the world population yet contributes meagrely towards the world economic activity. The serenity of the region is plagued by legacy of un-resolved issues, making peace and prosperity an elusive proposition. Most of these issues are between two nuclear-armed states; India and Pakistan which have fought two all-out wars over the years and yet an air of distrust still persists. In terms of military expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), expenditure of South Asian countries is as under:-<sup>54</sup>

- India - 2.4 %
- Pakistan - 2.7 %
- Sri Lanka - 2.1 %
- Bangladesh - 2.4 %

In the socio-political side, 260 million people lack access to rudimentary health facilities, 337 million lack safe drinking water, over 400 million people go hungry every day and the average public health expenditure stands at 1.7 per cent of the region's GDP.<sup>55</sup> These are the peculiar dynamics of South Asian countries and other developing nations which are often a hindrance in the realization of phenomena of globalization.

## **Challenges in Geo-Politics**

### **Foreign Policy Making**

**Sovereignty in Decision-Making.** Very few developed countries in the world are sovereign enough to formulate their own foreign policies. In Pak-US relations, even

though Pakistan has largely adopted policies best suited for its vital interests; however, US continues to influence our foreign policy, albeit, mostly unsuccessfully.

**Effects of Alliance of Weaker Countries with Powerful States.** Powerful states often create or hypothesize an enemy and force all allied states to consider that *enemy* as theirs. Case in point is Pakistan joining the American Bloc; consequently developing hostile relations with the erstwhile the USSR.

### **Domestic Public Policy**

**Terrorism.** Globalization is an enabler and facilitator of terrorism by all aspects especially cash flow, migration and media savvy environment. Pakistan cannot close its physical and cognitive borders for these essential elements of globalization. The challenge therefore is to develop robust mechanisms to obviate potential exploitation by VNSAs.

**Good Governance.** With enhanced public awareness and media glare, Pakistan is faced with a huge challenge of good governance and socio-economic development.

### **Undermining the Traditional Nation-State System**

- **Imagined Communities.** Making use of the social media; women-rights' activists, environmentalists and other social workers have formed an imagined community which is affecting the traditional notion of supremacy of the Nation State.
- **Spirit of Nationalism vis-à-vis Socio-Political Improvement.** Poor and economically down-trodden people tend to associate themselves more with the state. They tend to draw strength from the state which leads to development of supreme sense of nationalism. Conversely, the affluent and bourgeois class of the society adopts a Western style 'Democratic Individualism' approach which is fairly secular in nature.<sup>56</sup> This diametrically opposite mind-set along with the growing economic gulf has plagued the Pakistani polity thereby creating polarity and extremism. The traditional nation-state system is also affected by it.
- **Growing Secessionist Movement.** Balochistan imbroglio is decades old and as such not an outcome of globalization. Globalization has however furthered it. Some disenchanted Baloch leaders are operating from abroad and causing unrest in the restive province. In the absence of any extradition treaty, these self-exiled leaders are operating with impunity. Support to this insurgency through cash flow and movement of people is also an undeniable fact. Discussion of the issue in US Congressional Committee Meeting suggests that the internal matters of Pakistan are an international matter now on the pretext of human rights' violation.

### **Challenges in Economy**

**Economic Strangulation.** Globalization is closely linked to economy which is a key determinant of national power. Some challenges for Pakistan in economic field are:-

Given Pakistan's current economic situation, intrusion of IFIs in economic policy-making of Pakistan is likely to continue in near to mid-term. Our policy makers are therefore faced with the challenge of meeting the demands of IFIs besides addressing domestic demands/concerns. Recent example of RGST is a case in point.

Influence of donor countries on the recipient country is another dimension to economic strangulation. Pakistan is energy starved these days and is looking towards the most feasible options for the import of gas. Of all the options, Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline project is the most viable option. However, US instead suggests that Pakistan should go for Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) which costs more than US \$ 10.5 billion as compared to IP which costs around US \$ 7.5 billion<sup>57</sup>. Kerry-Lugar Bill and the strings attached to it is another example.

**Most Favourite Nation (MFN) Status to India.**<sup>58</sup> A lot has been said and written on this issue, however, some misgivings still persist. Following points merit consideration:

- For the financial year 2010-11, official mutual trade stood at \$2 billion. Pakistan imported worth US \$275 million as opposed to over \$1.20 billion worth of imports by India.
- Tariff liberalization programme is yet to take effect due to an environment of mistrust between Pakistan and India.
- Even though India granted MFN status to Pakistan in 1995, our products have not been able to make sufficient headway in the Indian markets due to raised non-tariff barriers (NTBs) by India.
- According to one's argument, availability of Indian products in Pakistani markets at much cheaper rates in abundance might cripple own industrial base. Proponents of free trade on the other hand argue that it will lead to competitiveness.
- Pakistan's positive list for non-MFN India consisted of 1,945 items while India's positive list for MFN Pakistan included 850 items only. According to the WTO Secretariat, India is one of the highest users of safeguard policies against imports from other countries.

### **Challenges of Free Trade at International Level**

Pakistan's exports are mainly limited to unfinished products like cotton, rice, textile and leather products. This gives Pakistan limited capability to optimally exploit the opportunities of liberalized trade since the value of raw products is far lesser than finished goods. Moreover, some large countries protect their domestic suppliers by subsidizing their farmers. At present Pakistan's contribution in international trade is only 0.14 %.<sup>59</sup>

### **Poverty Alleviation**

Globalization can juxtapose enormous economic wealth with severe economic poverty. Almost half the world i.e. more than 3 billion people live on less than US \$ 2.50 a day.<sup>60</sup> Poverty level in Pakistan still stands at a staggering 22.3%.<sup>61</sup> As per study, the wealthiest 20% of the world account for 76.6% of total private consumption, while the poor 20% consume just 1.5%.<sup>62</sup> It is therefore no understatement to say that, while globalization has brought prosperity,

it also has brought with it new problems, new risks, and new vulnerabilities. The challenge therefore remains whether opening up trade at the regional level will address this issue or exacerbate it.<sup>63</sup>

### **Implications of Capital Flow on National Security**

The sheer volume of capital flow across the national boundaries every day speaks of the importance of this aspect of globalisation. Impact of capital flow on national security are as follows:

**FDI is crucial** for any developing country especially the non-industrialized states like Pakistan. FDI is contingent upon security and consistency in government policies; the absence of which can cause capital flight, which is a national security issue. Despite globalized environment, Pakistan experienced reduction in FDI over the last 5 years.

**Large MNCs** investing in a country tend to exploit the latter's need for FDI; Pakistan is no exception.

### **Implications of Migration on National Security**

Migration has been a long standing feature in South Asia. It has associated hazards as well. Overall, migration management presents a far greater security challenge to weak and failing states than to advanced post-industrial states. Pakistan faces the issue of brain-drain which if not appropriately articulated, is likely to emerge as an important issue. The dictates of homeland security is against the spirit of globalization. While globalization professes free movement of people across frontiers, homeland security demands stringent controls. Pakistan hosts thousands of visitors mainly from India on the pretext of business, Sikh pilgrimage and people-to-people contact. It has been historically proven that hostile agencies have always exploited this conduit for their nefarious designs. Over last few years Pakistan has faced a serious recession in tourists; details of year 2010 includes arrival (0.907 Million), earning (\$ US 305 Million) and world Share (0.35 %)<sup>64</sup>. Cultural invasion is one segment of globalization which is viewed with a lot of suspicion. A conservative country like Pakistan can ill-afford Indian and Western cultural invasion.

### **One-Way Traffic**

The Marxist writer Immanuel Wallerstein expresses the dilemma over Universalism. *“Liberals view it as a gift of the powerful to the weak that places them in a double bind: to refuse the gift is to lose; to accept the gift is to lose”*.<sup>65</sup> Our proclaimed offenders have been given refuge in many western countries from where they are operating with total impunity. Conversely, we are expected to hand-over any suspect without credible evidence of his or her involvement in the act. In the blasphemous film row; the US refused to take any action against its producer, disregarding the sentiments of Muslims all over the world. Some clandestine security agencies would want unabated entry into Pakistan, while their homeland security agencies would make our entry into that part of the world most cumbersome and difficult.

### **Global In-justice and In-equality**

Social justice and rule of law is hard to find in inter-state relations. Display of high-handedness by powerful states is a universally accepted norm. Even after not being able to find WMDs, the very casus-belli of US invasion of Iraq; the US-led coalition continued to pursue its operations. This is our global village where desecration of the Holy Quran by a priest in US was

though condemned but it was not more than just a lip-service. Pakistan is also facing similar challenges.

### **Opportunities for Pakistan**

**Is Globalization Inevitable for Pakistan.** It is a very common argument for policy makers in Pakistan. The issue has recently gained currency after the present government's decision to grant MFN status to India. In the words of Dr Mahbub-ul-Haq, "*Globalization is no longer an option, it is a fact. Developing countries have either to learn to manage it far more skilfully, or simply drown in the global cross-currents.*"<sup>66</sup>

**International Trade.** Pakistan is endowed with a unique geo-strategic location which implies that it can neither be left out nor remain aloof to the economic activity occurring at its neighbourhood. Pakistan sits at the strategically important location from where it can act as a bridge between the east and the west. Even though Pakistan's exports primarily remain agricultural products with limited revenue generation capability; the EU still accounted for 22.6% of Pakistani exports which were mainly cotton apparel and leather goods.<sup>67</sup> This speaks of the tremendous potential which Pakistan has for international trade. Pakistan has a host of untapped natural resources and cheap and hard-working labour. This is a unique opportunity for foreign investors who can develop a symbiotic and mutually-benefitting relationship with Pakistan.

**Regional Trade – SAARC Forum.** SAARC is an economic and political organization of eight countries in South Asia. Opportunities which SAARC presents are:

- Economic well-being of more than 1.7 billion people of the region.
- Pakistan's revenue from import duties will rise.
- In India, the business elite prevail over policy-makers. Driven by their own economic interests, Indian business community would never support hostile relations with Pakistan. It is therefore quite possible that a liberalized trade policy leads to improved relations between India and Pakistan.
- Pakistan can benefit with access to a market of over a billion consumers. India can gain trade access to CARs.
- Market competitiveness.

**Trade with D-8 Countries.** Intra-D-8 trade was US \$130 billion in 2011<sup>68</sup>, which was 7.5 per cent of the total trade of D-8 trade bloc<sup>69</sup>, however the bilateral trade and investment among D-8 member countries is yet to reach its full potential. It is expected that it could reach to US \$500 billion in 2018 after the implementation of Preferential Trade Agreement among the member states.<sup>70</sup>

**Capital Flow.** Pakistan relies heavily on remittances by Pakistani Diaspora. Last year Pakistanis contributed US \$ 13 billion which is only possible in a globalized environment. As regards FDI, in the year 2011, total foreign investment inside Pakistan remained only US \$ 812 million. It is pertinent to mention that Pakistan has tremendous potential of FDI which was over 5 Billion US Dollars in 2009.<sup>71</sup>

**Migration.** Britain makes a staggering eight billion pounds in fees from international students. Ever since its inception, Pakistanis have been moving world-wide to earn a better livelihood. At

present 1.984 % of the total population of Pakistan has migrated to various countries.<sup>72</sup> Other than the remittances from these immigrants, many Pakistani expatriates are members of local parliaments and hold esteemed places in domestic politics. They act as an effective lobby to further Pakistan's core interest and those of the Muslim community. Pakistan is gifted with tremendous natural beauty and historical sites, which can attract tourism.

**Burgeoning Media and IT.** Pakistan has a vibrant media which is emerging as an important pillar of the state. With over 20 million internet users and over 120 million mobile phone users<sup>73</sup>; adequate means are already in place for Pakistanis to reap the benefits of globalization.

## **Recommendations**

The research leads one to believe that globalization as a phenomenon is here to stay. That it is not a matter of choice but a compulsion is a foregone conclusion. However, prudence should be the rule of the thumb. We must not try to run before we have learnt to walk since globalization is boon as well as bane. In a globalized world, only those nations stand chance to succeed which excel in knowledge, information and technology. Countries having strong work ethics, sound educational system, social and economic justice, political stability and the rule of law can convert the challenges of globalization into opportunities. By and large, Pakistan has benefitted from globalization but not commensurate to its potential. Much remains to be done, for which the panel offers Policy Options and certain recommendations.

**Policy Options.** Guarding of our national identity and vital interests will remain supreme as a rider clause in any option we adopt. Two policy options are available:

**Option – 1 - Globalization Model as per Dynamics of Pakistan.** This option will neither be a classical Neo-Realist nor a Neo-Liberal approach. Instead it is a blend of both in conformity with our peculiar geo-economic and geo-political dynamics.

**Option – 2 - Liberalist Approach.** In this option, Pakistan will embrace globalization in all its manifestations, in true letter and spirit of the concept of globalization.

**Recommended Option.** Having discussed the opportunities and challenges globalization offers to us, the panel recommends option-1 for Pakistan. We must see the issues from a practical perspective rather than seeing them from the spectacle of an exotic thought.

**Policy Parameters.** To accrue greater advantages from the phenomenon of globalization, Pakistan must follow a policy of positivity and goodwill encompassing parameters of Comprehensive National Security, Equality, Cooperation & Collaboration, and Interdependency & Mutual Benefits.

**Imperatives for Reaping the Benefits of Globalization.** These include political / internal stability, consistency in policies, good governance, macro-economic stability and knowledge-based economy, energy self-sufficiency, technological / educational base, Human Resource Development (HRD), and soft image.

**Contours of Foreign Policy.** To achieve real dividends of globalization, contours of foreign policy also need to be defined. These include:-

**State Sovereignty.** Even though part of the greater international community wherein important foreign policy decisions cannot be taken in isolation, Pakistan must take

important decisions in line with its supreme national interests and aspirations of its masses. We have to be part of global community on important issues including terrorism. But our geographical and ideological boundaries are sacrosanct and inviolable. Geographical intrusions in the recent past are a brazen act of violation of our sovereignty and beyond compromise. The government must take a strong diplomatic stance with US on these issues.

**War on Terror.** While we must abhor terrorism in all its forms and there are no qualms about it; we must tailor the approach towards fighting it out. We must build national consensus to acknowledge that the on-going counter-terrorism campaign is critical to our national security. The campaign should be given a national colour and decision to launch operation in North Waziristan Agency (NWA), and role in Afghan reconciliation process should be in line with our overall counter terrorism strategy and not on any foreign dictates. The '*Do More*' Mantra should rather be reversed.

**Regional vs Global Approach.** The importance of regionalism cannot be over-emphasized. In Pakistan's perspective, 'Look East' policy is therefore a recommended course of action for Pakistan.<sup>74</sup> However, we should shun '*either*' and '*or*' from our glossary and learn to manage relations with multiple centers of power simultaneously.

**Economic Organizations vs Security Organizations.** It has been historically proven that our entry into any security assistance program has adversely affected us in the long run. It is also a bitter conclusion that no country would fend for another in the times of crises. It is therefore recommended that we must prefer economic cooperation organizations more than the security related organizations. However, an economic organization morphing into security organization can also be worked out essentially at regional level.

**Adopting 'Politics of Globalization' Approach / Threat Mitigation.** Pakistan must manage relations with India and re-orientate our relationship with US on new lines based on equality and mutual respect. We must exude positivity and appear as a responsible and dependable nation which plays an important role in international politics. Being a likeable figure in the international arena is likely to go a long way in helping us achieve international justice on issues of national security.

**Economic Policy.** Following is suggested in this regard:-

**Economic Sovereignty.** Economic sovereignty once achieved, political and geographical sovereignty will also be assured. We must make an earnest effort to gradually rid ourselves of the IFIs and donor countries. Only then can we take independent decisions best suited for our country.

**International Trade.** We must diversify our trade and think beyond EU, US and Middle East. Africa and Asia-Pacific especially Australia is a huge market which must be capitalized. Measures to enhance international competitiveness are product diversification, value addition, widening industrial base, Quality Control, shifting from low to high tech production, HRD, and focus on branding and marketing.

**Regional Trade.** We must open-up trade with India on the basis of economic centrality to increase its stakes inside Pakistan. This can be a step towards threat mitigation. However, concerns of our industrialists must be addressed in a pragmatic

manner to enable level playing field. Both the countries must resort to direct instead of indirect trade. Pakistan must engage India to reduce its safeguard policies and NTBs. We must also reactivate the forums of ECO and SAARC to fully utilize the trade potentials.

**D- 8 Forum.** The immense potential of gaining mutual trading benefits with D- 8 Countries should be exploited to its maximum.

**Energy Corridor.** Pakistan must exploit its strategic location and develop road, rail and pipe links with CARs through Afghanistan and Iran and exploit opportunities of Gwadar Port.

**Economic Bloc / Environment.** As regards collective and cooperative mechanisms, measures in following forums and areas would help Pakistan benefit from globalization:-

- **PIC-T.** A regional economic bloc comprising Pakistan, Iran, China and Turkey (PIC-T) is proposed. This can be realized in short to mid-term. The peculiar geographical contiguity of these countries naturally serves as a trade linkage between East and West. We can pursue China to join IP Gas Pipe links. Presence of China as an emerging global political and economic power will stimulate regional blocs.
- **PRIC.** Though achievable in long term, Pakistan must pursue a regional economic bloc such as PRIC (Pakistan, Russia, India and China) at some point in time later.
- **FDI.** Pakistan must create conducive environment for foreign investors. Potential areas may include IT, telecommunications, SMEs, mineral development, petroleum exploration, petro-chemicals, chemicals, infrastructure development, pipelines, agro-based industry, health, education and technical training.
- **Foreign Remittances.** Though the system has been fairly institutionalized, the government must take further steps to check illegal system of '*hundi*' and '*hawala*'.
- **Cash Flow.** The government must further facilitate trans-world cash flow. Advancements in the field of IT must be fully exploited. However, necessary checks and balances must be ensured to obviate terrorists' financing, money-laundering and plundered money deposits in international banks.

**Cultural Exchange.** Foreign culture has only found its place here due to a vacuum created due to the absence of our own cultural foot-print. We must therefore propagate the rich cultural heritage of our country abroad especially through Drama and Fashion Industries and Halal Food Products, being our strength. We must educate our masses on the difference between modernization and westernization, while maintaining own cultural identity.

**Domestic Public Policy.** Necessary policy level measures would also be required at home, which include:-

**Extremism and Religious Intolerance.** Extremism has permeated our society and this phenomenon must be addressed on priority. To that end, we must follow the principle of mutual co-existence to transform ourselves into a pluralistic society. The notion of mutual co-existence is not only an important dimension of globalization but is also clearly ordained in our great religion. Pakistan's social construct, norms and values have traditionally been mellow and affable. We are known for our hospitality, benevolence and compassion. Let our culture not be hijacked by a few misled who want Pakistan to be thrown in the darkness of their obscurantist thought. Religious intolerance be addressed through following means:

- Diplomatic engagement with countries which are fuelling this menace.
- Regulatory mechanism for financial support of madrassahs in Pakistan.
- Check patronage of proscribed organizations by some political parties.

**Soft Image of Pakistan.** We must project our soft image to the world. But to project this image, we must first develop all those attributes which are essential for improving our general outlook. Case in point is 'intolerance'. To this end, we must ensure that our education system is proponent of the same analogy and there are no dissimilarities.

**Migration.** Being an important aspect, and to have a holistic approach, attention is also recommended in following domains:-

**Trans-National Movement of People.** Since Pakistan's decision to join the GWOT, our country has been host to frequent movement of undesirable elements. Raymond Davis and scores of other hostile elements went about scot-free in our country. Pakistan should not permit unabated movement of such undesirable elements on its soil.

**Paradox of Diaspora and Brain-Drain.** This is a paradoxical phenomenon. While we would like our effective Diaspora to contribute meaningfully to our economy, we are also weary of the brain-drain which is swiftly dwindling away our grey-matter. This needs to be carefully worked out. It is suggested that we should not be overly concerned about the latter i.e. brain-drain. Pakistan needs educated and accomplished people to represent it at the international forums who can contribute invaluablely towards professing the view-point of Pakistan.

## Conclusion

The research has made an effort to bring to fore various challenges and opportunities which globalization poses for Pakistan today. Pakistan will have to adjust itself to all the frontiers and dimensions of the globalization, through macro-economic stability, FDI, communication technology, raising of remittances, good governance, human resource development and trade promotion through vibrant FTAs and PTAs. It can safely be concluded that globalization is an irreversible phenomenon which has come here to stay and Pakistan has to accordingly adjust.

<i>Researcher:</i>	<i>Mr Zia-ul-Haq, Lt Col Aqeel, Lt Col Majid and Col Akinjobi (Nigeria)</i>
<i>Supervisor:</i>	<i>Air Cdre Zia-ul-Haque Shamsi</i>

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## **AFGHANISTAN – PRE AND POST 2014: IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN**

Pakistan has borne the brunt of the fallout of Afghan crisis in the past three decades, as Afghanistan's closest neighbour. The costs incurred by Pakistan in blood and treasure are simply incalculable. The impact of the developments has practically transformed Pakistan's national security perspective and environment. The critical questions are: where does Afghanistan stand today? What it means for Pakistan when combat and security responsibilities would be transferred to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), after the scheduled withdrawal of the bulk of US/NATO/ISAF forces in 2014?

### **Political and Socio-Economic Environment**

The Bonn Agreement of 5 December 2001<sup>1</sup> has been a success in the sense that all the major milestones of the given road map have been achieved: the Interim Authority was established; the Emergency Loya Jirga was held which established the Transitional Authority under President Karzai; the Constitutional Loya Jirga was held in Kabul which approved the new Afghan Constitution on 4 January 2004. Presidential elections have been held twice: in October 2004 and November 2009. Parliamentary elections were held on 18 September 2005 and 18 September 2010.

### **Political Environment**

Yet the process of political transition appears to have run parallel of the Afghan conflict instead of serving as the key instrument of resolving it. Today, a decade after the implementation of Bonn Agreement, nothing can be said with any degree of certainty about Afghanistan's political future, notably after the drawdown of foreign forces. Taliban-led insurgency is raging throughout the country. Writ of Karzai-led government "only weakly extends beyond the outskirts of Kabul"<sup>2</sup>.

So what was wrong with the Bonn process? In nutshell, it failed to address the fundamental issue of reconciling the ethnic divisions in Afghanistan. Concluded in a haste to fill the power vacuum in Kabul as the Taliban regime was crumbling under heavy US bombing, the Bonn Agreement brought together the "winners of the US led Operation Enduring Freedom" and "not the warring parties". Bonn "did not try to reconcile the differences between the warring parties or attempt to draw 'moderate' members of the defeated party the Taliban in the process of government reestablishment or state creation."<sup>3</sup>

The ethnic imbalance flowing from Bonn Agreement was reflected in the composition of the Interim Authority. It "gave control of key ministries to the Tajiks, specially the Panjshiris, and Northern Alliance who at the time of the conference controlled Kabul"<sup>4</sup>. The attempt to fix the imbalance in the Transitional Authority, through enhancing Pashtun representation, proved to be insignificant, as far as the Pashtuns were concerned. It triggered a Tajik backlash which led to the subsequent rift between Karzai and his Tajik allies.

### **The Reconciliation Process**

The 2010 Loya Jirga authorized Karzai to begin talks with Taliban and other groups. A Higher Peace Council (HPC) was established under late Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani. The HPC received a severe blow when Rabbani was assassinated in September 2011.

Meanwhile, President Obama, during his draw-down speech on 22 June 2011 stated that "America will join initiatives that reconcile the Afghan people, including the Taliban. Our position on these talks is clear: they must be led by the Afghan government, and those who want

to be a part of a peaceful Afghanistan must break from Al-Qaeda, abandon violence, and abide by the Afghan Constitution”. Obama Administration now regards Mullah Omar as a critical figure in its efforts to organize peace talks between the Taliban and Karzai.<sup>5</sup>

The second, a *domestic reconciliation process*, is underway between the Taliban and the Afghan Government. President Karzai, while inviting Taliban for direct talks and political reconciliation, requested help from Pakistan. On its part, Pakistan was very quick and responsive. Former Prime Minister Gillani appealed to the Taliban leadership and all other Afghan groups, including Hizb-i-Islami, to participate in an intra-Afghan process for national reconciliation and peace.

Most recently, Afghan reconciliation was discussed during the visits to Pakistan of Salahuddin Rabbani, Chairman Afghan High Peace Council (HPC) on 12-15 November 2012; and Afghan Foreign Minister, Zalmay Rassoul, on 30 November 2012. Following is the gist of the two Joint Statements:<sup>6</sup>

Joint appeal to the Taliban and other armed opposition groups to participate in the Afghan-led and Afghan-owned reconciliation process to end violence. There was pledge by Pakistan to the release a number of Taliban detainees in response to requests of the Afghan government/HPC. All concerned countries, including Pakistan, Afghanistan and USA will facilitate safe passage to potential negotiators to advance reconciliation process. Pakistan and Afghanistan will work closely with other international partners to remove the names from the UN sanctions list of the potential negotiators amongst Taliban. Joint appeal to the Taliban and other armed groups to sever all links with Al-Qaeda, and other international terror networks.

## **Elections 2014**

Schedule of next elections coincides with exit of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). According to provisions of Afghan constitution, Karzai cannot contest the elections a third time. Some of the names being speculated for the presidential seat are: Atta Mohammad (Tajik), Farooq Wardak (Pashtun), Mohammad Hanif (Pashtun) and Ashraf Ghani (Pashtun).<sup>7</sup> In a departure from the past, level of popular political participation has risen and demands for regional autonomy and wider political participation are much stronger.

## **Chicago Summit**

Post 2014 Afghanistan was on top of the agenda of the NATO Summit held at Chicago from 20-21 May 2012. Important elements of the declaration included<sup>8</sup>; emphasis on a ‘comprehensive approach’ and continued improvements in governance; ANSF will be in the lead for security nationwide after the security transition by mid-2013; NATO will “continue to provide strong and practical support” to Afghanistan through a new post 2014 “non-combat” mission to “train, advise, and assist the ANSF”; forthcoming elections must be conducted with full respect to Afghan sovereignty and in accordance with the Constitution in a transparent and credible manner; and roles of regional countries, “particularly Pakistan”, to ensure “enduring peace, stability and security in Afghanistan and in facilitating the completion of the transition process”.

## **Socio-Economic Dimensions**

Afghanistan has made considerable progress in many areas. Some key developments include improvement in basic infrastructure and essential public service delivery. Future

progress on the economic front would largely depend on: realization of the \$16 billion pledged at the July 2012 Tokyo Conference; development and utilization of multi-trillion dollar mining industry; and productive use of Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) already operationalized. The main features of the Afghan economy can be summarized as follows:<sup>9</sup>

Average GDP growth over FY 2003/04 to 2010/11 has been 9.1%, attributable mainly to consumption. Private investment and exports remain extremely low. Budget continues to rely heavily on external financing. Aid is estimated to be \$15.7 billion i.e. about the same as the size of the GDP in fiscal year 2011. Despite high GDP growth rate, Afghanistan remains one of the least developed countries with 1/3 of the population living below poverty line. Sustained growth at 6% a year would be required for next 22 years to double Afghanistan's GDP and generate the necessary employment levels. One striking feature of Afghan economy is its informal / illegal nature, which has sustained the society in turbulent times when the state failed.<sup>10</sup>

## **PART-II**

### **STRATEGIC AND SECURITY ENVIRONMENT**

The US-led coalition has trained and put in place the ANSF, mostly comprising Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), with a combined strength of 352,000 as of September 2012. The security and strategic environment remains complex and uncertain. With occasional fluctuations in the intensity and frequency of the number of attacks, the insurgency remains pretty strong. The latest trend of the so called "Green on Blue" attacks is a stark reminder of the disintegration of the Najibullah forces short of the collapse of the Communist regime.

#### **Who Is "The Enemy"?**

There are multiple and diverse armed groups, loosely allied, who continue to challenge security in Afghanistan. There is no consensus on the relative strength of both criminal gangs disguised as insurgents and actual insurgents in all areas where they have been and continue to operate, regardless of ISAF operational tempo. The ISAF Commanding General, General John Allen, told journalists in October 2011 "that the numbers of insurgents may be far fewer than the 25,000 previously assessed."

#### **The Taliban ("Quetta Shura Taliban")**

The Taliban is by far the largest opposition armed group in Afghanistan, accounting for more than 80 per cent of the total number of insurgents. Although Mullah Omar's leadership is largely undisputed, the extent to which the Taliban leadership is able to control its rank and file is a matter of debate. It relies on a mix of incentives, rewards, and direct orders to ensure a degree of compliance.<sup>11</sup>

The Taliban's "stated goals" are three-fold: 1) consolidation (*iqrar*) of an Islamic system; 2) unite the country and prevent it from being divided; and 3) provide security and peace in the country."<sup>12</sup>

#### **Hizbi-Islami**

Hizbi-Islami is the second-largest insurgent group in Afghanistan, accounting for perhaps 10 percent of the strength of the insurgency. Hizbi-Islami's relations with the Taliban are often troubled, and the two groups have fought each other in the recent past; as of early 2011 they seem to have patched up and are fighting together again.<sup>13</sup>

### **Al Qaeda**

Al Qaeda had a small presence in Afghanistan by late 2010, with probably tens rather than hundreds of cadres operating in Afghan territory. These cadres operated mainly as advisers, specialists, and trainers, giving them a greater value than their small numbers would suggest. It is difficult to judge Al Qaeda's strategy in Afghanistan, but certainly they oppose negotiations and will try to do whatever they can to sabotage them. Their likely strategy is to keep the Afghan front open as long as possible in order to weaken the American enemy and prevent future intervention in the Arab world.

### **Haqqani Faction or Network (HQN)**

The Americans believe that the HQN is arguably the most lethal threat to Afghan security. It is reported that the Haqqani Network are also in league with the Pakistani Taliban, who are fighting the Pakistani Army, which are allegedly a tacit supporter of Haqqani. Regardless of its anti-Karzai stance, this organization remains closer to Al Qaeda than to the Afghan Taliban. Al Qaeda fighters, which are operating in Afghanistan, are reportedly embedded with Haqqani fighters.<sup>14</sup> It is alleged that the network's targeting of Indian interests within Afghanistan encourages the speculation of a tie to Pakistan.

### **US Security Policy, 2014 Transition, and Beyond**

The policy goal of the Obama Administration is "to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a safe haven for global terrorism." However, the criteria for reaching this goal have for the most part revolved around the level or degree to which the government of Afghanistan and the ANSF can defend the country, govern effectively, and develop economically. The US's mission is now moving fast toward changing from a "combat leadership to a mentoring and over-watch" role by mid-2013.

In Kabul in May 2012, President Obama signed the critical U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement with President Karzai. This agreement is critical in establishing both a long-term commitment between the two nations and provides a political framework, which will define relations between the United States and Afghanistan. Additionally, Afghanistan has signed other partnership agreements with many of the NATO Allies or ISAF partners notwithstanding other regional countries, notably India.

The UN/Afghan Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) determined that the ANA would expand to 171,600 and the ANP to approximately 134,000. The ANSF was able to reach that level in September 2011, one month in advance. Due to the anticipation of an ISAF drawdown and the desire to approach the required force ratios to conduct counterinsurgency in accordance with US doctrine, a larger target size of 352,000 was set. This end strength was set for November 2012, but was reached by the end of September 2012, two months ahead of schedule. As the ANSF and the corresponding state security apparatus is funded almost entirely through international donations, the subject of sustaining the ANSF after 2014 was and remains a major issue.

The Obama administration's goal for the drawdown of US forces is for partner drawdown to coincide with US forces and in relative proportion as follows:

**Tranche 1:** began transition in July 2011 consisting of three relatively stable provinces: Kabul, Panjshir, and Bamiyan.

**Tranche 2:** began transition in December 2011 and focused on the provinces of Balkh, Dai Kundi, Takhar, Samangan, Nimruz, and areas of Kabul province, which had not already transitioned.

**Tranche 3:** began transition in June 2012: The successful completion of this tranche will mean 75% of Afghanistan's population will now be in areas where the ANSF is responsible for security.

**The fifth and final tranche** is planned for completion by mid-2013 an important milestone in NATO's Lisbon roadmap.

### **PART- III**

#### **ROLE OF NEIGHBOURING STATES AND REGIONAL PLAYERS**

Afghanistan's neighbours and regional players have legitimate interests and stakes in the restoration of peace and stability in Afghanistan. Each one of them is affected, in varying degrees, by the fallout of the Afghan crisis. Following is an assessment of the interests and roles of these states.

##### **Islamic Republic of Iran**

Iranian interests in Afghanistan include; enhancing Iranian influence and leverage in Afghanistan, strengthening Shia and pro Iran factions in the Afghan dispensation, preventing the return to power of Taliban and removal of US forces from Afghanistan. In addition, it is also in the quest for development of communications links in collaboration with India to turn ChahBahar port into a hub of transit and trade with landlocked Afghanistan and Eurasia. Iran would also like to secure its borders with Afghanistan, control of narcotics and trans-border crimes and return of Afghan refugees from its soil.

As Iranian and US interests generally converge on Taliban, enhanced role of non-Pashtuns, and Indian role in Afghanistan, Iran's role in the context of the 2014 drawdown is expected to remain generally positive and non-confrontational, despite the growing tensions between the two sides over Iranian nuclear programme. Withdrawal of the bulk of foreign forces itself is a significant incentive for Iran, though it will remain wary of continued US footprint.

##### **The Central Asian Republics (CARs)**

The common interests of CARs include; eliminating the threats of terrorism, extremism, separatism and control of narcotic drugs and trans-border crimes flowing out of Afghanistan. In view of the strong convergence of interests, the CARs are likely to play a supportive role in the 2014 transition.

##### **Peoples Republic of China**

While maintaining low political profile, China is trying to establish solid economic foothold in Afghanistan through expansion of trade ties and investment in the mining and energy sectors. China is the largest investor in Afghanistan. Chinese interests in Afghanistan

include: restoration of peace in Afghanistan and elimination of the threats of terrorism, extremism and separatism, and engagement in mutually beneficial cooperation in transit and trade, mining and energy fields. China would also like to prevent Russia and India military foothold in Afghanistan. While US military bases in Afghanistan may not be of permanent nature. China's interests dictate that it goes along with the process led by the United States. Slowly and gradually gaining strategic, political, and economic foothold in transformed Afghanistan.

### **Russian Federation**

Russian interests at the present juncture include; gaining strategic, political, and economic foothold in transformed Afghanistan; eliminating the threats of terrorism, extremism and separatism; preventing permanent US military bases in Afghanistan; control of narcotic drugs and trans-border crimes flowing out of Afghanistan and engagement in mutually beneficial cooperation in transit and energy fields. Russia's interests dictate that it goes along with the US led transition in 2014. Russia, along with China and Iran, is likely to oppose long term US footprint.

### **Saudi Arabia**

Saudi interests in Afghanistan include; countering Iranian influences in Afghanistan; strengthening pro Saudi Sunni factions in Afghanistan; eliminating the threats of terrorism and extremism; control of narcotic drugs and trans-border crimes flowing out of Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia has the capability to play a constructive role in facilitating Afghan consensus on an acceptable dispensation in Kabul. Saudi Arabia is likely to support the US led transition.

### **India**

Indian interests in Afghanistan include:-

Gradually regain its influence in Kabul to the level that existed prior to the 1979 Soviet invasion and take it to even higher levels, primarily to enhance its leverage in Afghanistan vis-à-vis Pakistan.

Help strengthen and bring to power the pro-India and anti-Pakistan factions.

Build an intelligence network in Afghanistan to foment trouble in Balochistan, FATA and other parts of Pakistan and build an image of a benign and friendly power.

Eliminate the scope of "militant support" for the Kashmiri freedom fighters through eliminating "the sanctuaries" in Afghanistan.

Establish transit and trade links and energy corridors with the CARs via Iran and Afghanistan.

Minimize "Afghan dependence on Pakistan" while enhancing its "partnership" with India.

The time apparently looks propitious for India to push for its interests and objectives in Afghanistan, but it may still be premature for India to play any effective role in Afghanistan for the following reasons:

Any military role for India would be available only at the cost of losing Pakistan's support, which would not be a worthwhile option.

India itself would be reluctant to commit military forces knowing that any country committing military foot-print in Afghanistan earns the hatred of the Afghan people and at the end leaves with a bloody nose.

India cannot play any meaningful role in the reconciliation process which is between the US and the Taliban factions. India enjoys limited clout with the Karzai government and the non-Pashtun factions previously part of the Northern Alliance with whom the US itself enjoys far stronger clout.

## **Pakistan**

Pakistan's main interests in Afghanistan at the present juncture may be summarized as follows:-

Restoration of peace and stability in Afghanistan.

Elimination of terrorism and extremism.

Preventing use of Afghan soil by terrorists against Pakistan and other countries.

Preventing hostile/Indian military foot print in Afghanistan threatening Pakistan's security.

Peaceful and secure borders with Afghanistan.

Security of transit/trade routes and energy corridors passing through Afghanistan.

Repatriation of Afghan Refugees.

Multifaceted cooperation with Afghanistan at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels.

Pakistan's role will remain crucial in the post 2014 scenario. On its own and in concert with other stake holders, Pakistan would do its utmost to facilitate an orderly and smooth transition in 2014 for the earliest restoration of peace and stability in Afghanistan which is a necessary precondition for the realization of its vital interests.<sup>15</sup>

## **PART- IV**

### **FUTURE AFGHAN SCENARIOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN**

The American plans of bringing about peace in the war torn Afghanistan are under high strain. The way forward is actually now the way out. Through a scenario building exercise, an effort has been made to arrive at a probable set of scenarios for post 2014 Afghanistan.

#### **Imperatives**

##### **Political**

A meaningful dialogue between the US/Afghan government and Taliban / Hizb-e-Islami/other factions on power sharing between Pashtuns and Tajiks, US versus Taliban; Afghan constitution and US foot print in Afghanistan.

Good Governance and Rule of Law.

### **Security**

Capacity building of ANSF.

ISAF drawdown (in depriving the insurgency of their main justification).

Use of smart power, in terms of generating incentives for the Taliban through greater share in power and other means with ultimate aim of raising their stakes in peace and stability.

### **Socio - Economic**

Growth and sustenance of economy.

Socio-economic development.

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).

Cultural dynamics (non-interference in cultural matters).

### **Drivers**

There are political, strategic, social, economic and cultural drivers, which are and will play a crucial role in shaping the future of Afghanistan. Interplay of proportionate and combined effects of fusion of selected drivers i.e. *governmental policies* and *insurgent policies* given in succeeding paragraphs is likely to shape different scenarios.

#### **Governmental Policies**

**US.** Perceived change in the US policy towards politico-economic development from military centric approach and engaging Taliban for a negotiated settlement reflects a paradigm shift.

**Afghanistan.** Shift in power sharing arrangement by current Afghan government as an outcome of reconciliation process, resource sharing arrangement and behaviour of next Afghan government will facilitate the stability in Afghanistan.

**Pakistan.** Role in helping create conducive conditions for a grand intra-Afghan settlement.

#### **Insurgents Policies**

**Taliban.** From adopting a rational policy to continue fighting.

**Al-Qaeda.** Al-Qaeda has lost its influence and carries only symbolic value.

Haqqani Group

Other Groups

### **Prevailing Trends**

Various discernible trends in different domains having pronounced bearing on the contours of Afghanistan are:-

#### **Politico – Diplomatic**

US will keep low footprint albeit high influence, post 2014.

US-Afghanistan Strategic Agreement and US-India strategic partnership.  
 Respective national interests of Pakistan and Iran in Afghanistan.  
 Reconciliation process and diminishing Al-Qaeda strength and influence.  
 Blame on Pakistan for not playing a positive role as a facilitator.

**Economic**

Donors pledges viz-a-viz donor fatigue.  
 Rampant corruption and poor governance detrimental to economic growth.  
 Economic salvation linked to development of mining sector in long term and associated challenges.  
 Low socio-economic development despite huge aid during last decade.

**Socio-cultural**

Total aversion to outside interference.  
 Dominant role of tribal warlords and ethnicity.  
 Lack of human resource development and social deprivations.  
 Poor governance and endemic corruption.

**Security**

ANSF’s questionable viability.  
 Capability viz requirement to take on security transition.  
 Financial sustainability.

**Post-2014 Scenarios (2024)**



**Scenario 1: Muddling Through (Most likely)**

Main elements are:-

**Assumptions**

Positive realization by insurgents among themselves.

Pakistan is negotiation with Taliban / Haqqani partially successful.

Weak and split Afghan government - US sponsored.

No structural reforms, institutional disharmony, nepotism and endemic corruption.

Preferential treatment to Northern Alliance, which plays spoiler role in achieving reconciliation.

ANSF not potent enough to control insurgency completely.

US presence and military bases.

Indian and Chinese involvement in developmental activities.

### **Uncertainties**

US future objectives and strategy.

Regional consensus.

Capability and credibility of Afghan security apparatus.

**Scenario – 2024.** Realization by insurgent groups to reconcile differences post US drawdown for Afghanistan, irrespective of Afghan government's failure to address larger cause of Afghan stabilization and peace. Reconciliation process remains under strain due to negative influence of Afghan government and Tajiks sensing compromise of their interests. US drawdown as planned. Elections are held, some Taliban/other factions boycott elections. Government retains power with a new President but public dis-contentment with the government continues. International support continues as pledged. Mistrust to a varying degree continues amongst internal and external stakeholders. No significant change in regional dynamics; Afghanistan remains a battleground of conflicting interests, both positive and negative. Battle of dominance continues between ANSF / US Forces and belligerent Taliban. Cross border attacks and Haqqani Group access to sanctuaries in North Waziristan Agency (NWA) continues. Uneasy peace with relative instability prevails with fair degree of development.

### **Implications**

Continuous presence of US forces in a volatile neighbourhood would pose serious threats to the internal stability of Pakistan in particular and the region in general.

Drone strikes will continue breaching the sovereignty of Pakistan albeit with low intensity.

Interference in Balochistan by the Indians to support sub-nationalist groups will continue.

Repatriation of refugees may not be possible.

US footprint on Afghan soil will continue to raise concerns for Pakistan, China, Russia, Iran and CARs.

Future of Afghanistan as an 'Energy Corridor' would be relatively low.

US financial constraints and reduction in development aid for Afghanistan will directly affect Afghan economy and will have direct / indirect effects on Pakistan's economy.

## **Scenario 2: Stable Afghanistan**

Main elements are:-

### **Assumptions**

Consensus among ethnic / political factions.

Internal divide in Taliban with hardliners not willing to reconcile over US footprint.

Pakistan negotiation with Taliban / Haqqani network succeeds.

National consensus government with US support.

ANSF – emerging as a potent force.

US presence and military bases.

Dominant and reconciliatory role of tribal warlords.

Indian and Chinese involvement in developmental activities.

### **Uncertainties**

US future objectives and strategy.

Regional consensus.

**Scenario – 2024.** Mutual realization by all internal stakeholders on future peace and stability and reconciling extremes. Reconciliation process partially succeeds / moderate Taliban joins government. Moderate Taliban participate in elections while hardliners boycott. US drawdown as planned. Coalition of moderate Taliban and Northern Alliance form the Government. International support continues as pledged. Level of trust increases amongst stakeholders. Fighting continues between ANSF / US Forces and hardliner Taliban with low intensity. Cross border attacks reduce / Haqqani Groups access to sanctuaries in NWA denied to a fair degree. Uneasy peace continues with fair degree of development in Kandhar and Helmand as well. Eventually in mid to long-term ANSF / US Forces overpower hardliner Taliban and regain control of maximum areas. Development and prosperity returns to Afghanistan.

### **Implications**

Drone strikes halt, which helps in improving Pakistan's internal security situation with peace returning to FATA.

Interference in Balochistan by the Indians and cross border incursions in FATA by terrorists hiding in Nuristan stops.

Repatriation of Afghan refugees.

Helps Pakistan fight extremism / terrorism / sub-nationalism.

However, US footprint on Afghan soil will continue to raise concerns for Pakistan, China, Russia, Iran and CARs.

Future of Afghanistan as an 'Energy Corridor' would be bright.

Socio-economic development of the region becomes possible.

Narco trade recedes.

Binary stretch on Pakistan military ends.

### **Scenario 3: Simmering Militancy**

Main elements are:-

#### **Assumptions**

Taliban on winning streak.

No reconciliation.

Limited power sharing arrangement.

Insurgents continue with renewed vigour.

Power struggle among political / ethnic factions continue with same tempo.

US sponsored government.

US presence and military bases.

Preferential treatment to Northern Alliance.

Afghanistan –Pakistan border region remains troubled.

Chinese and Indian involvement in developmental activities.

ANSF not potent enough to control insurgency.

#### **Uncertainties**

US future objectives and strategy.

Regional consensus.

Social and economic development.

**Scenario – 2024.** Insurgents disregard all efforts of reconciliation on the plea of not accepting their preconditions. US drawdown provides notion of victory and further toughens their stance irrespective of concerted governmental efforts spearheaded by the re-elected President. New government duly recognized by international community makes some structural reforms and struggles to improve governance. Drawdown progresses as planned. US reduces physical presence but retains high influence. Efforts by ISAF to train ANA continue. Taliban expand their influence and eastern and southern provinces come under their de facto control. There is limited anarchy in many parts of the country. Increased drone strikes and intelligence-led operations are causing collateral damage but not eroding the capability of insurgents. Efforts for peace and reconciliation are taken over by UN with full US support. Close to 2020, Kabul lingers on with fractured central authority. Warring factions have consolidated their alliances. US is actively backing Northern Alliance but losing interest. Taliban led alliance is receiving covert support from some sympathizers.

#### **Implications**

US and her allies continue implicating Pakistan as an abettor of terrorism.

Continuous presence of US forces in a volatile neighbourhood would pose serious threats to the internal stability of Pakistan in particular and the region in general.

Drone strikes continue breaching the sovereignty of Pakistan thus inviting public wrath, unless, a regime change in Pakistan post 2013 general elections reverses the situation.

Interference in Balochistan by the Indians with cross border incursions in FATA by terrorists hiding in Nuristan.

Pakistan may face pressure, allegedly for not facilitating the reconciliation process.

#### **Scenario 4: Destabilized Afghanistan (Most Dangerous)**

Main elements are:-

##### **Assumptions**

Taliban on winning streak.

No reconciliation.

Al-Qaeda ideology remains.

Insurgents continue with renewed vigour.

Power struggle intensifies among political / ethnic factions.

Afghanistan –Pakistan border region loses respective government's writ.

Afghan government structure collapse.

ANSF fragmented and joins ethnic affiliations.

All neighbouring countries promote respective interests.

Chinese exit from economic scene.

##### **Uncertainties**

US future objectives and strategy.

Level of Taliban resistance.

Pakistan's leverage.

**Scenario – 2024.** The adoption of extreme positions by insurgents and staunch and uncompromising stances by US and Afghanistan Government dominated by Northern Alliance govern this outcome. The planned political and security transition in Afghanistan fails. India works up the anti-Pakistan Afghan elements to increase pressure on Pakistan. US continue with its 'aid and raid' approach in Afghanistan. There is greater anarchy and new round of civil war. NATO supply route via Pakistan is shut down. US rely on Northern Distribution Network (NDN) which the Russians resist. There is a unanimous call from regional States for US to vacate its military bases from Afghanistan. Insecurity in larger part of the country means that election process is halted. International support starts reducing due to changed objectives / terrorist's attacks. State structures become irrelevant and non-existent. There is no single authority in Kabul. Northern Alliance from North and Taliban's from South and East

compete for control over Kabul. This development is unlikely to kick in before 2014, as the Taliban are not in a position to achieve a comprehensive military victory as long as NATO/ISAF troops are present. There is a full scale civil war and the wave of violence and religious radicalization spreads over Pakistan, effectively contributing to increased insecurity and destabilization of Pakistan.

### **Implications**

US and her allies continue implicating Pakistan as an abettor of terrorism.

Continuous presence of US forces in a volatile neighbourhood would pose serious threats to the internal stability of Pakistan in particular and the region in general.

Drone strikes continue breaching the sovereignty of Pakistan thus inviting public wrath, unless, a regime change in Pakistan post 2013 general elections reverses the situation.

Pakistan may have to bear extra burden in terms of more refugees from Afghanistan.

Pakistan military overstretches to new extremes.

Narco trade and its nexus with terrorism increases.

Pakistan's economy remains under continuing stress.

## **PART-V**

### **POLICY OPTIONS FOR PAKISTAN**

There are four possible policy options for Pakistan:-

**Constructive Engagement:** Continue existing policy with necessary modifications and fine-tuning. (Recommended)

**Regional Approach:** Try to seek a solution in concert with Afghanistan's **neighbours**, Russia and China and other regional players. Not advisable. (Not recommended)

**Neutrality:** Not affordable in view of the porous border and direct impact of Afghan situation on Pakistan. (Not recommended)

**Aggressive Engagement:** Try to keep Afghanistan under Pakistan's sphere of influence, seek to manipulate internal politics, seek strict harmonization of Afghan policies with those of Pakistan. Not advisable.(Not recommended)

### **Elements of Proposed Policy**

Support Afghan-led and Afghan-owned solutions.

Coordinate with all key stake holders, namely US, Iran, Russia, CARs, Turkey and China through existing bilateral, trilateral, quadrilateral forums and creating new forums where necessary.

Work closely with Afghanistan and other stake holders to eliminate terrorism and extremism.

Develop modern border control mechanisms, without restricting legal cross border movement.

Neutrality in dealing with Afghan factions and ethnic groups.

Develop close ties with Afghanistan in conformity with norms of inter-state conduct.

Build mutually beneficial partnerships in transit, trade, connectivity and energy corridors at the intra and inter regional levels.

Intensify cooperation under OIC, ECO, SCO, UN, NAM, CAREC (Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation) and SAARC.

Develop mechanisms for orderly return of refugees.

## Conclusion

Afghan situation remains highly volatile and complex. The success of the transitional process depends on resolving the political conflict, which in turn depends on the success or failure of the reconciliation process. There are lingering fears that Afghanistan may once again descend into a chaotic situation after the planned drawdown of US/NATO/ISAF forces in 2014. This would be the likely scenario if the reconciliation process failed. The situation would further aggravate if the regional players jumped in to fill the vacuum and support their respective proxies, the way they did during the 1990s. This scenario would have grave implications for Pakistan in terms of aggravation of the phenomenon of terrorism and extremism, with devastating impact on Pakistan's national security, foreign relations, national cohesion and unity, economy and image.

In the more likely scenario, Afghanistan, while tumbling through odds, would ultimately stabilize in the mid to long term perspective. The first decade or so after the drawdown would, in any scenario, be highly volatile and full of challenges for both Afghanistan itself, as well as Pakistan. This scenario is based on the assumptions that: the reconciliation process would succeed in bringing about a power sharing arrangement with the dominant Taliban faction; the potency and cohesion of ANSF would be ensured; financial support to the Kabul set-up would be guaranteed; regional players would not have the temptation to fill any vacuum. And these rather optimistic assumptions are in turn based on the facts that: the US has finally turned around towards reconciliation (Kabul regime was already convinced); the Taliban, on their part have shown willingness to engage in negotiations; the regional players have vital stakes in peace and stability in Afghanistan and do not stand to gain anything from the continuing violence and turmoil. The interests of internal as well as external players, thus, practically converge at this juncture, on restoration and peace and stability in Afghanistan, rather than continuation of the conflict and violence.

<i>Researcher:</i>	<i>By: Amb Aslam Khan, Brig Rizwan Rafi, Col William Sterling (USA), Lt Col Shuja Anwar</i>
<i>Supervisor:</i>	<i>Brig Najeeb Ahmed</i>

## Endnotes

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## PAKISTAN: DEMOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE CHANGE

### Introduction

Demography and climate change are two silent phenomena. Unlike other natural calamities, the effects are not felt until they are already deeply entrenched. We are lucky that we can read the natural trends and can plan to respond. The study of demography in Pakistan presents some absorbing trends. Population growth rate of Pakistan fluctuated from 1950 to 1972 and settled down to steady ratio in the decade of 2000 to 2012. The reasons are varied and implications tremendous. Climate change is undoubtedly the most serious environmental crisis Earth is experiencing in recent history. The impact of climate change along with the destruction of ecosystems associated with the relentless industrialization will transform forever its physical and biological properties. Indeed, in the context of Pakistan, climate change is not only the biggest environmental threat faced by the country but is also likely to be the cause of extraordinary social and economic problems in the course of this century.

The article makes an attempt to establish that the demographic trends in Pakistan have tremendous potential which is being marred by lack of understanding of its consequences on national development and National Security. The rapid population growth presents both an opportunity and a nightmare to Pakistan. If incredible energies of the youth bulge are harnessed and channelized they could turn out to be our biggest asset. On the other hand, if sight is lost, Pakistan could easily drift into mayhem. Despite being amongst the lowest contributors, Pakistan is most vulnerable to climate change due to its dependence on weather patterns, melting of HKH glaciers and their effects on water patterns in Indus River System. Pakistan has limited capacity to adapt to climate change and the impact will be immense, threatening the water, food, energy and human security.

In later part of the article, in order to find out the accumulated effects on National Comprehensive Security calculus, an effort has been made to establish the linkage of these two important areas as there are some striking similarities between impacts of demography and climate change. Most environmental problems, including those arising from climate change, tend to increase in magnitude due to bulging rise in population. In the last part, response matrix covering short, medium and long term recommendations have been proffered to control and mitigate the effects of this phenomenon.

### Demography

Demography is the scientific study of human population<sup>1</sup>. It covers the statistics from birth to death of an individual and once analyzed scientifically becomes the demography of a particular nation. Contemporary thought on demography focus upon human resources and its potentials for policy planning rather than taking it as simple statistics. The development of human resources has been considered to be the main attribute of the Capitalism<sup>2</sup>. Globalization is creating significant thought for Human Resource Management (HRM)<sup>3</sup>, a concept which demands to choose, recruit and train the right people for right type of work. Pakistan is a labour surplus economy<sup>4</sup>. Thus in Pakistan, suitable exploitation of demography is a binding rather than an option.

### International Approach to Human Development

The International Conference on Population and development (ICPD) held in Cairo in 1994 was a milestone in the recent history of population and development. The Programme of Action was adopted by 179 countries. At the United Nations Millennium summit held in 2000 to which Pakistan is also a signatory, clearly defined eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and provided strategic framework for operationalization of population and development policies by all member countries. These goals are to be achieved by 2015.

The performance of Pakistan in achieving these goals has been only satisfactory. With existing pace, Pakistan is likely to achieve considerable success on only two from the list, which are primary education for all and global partnerships for development. The reasons are numerous and can be mainly attributed to lack of continuity of policies, capacity issues and regional dynamics to implement these policies by successive governments. Host of other social norms have further accentuated the problems and thus the country has lagged behind on almost all the MDGs.

### **Demographic Trends in Asian Context**

In the 1930s, large empires –British and Japanese controlled Asia. By 1950, well entrenched Nation States had emerged. This had effects on demography, changed migration pattern and nationalities as well. In present day Asia, three big demographic tendencies are exerting influence on the region's economic and political calculus. The first is rapid population aging, especially in East Asia. By 2025 China's median age may be approaching 40 years, and Japan's may well exceed 50. Second is an adverse mortality trend— in Russia already, but possibly in China and India as well stand to constrain options for some emerging actors on the Eurasian stage. Finally, the strange and unnatural phenomenon of rising ratios at birth in favour of females has been extending over much of the Asia terrain.

For further revealing comparison , if we consider the two-generation sweep from 1975 to 2025, in which we are currently (more or less) at three quarter point, we will observe that relative population weight is poised to shift for various dyads<sup>5</sup>, few important ones are :-

**India/China.** By the UNDP's "medium variant" projections, between 1975 and 2025, China's population would grow by about half, from about 930 million to over 1.4 billion. India's, on the other hand, would increase to more than double, jumping from around 620 million to over 1.3 billion. A generation ago, there were nearly 50 % more people in China than in India; a generation hence, the projected differential would be a mere 5 %. The management pattern is quite divergent in both the cases and has academic value.

**Pakistan/Russia.** The most radical shift in the relative population weight of major countries in the region, would involve Pakistan and Russia. In 1975, Erstwhile USSR population was nearly twice as large as Pakistan's (134 vs. 70 million). By 2025, under "medium variant" projections, the situation will be virtually reversed: Pakistan would be just over twice as populous as Russia (250 vs. 124 million)<sup>6</sup>.

### **Important Constituents of Demographics of Pakistan and its Implications**

**Population Size and Growth.** The areas, which now constitute Pakistan, is the area of the Indus Valley Civilization, one of the oldest in the world dating back at least 5000 years, the population was dependent on the Indus River System. The area has a history of consistent census undertaking since 1901. Since both fertility and mortality remained high during first half

of the twentieth century, the size of population hardly doubled. In the post-world war II span, decline in mortality followed and population grew rapidly. In 1951, when the first census of Pakistan was taken, the population was recorded as 33.8 million. The inter-census growth rate between 1961 and 1972 touched 3.7 per cent level, while overall the population of Pakistan experienced an increase of more than six times during the post-independence 65 years period. The current population of Pakistan is estimated around 180 million and has become the 6th most populous country in the world. The current population growth rate is at steady level of around 2 per cent per annum. The population density has increased from 43 persons in 1951 to present 185 persons per sq. km. As per UNDP estimates, the population of the country is likely to touch approx. 310 million in 2050.

**Impact on Socio-economic Development.** This rapid population growth in Pakistan, which has been one of the highest among developing countries, has been offsetting the gains in social and economic development. A comparison can be made between Pakistan and South Korea from 1950 to 2011 in regards to per capita income and population growth. In 1950, Pakistan and South Korea had same level of per capita income, that is, 79 and 82 US dollars respectively, in 2011, PPP(Parity Purchase Power) was estimated around 2800 US \$ compared to 30100 US dollars of South Korea. In 1951 our population was 33 million with 1.8 per cent per annum growth rate; in 2012 our population is approx. 180 million with 2 per cent per annum growth rate. In contrast to this, in 1950 South Korea's population was 20 million with 3.0 per cent per annum growth rate. In 2012, South Korea's population was estimated around 49 million with 0.8 per cent per annum growth rate. This indicates that Pakistan has added 6 times population compared to 2.5 times of South Korea. There may be several factors of this large differential in per capita income. However, the major factors are that we could not control our fast population growth and suffered from inconsistent national policy and lack of Developmental Strategy during these years, whereas South Korea has been able to contain its fast growth of population and treaded on a better national vision.

**Age Structure and Youth Bulge.** Population can usefully be divided into three age groups-young dependent under age 15, the working age population between the ages 15-64, and old age dependent at ages 65 and over. The last half of the twentieth century, especially the last three decades in Pakistan has been marked by rapid fertility decline. The total youth population of Pakistan has touched more than 60 % of the country's population; this youth bulge (almost 100 million) can be converted into demographic dividend, which demands its exploitation through planning and vision.

**Literacy Rate.** According to 1998 census, the level of literacy was 43.9 %.The literacy rates increased from 17 per cent in 1961 to 45 per cent in 2000 and increased to 58 % in 2012 with a clear tilt towards male education. However, because of the faster growth of population, absolute size of the illiterate population has doubled during the same period and increased even faster than the literacy rate. There were 22 million illiterate persons in 1961 compared to around 51 million in 2012. The fast growth of population also affected the requirement of educational institutions. The number of primary schools has increased from 44,000 in 1961 to 170,000 in 2011, barely enough to cover only 79 per cent enrolment at the primary level. The position with regards to female participation rate in education is even more discouraging which is 55 per cent at primary, 24 per cent at middle and only 14 per cent at high school levels. The high DROP OUT rate from middle to secondary and from secondary to College is almost more than 50 %. Another important element is that almost 1.5 million students are getting education at Madrassas; these students cannot contribute optimally to the national development.

**HRD.** Pakistan is confronted with a nominally high population rate, low literacy level and poor skill and technological base. The combined effect is critical imbalances in the development of HR. It has proven that the achievement of economic and social goals of the country depends largely on the fact that how effectively its manpower resource is being utilized for the national development.

**Unrestrained Urbanization.** Pakistan is one of the most urbanized nations in the South Asia with city dwellers making up to 38 % of population. About 50 % of population of Pakistan is now residing in the towns above 5000 population. This uncontrolled rural to urban flow of population is because of lack of facilities in rural areas and has resulted into population swell in urban centers outpacing their infrastructure facilities and civic amenities. In all big cities one-fourth of the population reside in such squatter slums. The growth of cities and rapid industrialization has also brought complex problems of waste management, treatment and disposal of toxic and hazardous waste. Without a reduction in population migration and effective urbanization management science, it will be very difficult to provide necessary services to all the new urban households that can be expected in the next 15 years. This first phase of demographic transition needs immediate attention.

**Unemployment.** In Pakistan, there were 18.5 million employed persons in 1970-71. The number of total employed persons increased to 50 million in 2011/ 2012, which means almost 3 times increase during these 42 years. However, during this period the number of unemployed increased over 6 times from 0.4 million in 1970-71 to 7 million in 2011/12. Regarding female employment, the figures are further depressing, as they form only 20 per cent in the employed force. A total of almost 2.5 million people are entering in the market every year which will rise to almost 6 million by year 2050. Such big number demands diversity of economic base and a sustained growth of minimum 6- 7% per annum for absorbing these in the jobs.

**Societal Dependency Ratio.** Statistics reflect that in Pakistan, the proportion of the population aged 60 and over is estimated to increase from just fewer than 5 per cent in 2000 to 15.7 per cent in 2050. At the same time the proportion aged 0-14 years is expected to decrease from 41.8 per cent to 21.9 in 2015. Though people of more than 60 years of age account for just above 5 per cent now, aging requires some attention since the above development will take place at a faster pace than it did in Europe. This high proportion of adolescents requires increased investments in health and rehabilitation in spite of all cultural and social norms of our society.

**Health and Sanitation.** A rapidly growing population means increased pressure on all kinds of health services, which normally cannot keep pace with the requirement. More than half of our population does not have access to health facilities. There is one doctor for about 1600 persons. A Nurse is available for over 3700 people. The facilities are mostly urban based. Most of the rural areas based health centers are understaffed and without medicines. Infant mortality and maternal mortality rate is also high. The availability of sanitation facilities are negligible (12 per cent) in rural areas, in some parts of big cities and many small cities adds to environmental and health problems.

**Population and Environment.** Environmental concerns like water, air and land pollution, degrading agricultural lands, shrinking forests have implications for long-term sustainable growth. The National Conservation Strategy was adopted in 1992 which provided a

broad framework for addressing environmental concerns in the country. The progress on the issue however could not yield the desired momentum.

**Major Conclusions.** Major conclusions that emerge are:-

- Unmanaged population growth of Pakistan is putting huge strain on socio-economic development and has been offsetting limited economic gains.
- Potential of youth is a time critical opportunity as well as challenge.
- Unequal distribution of basic amenities in rural and urban areas is leading to rapid and unplanned urbanization.
- Megacities due to conurbation are becoming unmanageable. Hence, option of exploring new sites of agro based towns and Export Zones along coastline is a necessity.
- Dwindling limited resources leads to the choice of adoption of SAVE, ARRANGE or SNATCH policy.
- Institutionalization based on future vision is a key to harness potentials of the nation.
- Human Resource is most prominent and ubiquitous. Labour surplus economies (like Pakistan) demand pragmatic HRD policies and practices.
- Public and private partnership drives entrepreneurs, sustain economic growth and provide requisite thriving opportunity.
- Lack of long term Developmental Strategy. Capitalizing on full potentials of human, natural and manmade resources will lead to demographic dividends.


## **Climate Change**

**Trend.** Climate change<sup>7</sup> is a change in the statistical distribution of weather over periods of time that range from decades to millions of years. It is primarily triggered by global warming. The average temperature of earth, generally agreed upon at 14<sup>0</sup> C has risen by about 0.74<sup>0</sup> C over the last century<sup>8</sup>. Ten of the warmest years in recent history (since 1850) have been in past two decades. If the trend continues, it is expected to increase by another 1.8° C to 4° C by the year 2100<sup>9</sup>.

**Causes.** The earth's climate has remained in a state of perpetual change through history primarily due to natural phenomena. Major natural causes include continental drift, volcanic activity, the earth's tilt and oceanic currents, variations in solar output, and Al-Nino and La-Nina Cycles<sup>10</sup>. These changes and the resultant variations in atmospheric temperature will continue to happen in the future as well and are not very predictable. After years of speculations, a scientists' forum by the name of Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) was formed in 1988. Successive IPCC reports<sup>11</sup> have concluded with growing confidence that the earth's climate is indeed warming, and most worrisome are the anthropogenic (i.e. human-induced) causes - particularly the burning of fossil fuels which releases CO<sub>2</sub> to the atmosphere.

These key conclusions are accepted by world's leading climate scientists. Starting with the industrial revolution in the 18<sup>th</sup> century there has been a gradual rise in greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphere. There are a few important aspects that must be understood:-

- GHG are a part of the atmosphere that help regulate the temperature of atmosphere through greenhouse effect at its current level of 14<sup>0</sup> C<sup>12</sup>. A variation in their composition traps more solar heat.
- The prime human induced GHG in the atmosphere is carbon dioxide<sup>13</sup>. The contribution of other gases is shown in the pie-chart.
- The current concentration of CO<sub>2</sub> in atmosphere is 391.07 particles per million, which is highest ever in history<sup>14</sup>.
- Contribution of energy sector in GHG is particularly conspicuous.



## Global Interests

The GHG emitted from anywhere on the earth affect the entire globe. The harmful impacts of global warming are already manifesting themselves around the world in the form of extreme weather events like storms, tornadoes, floods and droughts, with increasing frequency and intensity. As a result, the world today suffers around 400-500 natural disasters on average in a year, up from 125-150 in the 1980s. The main effects of global warming include melting of Arctic sea ice, thus releasing more water to world oceans which may lead to changes in oceanic circulation, rise in global ocean temperature resulting into extensive and frequent hurricanes and rising sea levels. Additionally, erratic rainfalls that cause floods of unprecedented magnitude as well as extreme drought and high intensity heat waves affecting cropping seasons, productivity, life cycles, health and even extinction of many species.

**International Efforts towards Climate Change.** United Nations conference on Environment and Development held at Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 commonly known as Earth Summit<sup>15</sup> is a benchmark event in the history of climate change. Later, United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change UNFCCC was negotiated, which provides the basic document for future course of action. The objective of the treaty is to cut GHG concentrations

in the atmosphere to 350 ppm, the 1990 level; that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Developed countries are responsible for increased emissions and must take lead in cutting emissions. However, it is cost prohibitive, therefore negotiations often stall. Progress was only made after, "**flexibility**" mechanisms<sup>16</sup> were evolved, which allowed industrialized countries to fund emission reduction activities in developing countries as an alternative to domestic emission reductions; being cost effective. The arrangement is called Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Some funds have also been agreed upon, however the details are being negotiated.

### **Impact of Climate Change on Pakistan**

**Vulnerabilities of Pakistan.** The country is located in a mostly arid and semi-arid region of Asia and its river flows are heavily dependent on monsoon rains and Himalayan-Karakoram-Hindukush (HKH) Glaciers, both being affected by climate change. German Watch a leading group on climate studies has placed Pakistan at number 1 in Climate Change Risk Index<sup>17</sup>. The prime reasons include geography, which places Pakistan at a location in heat surplus zone of earth. The expected rise in temperature would be more in Pakistan than global average<sup>18</sup>. The IPCC's scientific consensus is that Pakistan could face reduced flows in the Indus River System due to glacial melt HKH ranges<sup>19</sup>. Moreover, gross changes should be expected in precipitation patterns in Pakistan<sup>20</sup>. Unfortunately at this juncture, Pakistan has limited capacity to cope with the impact of climate change.

**Analysis.** Climate change and its fallouts will affect vital interest of Pakistan in many ways. The major effects include:-

**Water Security.** Extreme fluctuations in irrigation water are expected, which may include:

- Intensive rains resulting in over flooding during particularly summer season.
- Increased frequency of drought causing acute water shortages.
- The increase in glacial melting may however help, though only temporarily.
- Reduction in storage capacity of the existing water reservoirs.

**Food Security.** Agriculture, livestock, fisheries and forestry (AFL) sector is the backbone of Pakistan's economy contributing to the 22% to the country's GDP, 57% to export earnings, and providing livelihood to almost 68% population of the country<sup>21</sup>. Major effect in each of these sector include:-

**Crop Sector.** The Crop sector will experience decreases in crop production and quality due to:-

- Change in both duration and timings of cropping season. Winter seasons will be shortened, while summer cropping seasons will become unpredictable.
- Heat stress at sensitive growth stages will affect crop productivity<sup>22</sup>.
- Erratic rain behaviour causing effects both ways.
- Increased crop water requirement due to higher evaporation at elevated temperatures.

- Certain zones particularly in the north and west of the country may experience better yields due to increased temperatures and longer cropping seasons.

**Live Stock Sector.** Livestock sector accounts for about 11% of national GDP<sup>23</sup>. Traditional pastoralist system of livestock management is likely to suffer under extreme climate change scenarios, as their capacity for adaptation is low.

**Fisheries.** Fisheries sub sectors will be affected as the temperature change will cause a shift in the range of fish species and distribution. Additionally, increased intrusion of sea water in delta region due to diminishing water flows will adversely affect breeding grounds of fish.

**Forestry.** The deforestation rate has been estimated at 0.2 - 0.5 percent per annum. Forest cover, which is 4.8 percent of total land area<sup>24</sup> and supports the economy and ecology in many ways; will come under further pressure.

**Energy Security.** Pakistan's future energy vision relies heavily on hydro-power potential<sup>25</sup> of the Indus River System and on coal fired thermal generation. Gross variation in flows will seriously affect reliability of hydro-power. Use of open flame coal will come under exceeding criticism in the future.

**Migration, Urbanization and Human Distress.** Climate Change is likely to have a detrimental impact on rural livelihoods. More people will be forced to seek employment in urban areas. Thus, human migration towards urban areas is expected to rise, and 'kachi Abadi' settlements are expected to proliferate in the future. All other fallouts of such slums can be easily predicted.

**Demography.** Pakistan's rapid population growth is only going compound each of the problems have been covered previously.

### **Zone wise Effects**

**Mountain Areas<sup>26</sup>.** The most likely climate change risks to the mountain areas of Pakistan are<sup>27</sup> increase in intensity of precipitation, resulting in more frequent flash floods and landslides; increase droughts, resulting forest fires; and increase in temperature, resulting in rapid glacier melting and glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs).

**Arid and Semi-arid Areas.** Increasing temperature and low rain fall causes moisture loss from soil, converting them into barren lands. Climate change will exacerbate this process. Desertification threatens to affect over 43 million hectares of land<sup>28</sup> in Pakistan. Effects of drought will be more visible in arid and semi-arid areas.

**Coastal Areas.** Pakistan is one of the countries classified by UNEP (United Nations Environment Program) as being particularly vulnerable to the effects of sea level rise. Data processed at the National Institute of Oceanography (NIO) shows that sea level rise along the Pakistan coast is approximately 1.1 mm per year<sup>29</sup>. Impact may include: risk of erosion, flooding, inundation and displacement of wetlands and lowlands and salinization of ground and surface water, particularly in Indus Delta Area<sup>30</sup>; increased threat to mangrove forests and other ecologically sensitive species<sup>31</sup> as well as increased risk of occurrence of severe cyclones and storm surges<sup>32</sup>. Lastly, the change in the

ocean climate patterns has caused rise in the cyclonic storm activity in the Arabian Sea<sup>33</sup>, having devastating impact on the coastal areas of Sind and Balochistan.

### **Key Strategic Factors in Demography and Climate Change of Pakistan**

**Urbanization.** Urbanization is a common factor from both demography and Climate Change perspective, prime reasons are:-

**Demography.** There are not enough agri-related jobs in rural areas to employ the swelling population. Urban areas offer better opportunities to educated youth with a comparatively easy going life which is free of agriculture related inherent risks.

**Climate Change.** The frequency of natural calamities greatly increases risk of agro output. Diminishing water resource will add to the difficulties of agriculture as a profession.

**Conclusion.** Regardless of the causes, urbanization is likely to continue, so much so that by 2030, 50% of the Pakistani population is expected to be urbanized, putting more pressure particularly on the megacities. However, in the absence of economic growth, these mega cities in turn will parent a host of other administrative nightmares, making the urban population extremely vulnerable to exploitation and casting a direct shadow on national security, including engagement of Armed forces and Law Enforcing Agencies into internal security situations.

**Water and Food Security.** The confluence of demography and Climate Change affects food and water security of future generations in a big way.

**Demography.** Increasing population requires greater number of people to be fed, putting more stress on available agri-land. Domestic water consumption for urban and rural population is likely to increase. Growing population would need more housing space, occupying vital agriculture utility space and even water.

**Climate Change.** The water related calamities of last three monsoon seasons destroyed crops over a large area and affected around 20 million people mostly from rural areas. The loss in agriculture sector alone was estimated more than US\$ 3 billion, while the accumulative losses were around 10 billion US \$, wiping out 0.5% of GDP and deeply affecting growth.

**Conclusion.** The mutually complementing effects of demography and Climate Change on food and water security will be enormous, directly impacting our national security, in the form of inter provincial friction on the sharing of resources.

**Energy Security.** Energy sector in Pakistan is under increasing stress, the effects of demography and Climate Change on energy sector include:-

**Demography.** Energy consumption is expected to rise to 129 million TOEs by 2030. Major reasons included improving life-styles, inherent to developing economies, which requires more energy; increasing population, which is a major contributor to increased energy needs; and per capita energy consumption in urban areas (upto 80% more than rural areas), which is going to put more demand on scarce energy resources.

**Climate Change.** From the Climate Change perspective, energy security will be affected due to extreme oscillation in water flow pattern in the rivers that will grossly undermine reliability of hydro-power generation; global criticism on thermal power particularly coal based generation; and non-availability of natural gas in requisite quantum (preferred being least on Green House Gases emissions). The cost of energy production will therefore become prohibitive.

**Conclusion.** The conflicting exigencies of demography and Climate Change put the energy sector in a binary stretch like situation. Resultantly, energy security in the future will come under threat. The obvious fallouts will have direct bearing on the socio-economic development and security needs of the country.

**Disaster Management.** Since recent past Pakistan is faced with enormous impact of natural calamities / disasters, climate change and demography have a close interplay in the magnitude of the disasters:

**Demography.** Unplanned expansion of towns and cities close to river banks has increased their risk to disasters. More affected population also means that relief and rehabilitation efforts would need more resources at national level.

**Climate Change.** The effect is only accentuated by expected increase in frequency and magnitude of natural calamities as a result of Climate Change.

**Conclusions.** The frequency and scale of natural disasters could force employment of armed forces in rehabilitation efforts for sustained durations. The heightened vulnerabilities to disaster risks demand more resources for relief and rehabilitation. The diversion of funds from other heads has obvious fallout on socio-economic development of the country. Such adjustments also have fallouts on the resources for Armed Forces developmental and R&D capacity.

## **Pakistan's Population Youth bulge and Human Resource Development**

The increasing population with a noticeable component of youth bulge suffers from lack of education and inadequate health facilities. Today our next generation stands on weak footing to deal with the challenges of an evolving competitive environment across the globe. This leaves them with very few opportunities to choose livelihood and employment. The growing frustration among the youth is likely to make them vulnerable to prejudice and polarization which can lead to extremism. Hence a failure to engage youth and convert their energies into a dynamic force may result in very grave consequences for the country.

## **Climate Change and GoP Response**

The Government has proactively acted to address the risks of the climate change. Recently, Pakistan Climate Change Policy has been approved by the Cabinet. The policy is quite elaborate and chalks out explicit tasks and responsibilities for mitigation and adaption measures to coup with the impact of Climate Change. Furthermore, the lack of awareness, resource and technological constraints with respect to mitigation and adaptation techniques would continue to pose challenge to the country. Therefore, the country which is the least contributor and worst affected by the CC needs to plead its case with adroit wisdom to gain benefits from the international protocols of CC. The Ministry of Human Resource Development has been established this year (2012), the policy guide available so far is the

Vision 2030 Policy Document issued in 2007, however, implementation process has been marred due to lack of resources. Fallouts of demography and Climate Change if not addressed and managed, will have a direct bearing on the national interests which include, Eradicating Extremism, Socio Economic Development, Energy And Water Security, Internal Stability And Education. The consequence will therefore, put strain on economy and good governance, affecting all other facets of national security of the country.

## **Recommendations**

After analyzing both the issues, it is concluded that Demography and Climate Change are interrelated issues and their impacts on the society are reinforcing and has a direct impact on National Security. In response domain, demographic management needs a pro-active response due to fact that we are already in a precarious situation whereas in the context of Climate Change, the two approaches of adaptation and mitigation are required. The response framework is based on the vision of revitalization of existing resources, and synergizing their actions by applying systematic corrections through interfacing under a futuristic framework for accruing benefits of the potentials and opportunities. The focus is first to address the immediate concerns, create a stable situation and then venture for mid to long term futuristic recommendations flowing out of the same stability. Composite proposals are being given for both issues.

### **Short Term Recommendations**

**Nomination of a Lead Agency.** Importance of a lead agency for steering any national policy cannot be over-emphasized. As population and environment aspects have been devolved to the provinces with the passage of 18th amendment, a vacuum has been created at national policy level. The newly created HRD Ministry should be mandated as the lead agency for management of entire HR in the country. It should be supplemented by planning commission for policy level coordination. Existing organizations like NAVTEC and provincial level TEVTAs should be guided by the same ministry to develop HR as per the skill demands of the country.

**Institutional Capacity Building.** As Provinces have not yet been able to form local governments thus they lack capacity to handle fallouts of demography and Climate Change. There is a need to develop provincial and district level institutions to monitor and handle demographic and climate change impacts.

**Demography Management.** The fast growing population has to be managed through a rigorous demography management. Following steps are recommended in this regard:-

- **Population Welfare Programs.** An effective population welfare programme to reduce the rate of population growth can enhance the development effort in a number of ways. A reduction in the fertility rate would have an immediate effect on the health of mothers and children and would begin to affect school enrolment rates and education expenditures in short period.
- **Education and Female Literacy.** A well-funded and rigorous programme for primary and female literacy is recommended. Besides improving literacy, it would have two direct impacts; firstly, the Total Fertility Rate will drop affecting the population growth rate. Secondly, educated women are likely to be more capable of ensuring education choices of the next generation.

- **National Health Policy.** A National Health Policy capable to absorb the changes after 18th amendment is another important factor. It should focus on child mortality & immunization, life care and emergency services, hygiene and sanitation and old age issues and should focus on international commitments on MDGs.
- **Prudent Macroeconomic Management.** Synergy in Ministry of Finance, HRD and Planning Commission to jointly work out Poverty alleviation program under BISP is required. The Transition should be directed from aid based to Project based self-sustaining Micro and Macro level management. The need is to work for improvement in creation of job opportunities through better private public partnership.

**HRD.** Human capital is the capital in the 21st century world. The study has shown that demographic dividends will only come our way if we have adequate HRD to encash them. Following is recommended in this regard:-

- **Demography.** A futuristic and market oriented National HRD Policy be framed and approved at national and provincial level. With developing skilled labour, to meet the global market demand being the purpose. Also, introducing courses related to economic choices and decision making by the manpower, entering the labour market as well as youth entrepreneurship and leadership curriculum in primary and secondary level of education. Additionally, create ease of doing business, for new entrants in private sector. Concurrently provide guidance and direction towards the level of expertise and capability to youth, which can help them in existing competitive world.
- **Climate Change.** Develop climate change professionals' pool by sending young scientists and students for higher studies. Moreover, identify the national institutional needs to develop the capacity for carbon trading under CDM (clean development mechanism). Awareness is primarily required in the domain of Climate Change. Using all available and appropriate media, we need to, raise awareness of masses about impacts of trends in demography and climate change. Education syllabi and traditional sources for information as well as modern media can play an important role in this sphere. The Information ministry should play the desired role in this regard.

### **Mid Term Recommendations**

**Policy for Urbanization and Better Managed Urban System.** Study has shown that both Climate Change and demography trends are going to supplement the urbanization trends to tackle the problems arising out of both. Following needs to be done

- Undertake studies to determine future expansion needs of the existing towns, while redirecting population migration. Plan new cities along Makran Coast and West of Indus to mitigate the pressures on existing cities and promote national cohesion
- Promote and develop smaller agro-based towns –industrial clusters to discourage rural to urban migration
- Legislate to ensure energy efficient buildings

- Design central sewerage schemes for all large metropolitan areas and ensure proper disposal of industrial waste

**Water Security.** Water is life and a common concern of both demography and Climate Change. Some possible strategy steps for water resource management are as under:-

- Comprehensive inventory of all water resources
- Protect groundwater through management and technical measures
- Promote through financial incentives solar water desalination for irrigation and drinking
- Develop and extend technologies and techniques for sea water utilization
- Address sea water intrusion into Indus Deltaic Region
- Modern techniques for treatment of re-using waste water from urban and industrial areas

**Food Security.** Food security will come under increased focus as population increases and Climate Change affects traditional cropping patterns and yields. In Agriculture Sector, harness the potential of improved crop yield, focus research towards development of new high-yielding, tolerant crops, and develop and introduce better breeds of livestock.

**Energy Security.** The study in both the spheres of demography and Climate Change has shown that our traditional sources of energy are not going to suffice for very long. The recommendations for energy sector which is able to cater for both growing demand and need to mitigate GHG emissions are:-

- Invest in clean energy, particularly solar, wind and coal gasification
- Promote the integrated “Cleaner Production” strategy, in industrial sectors and promote the culture of paying to the community by industrial sector
- Promote the use of energy efficient methods

**Disaster Preparedness.** As already concluded, demography and Climate Changes are likely to magnify the impact of natural disasters in future. Following should be done in this regard:-

- Undertake risk mapping for possible disaster prone population centers and take precautionary measures
- Strengthen early warning system in the country. Enhance the capacities to address the disaster impacts by strengthening relevant agencies
- Develop communities’ evacuation plans
- Set up mechanisms to monitor the development of glacial lakes
- Redesign and upgrade storm drainage capacity of major cities

**Mitigation in Climate Change.** The strategy to deal with Climate Change will not be complete without mitigation. As a responsible member of the international community, Pakistan must to contribute to the global GHG mitigation efforts without compromising on its basic minimum energy and food needs. The agriculture sector also needs to adopt

best practices that are low on GHG emissions. Also aggressive afforestation and reforestation is of paramount importance.

### **Long Term Measures**

**Policy Continuation.** In order to capitalize on the opportunities of demographic dividend and climatic goals, the success would impinge definitely upon continuous resource allocation to these important factors of national development in long term.

**Collaborative Investment Approach.** Advance the collaborative investment approach capturing the private sectors desire to invest in the spheres of Health education and Natural disaster insurance; the expense a resource stricken government alone cannot meet. Financial co-options through attracting FDI in agriculture, forestry, livestock sector and planning of the new urban centers to mitigate population pressures and climatic changes. We should open the education sector as an investment zone to Pakistani Diaspora.

**Coherent Policy for Donor Assistance.** In the sphere of climate change Donors have reasonable understanding of Pakistan's vulnerabilities. It is time that we make an endeavour to reach the international climate change policy forums and seek the due financial support available to high risk countries. The need is to benefit the potential resource channels through a coherent policy.

**Role of Leadership.** The leaders of Pakistan whether national or provincial have to decide to empower the local authorities to play their part in future developmental plans for the citizens of Pakistan who have been granted the right in the Constitution of Pakistan to prosper and seek the dividend (article 18) and to live safely (article 4) in their chosen environment.

### **Conclusion**

Migration, industrialization and urbanization all play significant role on the climate of the planet earth. The major demographic and climatic changes in the coming century will have direct bearings and serious consequences on country's political, ecological and social policy formulation and all sections of the society must rise to this national security challenge with a sense of collective responsibility.

<i>Researchers:</i>	<i>Ms Sarwat, Cdre Zubair, Lt Col Kayani and Lt Col Akif</i>
<i>Supervisor:</i>	<i>Brig Inam Haider Malik</i>

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## **PART – 3**

### **Military Strategy**

- Indo – Pak Conflicts; 1998 to Date
- Evolution of Operational Art (1910 to 1989)
- 4GW And Emerging Contours of 5GW: Political-Military Dimensions and Impact on World Politics

## INDO – PAK CONFLICTS; 1998 TO DATE

“We are superior to Pakistan in military and industrial power. But that superiority is not so great to produce results in war or by fear of war. Therefore, our national interest demands that we should adopt a peaceful policy towards Pakistan, and at the same time, add to our strength. Strength ultimately comes not from the armed forces but the industrial and economic background behind them. *As we grow in strength, as we are likely to do so, Pakistan will feel less and less inclined to threaten or harass us, and a time will come when, through sheer force of circumstances, it will be in a mood to accept a settlement that we consider fair, whether in Kashmir or elsewhere.*”

(Nehru<sup>1</sup>, August 1952)

### Introduction

The continuum spanning almost fourteen years from 1998 to date appears to be a one long India – Pakistan crisis punctuated by periods of apparent peace yet marred by the intense struggle at sub conventional level, both within the kinetic and non-kinetic domains. The bilateral relationship between the two arch-rivals has been clouded by territorial disputes leading to a series of wars and crises. Kashmir, which remains to be the bone of contention since 1947, is not merely a living symbol of incomplete identities but a continuing reminder of an extraordinarily violent separation that cost as many as two million lives without a war being fought<sup>2</sup>. Since May 1998, with overt nuclearization, the traditional rivalry between India and Pakistan acquired a new dimension. With the war becoming increasingly unthinkable, the advent of nuclear weapons generated a twin proclivity for crisis and caution. The “**stability – instability paradox**”, produced a high degree of stability at the strategic level yet it bred instability at lower levels enabling both the countries to continue their confrontation short of war. In 1999, during Kargil Conflict, in spite of mutual provocations, neither side sought to mobilize for a full-scale war. Immediately after 9/11, Twin Peaks Crisis was triggered between India and Pakistan by a terrorist attack on Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001. In this ten months long crisis, both sides mobilized for war, but remained short of indulging in an armed engagement. Sequel to realization by both, of the futility of armed conflict between nuclear rivals and consequent devastation which it may cause, they began a comprehensive “Composite Dialogue” in 2004 on a wide range of political and strategic issues and agreed to reduce nuclear risks through Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). However, the dialogue had hardly gained momentum that it was brought to a grinding halt by Mumbai terrorists’ attacks in November 2008 which marked the third conflict in a short span of nine years.

Consequent to 9/11, India, having made inroads into Afghanistan under the patronage of USA, launched sub conventional/proxy war against Pakistan to foment and aggravate unrest in Balochistan<sup>3</sup> and support violence in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The radicalized Pakistani society, due to a host of reasons, is also being utilized as an ideal testing ground for the implementation of Kautilya – Chanakya’s insidious strategies to destabilize Pakistan while keeping it under the perpetual assault of non kinetic forces. Global War on Terror and continuing tensions between the two nuclear neighbours saw the United States plunging deeper into the region’s strategic politics and crises, yet in the overall assessment, it did succeed in defusing those crises which came in a succession. Currently, in the backdrop of resumption of Composite Dialogue in 2010, both the countries appear to be determined to normalize their relations so as to give peace a chance once again.

## **Aim**

To analyze the Indo – Pak conflicts from 1998 to date with a view to drawing lessons from policy/strategic dimensions.

## **Scope**

The paper, while focusing on Decision Making at strategic level, Impact/efficacy of nuclear deterrence, Sub conventional domain of the conflict, Role of US in de-escalation and Strategic coercion will encompass following:-

**Part 1.** Kargil Conflict – 1999.

**Part 2.** Mil Standoff – 2001/2002 (Twin Peaks Crisis).

**Part 3.** Escalation – 2008 (Mumbai Terrorists Attack).

**Part 4.** Lessons learnt from policy/strategic dimensions.

## **PART 1**

### **KARGIL CONFLICT – 1999**

#### **Resume of Conflict**

In 1999, India and Pakistan fought a short war over disputed territory along the Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir. It began in May when Pakistani forces infiltrated and occupied positions on heights on the Indian side of the LOC thereby seizing an approximately 100-kilometers stretch of territory. Initially Indians did not realize the full gravity of the situation and tried to dislodge the infiltrators through launching of piecemeal attacks which failed bitterly. Once it was fully assessed, India saw that Pakistan's action significantly challenged India's control of the Srinagar – Kargil main highway in Ladakh region and threatened to strangle Indian forces on Siachen Glacier which it had encroached in 1984 in violation of Simla Agreement. India escalated at the points of Pakistan's attack by pumping in more than two additional infantry divisions, two commando battalions, two ATGM battalions, fifteen artillery regiments and upped the ante by employing attack helicopters and Air Force.

#### **Nuclear Factor and International Community**

Initiation of open hostilities between India and Pakistan within less than a year of their nuclearization seriously undermined the notion of no space for war between two nuclear rivals. USA and other global powers, wary of the conflict escalating to nuclear show down, restrained both the countries and advised to resolve the dispute through peaceful means. However, in the initial phase, both showed their resolve to fight bitterly and threatened to use even nuclear weapons against each other.

#### **Crisis Management**

With the progress of the conflict, politico-military leadership of Pakistan grew increasingly nervous due to persistent international pressure. On 4 July 1999, after meeting US President Bill Clinton in Washington DC, Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif returned to Islamabad and ordered withdrawal of the troops from the Kargil heights – a decision which became a point of much controversy and bitterness between the political leadership and military establishment of Pakistan.

#### **Decision Making During Conflict**

**Pakistan.** A great degree of controversy shrouds the extent of involvement of political government in the decision making process leading up to the conflict. Conflicting charges of complicity of Pakistani government in the preparation and launching of operation were levelled by Indians. Denials by the then prime Minister Nawaz Sharif notwithstanding, reportedly, there had been a series of meetings of a kitchen war cabinet comprising Prime Minister, top military and intelligence officers, and senior officials from defence and foreign ministries. Former President Pervez Musharraf also claimed to have briefed Nawaz Sharif who approved the basic contours of Kashmir policy. However, in the conduct and subsequent unfolding of the graver crisis, the civilian leadership seemed to be in least control of the events and the shots were primarily being called by the army. *Moreover, misplaced desire to maintain utmost secrecy profoundly impacted the institutionalized decision making process which ultimately led to cleavages between the political leadership and military establishment.*

**India.** The strategic decision making process in India seemed far more institutionalized and harmonious than in Pakistan. A small circle of decision makers comprising Prime Minister Vajpayee at the center receiving important inputs from Minister of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Prime Minister, Home Minister and National Security Adviser, worked very closely to arrive at strategic decisions while the necessary advice was also provided by Indian services chiefs on as required basis. Meetings of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS)<sup>4</sup>, comprising the core group of politicians, senior bureaucrats and services chiefs was a daily affair and all strategic matters were thoroughly debated, decisions then taken and implemented by various government departments.

### **Nuclear Deterrence During Kargil Conflict**

Post overt nuclearization, it was the first instance of military hostilities between India and Pakistan. Both sides showed the nuclear card, reminding the opponent that neither side could now disregard a new reality. Kargil was a grim reminder that nuclear weapons did not necessarily terminate the potential for a spill over of conventional hostilities into a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan. During the conflict, leaders/officials of both countries did not hesitate to exchange direct or indirect nuclear threats which rang alarm bells in the international community.

### **Deterrent Effect on India**

Due to deterrence, India did not enlarge its theatre of hostilities against the military logic, which required extension of the conflict to other sectors to release pressure on Indian forces in the confined Drass – Kargil Sector. Fear of uncontrollable escalation prevented India from attacking Pakistani forces and targets across the LOC. Indian Air Force was used to support its ground forces, but under strict orders not to cross the LOC which entailed great flying risks in mountainous terrain.

### **Deterrent Effect on Pakistan**

Capability notwithstanding, Pakistan, for its part, did not extend its ground operations to other sectors to draw off Indian ground forces concentrating in the Drass – Kargil area or exploit the relative vacuum presented by Indian forces elsewhere. Pakistan also did not use its

Air Force in support of the infiltrators or to counter Indian Air Force. Was Pakistan worried that opening the other sectors or use of air force would escalate the conventional conflict? Was Pakistan inhibited by the nuclear deterrent available to India? What forced Pakistan to meet restraint with a reciprocal restraint? Or it can be concluded that nuclear deterrence did delimit, if not deter, Indo-Pak conflict for the first time but actually, unfavourable environment, sagging economy and cleavages in the civil-military relations had a greater restraining impact on Pakistan.

### **Role of US in Defusing of Kargil Conflict**

Through deft exterior manoeuvre, India successfully isolated and portrayed Pakistan as a revisionist state attempting to change the status quo which must be restrained else it could lead to catastrophic consequences. Therefore, international community led by United States urged Pakistan to respect the LOC and withdraw its forces from across, while at the same time, urged India to restrain itself from crossing the LOC or open another front in the conflict. As stated earlier, this led to US President Bill Clinton's brokered peace deal in July 99 which necessitated Pakistani withdrawal from across and restoration of the LOC which was done<sup>5</sup>. Formal ending of Kargil conflict by USA in India's favour surprised even Indians as it was the first time in fifty years that the United States had sided with India against Pakistan 'openly and firmly'. Kargil initiated a period of greater harmony between the United States and India which developed into strategic partnership in the later years.

### **Outcome of the Conflict**

There has been a lack of consensus among Indian and Pakistani observers about the outcome of the conflict as well as the influence of nuclear weapons. Pakistan felt that the military victory on the battlefield though could not be sustained on political grounds; yet the central objective of bringing Kashmir back to international focus was largely achieved. In contrast, India was convinced that Kargil was a victory for it as its forces had prevailed on the battlefield, its political leaders had not been intimidated by Pakistan's nuclear weapons, and Pakistan had been portrayed to the international community as an aggressor and reckless state while India attained the reputation of a responsible and restrained nuclear power.

## **PART 2**

### **MILITARY STANDOFF – 2001/ 2002 (THE TWIN PEAKS CRISIS)**

#### **Recapitulation of the Conflict**

The military standoff between Pakistan and India in 2001/2002 spanned over a period of 10 months and was a product of 2 separate terrorist activities. Due to the severity of events, bringing both the countries to the peaks of tension, these crises are referred to as "Twin Peaks Crisis." The "First Peak of Crisis" began on 13 December 2001, when the terrorists attacked Indian parliament, killing a number of guards there<sup>6</sup>. The Indian leadership portrayed the attack as an assault upon the very foundations of Indian democracy and quickly pointed an accusing finger towards Pakistan. Blaming Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LET) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) for the terrorists attack, India demanded that Pakistan must end the activities of these two organizations, arrest their leadership and freeze their financial assets. India also demanded extradition of some twenty alleged criminals who were on its wanted list and had been given asylum in Pakistan. Pakistan demanded concrete evidence against these individuals. India cut diplomatic links with Pakistan and geared up the war hysteria by deploying more than half a

million troops along the LOC and the international border. Pakistan also responded in kind and this became the biggest mobilization ever since WW II. The international community led by US maintained a steady politico-diplomatic pressure on both India and Pakistan to forestall the possibility of armed conflict. With the intense efforts of global community and Pakistan's crackdown on militant organizations the crisis seemed to have subsided by Mar 2002. The full scale deployment of troops however continued. The Second Peak of Crisis occurred on 14 May 2002, when the militants struck an Indian military camp at Kaluchak near Jammu and killed as many as 30 people including family members of Indian soldiers. This propelled the already tense environment to new heights. The worsening crisis initiated steady diplomatic efforts which culminated in June 2002, when US conveyed to India that Pakistan had agreed to ensure stoppage of such infiltration permanently<sup>7</sup>. India declared that its objectives had been met and withdrew her troops in October 2002.

### **Global and Domestic Environment**

The international environment was influenced by 9/11 terror attacks and the international coalition had attacked Afghanistan to uproot Al Qaeda network. US led Operation Enduring Freedom was underway in Afghanistan and Taliban regime had been overthrown. Pakistan was the front line ally in GWOT and had extended facilities to international effort in Afghanistan. Pakistan had deployed troops along Pak Afghan border to cater for Al Qaeda and Taliban remnants fleeing from Afghanistan. On domestic front, Pakistan had a military rule and relations with India were improving despite inconclusive Agra Summit.

### **Decision Making at Strategic Level**

**India.** Under the chairmanship of Prime Minister, the CCS was formally entrusted with the responsibility of handling the Twin Peaks Crisis. The decisions such as mobilization of armed forces, and the restraint shown by them were taken unanimously. However, despite seamless functioning, there existed opaqueness in its decision making process. For instance, full scale mobilization of armed forces without a clear objective is a case in point.

**Pakistan.** In Pakistan, General Musharraf was at the center of decision making process. Through consultations with Services Chiefs, DG ISI, Corps Commanders and Principal Staff Officers, key decisions were arrived at, while the foreign and other ministries also played their due role. Pakistan's clear understanding of the nature of conflict was evident throughout the crisis however; an established decision making body like Indian CCS was not existent. Concurrent to preparedness of armed forces, Pakistan denounced terrorism, banned Jihadi Organizations and extended "Olive Branch" to the Indian leadership.

### **Impact/Efficacy of Nuclear Deterrence**

The nuclear weapons remained visible throughout the conflict and did contribute in escalation control as is evident from following:-

Both India and Pakistan resorted to serial testing of their nuclear capable missiles. India test fired Agni – II and BrahMos missiles while Pakistan test fired Ghauri, Ghaznavi, Abdali, and Shaheen missiles, to signal their resolve to each other as well as to international community.

In January 2001, when both sides had fully mobilized, Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, the head of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division highlighted four red lines, the breach of which could prompt Pakistan's nuclear response<sup>8</sup>.

Following the Kaluchak incident, the nuclear threat became so palpable that it prompted US to issue travel advisory to US citizens on 30<sup>th</sup> May 2002 and ordered nonessential embassy staff and all dependents to leave India. Other countries also followed suit which became a turning point in conflict due to exodus of foreigners from India hurting its economy gravely.

### **Role of US in De- escalation**

The US had important interests at stake which ultimately helped bring the crisis to an end. Some of the US interests in managing the crisis were: avoidance of negative fallout on OEF, averting the possibility of nuclear war and desire to retain both India and Pakistan as allies.

### **Strategic Coercion**

During the Twin Peaks Crisis, Indian government's deliberate decision to resort to coercion was based on a perception that drawing analogy between 9/11 and Twin Peaks Crisis would create an overall favourable environment to pressure Pakistan over Kashmir. In spite of outright condemnations of attack by Pakistan, India, without any formal inquiry, assigned responsibility to Islamabad and placed strict demands for compliance. On refusal of Pakistan to cow down, India took a series of actions to coerce her into submission: withdrawal of Indian High Commissioner from Pakistan, expulsion of Pakistani High Commissioner, denying Pakistan over flights, visa restrictions and reduction of consulate facilities, stepping up diplomatic and media offensive against Pakistan, snapping rail, road and air links, massive and prolonged troops' deployment along the LOC and International Border with Pakistan and frequent artillery duels along LOC were steps in this direction.

**Indian Objectives Behind Coercive Strategy.** These included; to compel Pakistan into making U turn on Kashmir Policy<sup>9</sup>, to portray Freedom Fighters as terrorists, to portray Pakistan as part of the problem, to seek strategic partnership with United States, to cast negative impact on Pakistan's force equalizing capability and to entice Pakistan into an arms race.

### **Pakistan's Response to Indian Coercive Diplomacy**

Pakistan's well-articulated two pronged strategy comprised maintaining deterrence as well as desire for peaceful resolution of the crisis. Some of the key steps taken in this regard were; Pakistan's resolve to defend itself at all cost was heralded publicly; Pakistan mobilized its forces to meet the Indian threat promptly; the Government of Pakistan banned five Jihadi groups; the President of Pakistan repeatedly offered dialogue to resolve all outstanding disputes peacefully and pledged not to initiate hostilities; and Pakistan gave assurances to stop cross LOC infiltrations and deny her territory for use for terrorist activity in another country.

## **PART 3**

### **MUMBAI TERRORISTS ATTACK– ESCALATION 2008**

#### **The Trigger**

On 26 November 2008, a group of 10 terrorists, who had allegedly set out by a boat from Karachi, launched a series of attacks in India's commercial capital Mumbai, killing 166 people and holding the city in fear and complete paralysis for three days. Those killed also included 25 foreign nationals including six Americans, which immediately internationalized the issue.

### **Effects of Mumbai Terrorist Attacks**

The attacks spoiled the on-going dialogue between India and Pakistan and the threat of another crisis loomed large on the horizon. The immediate effects were suspension of Composite Dialogue, return of traditional mutual acrimonious environment marked by fiery statements, threat of surgical strikes and undertaking of provocative flights by IAF on 14 Dec 2008. Sequel to movements of few Indian formations, Pakistan Army was also prompted to take necessary safeguards by shifting some of its elements from western to eastern border. Pakistan was subjected to intense pressure by international community to act against militant cum extremist organizations and curb their activities and further weakened Pakistan's support to Kashmiri Freedom Struggle which became increasingly aligned with international terrorism.

### **Crisis Management**

The crisis, which remains to be *unfinished*, led to traditional rhetoric containing accusations and counter accusation by both countries. As Stephen Philip Cohen and his co-authors have noted, previous crises between India and Pakistan have been managed, not resolved. These crises ended because leaders in both countries concluded *“that further escalation was self-defeating.”*

**Indian Response.** India did not initially blame Pakistan; issued a Demarche on 1<sup>st</sup> Dec<sup>10</sup>. Demanded extradition of three Pakistani nationals through a 2nd Demarche<sup>11</sup>. India did not escalate the crisis to the same levels as it did in 2001 / 2002 for the reasons such as lack of cogent options, economic compulsions, playing an aggrieved party, and role of Non State Actors.

**Pakistan's Response.** Pakistan immediately condemned the attacks as “detestable” and “heinous” and offered joint investigation,<sup>12</sup> conducted crackdown on elements of banned organizations, alleged to be involved in the attacks. Later, based on the evidence shared by Indians, FIRs were lodged against those alleged to be involved and their cases were prosecuted.<sup>13</sup>

### **Decision Making During Mumbai Attacks**

**India.** Like the 2001/2002 military standoff, the CCS headed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was entrusted with the responsibility of handling the crisis. However, there were indications of strain within the decision makers. External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee was pushing for a military response, while the Prime Minister was counselling restraint. Inability of the decision makers to find a potent workable option of retaliation against Pakistan in the face of growing domestic pressure added much to their anxiety and frustration. Overall Indian leadership acted with maturity.

**Pakistan.** In Pakistan there was nascent democratic set-up and diffusion of power within the country and visible lack of cohesion among the decision makers with regard to the response to the crisis. Confusion about the dispatch of DG ISI to India, resignation of National Security Advisor and identity of lone survivor of the militants spoke ill of the coordination among the decision makers. Initial responses notwithstanding, later the decision makers harmonized their efforts and cobbled a cogent response in the backdrop of ground realities which greatly contributed in mitigating the crisis.

### **Effects of Nuclear Deterrence**

No nuclear posturing was carried out by either side. This indicated that probably both sides learnt good lessons from the previous crises, fully came to realize the operation of nuclear deterrence in the region, understood the futility of coercive diplomacy and till the advent of potential spoilers like ballistic missile defence, preferred to settle their disputes through peaceful means.

### **US Role in Escalation Control**

US diplomacy certainly remains at the forefront of efforts directed at escalation prevention, escalation control, crisis mitigation and crisis management between India and Pakistan<sup>14</sup>. The crisis occurred during the period of transition between the Bush and Obama administrations, which compounded the efforts of US diplomats to handle it. US had at least four interests in the crisis which demanded its active involvement: firstly, American lives had been lost in the attacks, secondly manage relations with two friendly countries mutually hostile to each other, thirdly prevent shifting of Pakistan Army from Afghan border to Indian border which would have affected the GWOT and finally the possibility of war between India and Pakistan would have directly impacted US forces/assets in the region. Consequently, the US immediately involved itself in the crisis and sought its prompt management. US, applied carrot and stick policy on both countries and resorted to high level diplomacy including calls by US President to leaders of both the countries and visits by senior diplomats.

## **PART 4**

### **LESSONS LEARNT FROM POLICY/STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS**

Due to unresolved disputes and role of Non State Actors, attempts to the contrary notwithstanding, Indo-Pakistani relations are and will remain prone to periodic crises and any peace process between them will at best remain fragile. The critical analysis of crises occurring in the period from 1998 to date yields few useful lessons which are given in the ensuing paragraphs.

### **Stability – Instability Paradox**

Nuclear weapons, in theory, can only deter nuclear weapons and large-scale conventional wars. But, the stability part of the paradox has decisively pushed Indo – Pakistan antagonism to subterranean channels with its manifestations in subversive activities, enhanced militancy and cross-border terrorism and so on directed against each other, illustrating the operations of the instability part of the paradox. Such incidence of perpetual conflict in subterranean channels in South Asia, raise problems for escalation control as well as mar the prospects of durable peace in the region hence the need to resolve those underlying issues which vitiate the environment and yield periodic conflicts<sup>15</sup>.

## **Lack of Institutional Mechanisms**

The manner in which Indo-Pakistan crises suddenly erupt and escalate highlights the paucity of institutional mechanisms to prevent, contain and manage them. The on-going composite dialogue notwithstanding, till the institution of a robust and meaningful risk reduction mechanism with in-built capacity to sustain the shocks of spoiler attacks unleashed by Non State Actors, real reduction of tensions or the establishment of stability at lower force levels will remain an elusive objective. Absence of such institutional mechanisms prevents initiation of timely steps to defuse deteriorating situations.

## **Pattern of Crisis Management**

Indo-Pakistan crises appear to escalate uncontrollably towards potential catastrophe and leadership of both countries tends to avoid decisions and eagerly awaits external intervention. Both states seek to achieve their ends without war – Pakistan because it might lose and India because it might not win<sup>16</sup>. The leadership of both countries have shown great sensitivity to the loss of face to their public, hence fervently hopes for and willingly accepts third party intervention to extricate them from their predicament which is reflective of the operation of *independence – dependence paradox*.

## **Prospects of a Limited War**

Ironically, Indians are not prepared to reconcile with the bitter reality that nuclear weapons have eliminated the space available to India for translating its superiority in conventional arms into political advantage as Pakistan has effectively been immunized from any reprisals by larger conventional forces of India. Moreover, in an action – reaction mode of the crisis, which has generally been the tradition in the past, both sides quickly climb up the escalation ladder and their respective attempts to dominate the escalation may result into the whole process spinning out of control. From the perspective of escalation control, moreover, “There will be pressure on the losing side to expand the war in order to reverse the battlefield decision and pressure on the winning side to further improve its war termination conditions and hence military operations.” However, experience of Kargil will continue to haunt the military planners of both countries regarding the existence or otherwise of space for a limited war between the two under nuclear overhang.

## **Role of United States in Escalation Control/Crisis Management**

The Indo – Pakistan crises saw incremental involvement of US which may instil a wrong inspiration in the leadership of both countries that they can provoke and escalate such crises to gain political advantage, since the United States and the international community, in pursuit of their strategic interests, would not allow the matters to spin out of control. How these crises would have turned out if US had not intervened is a meaningful question to be asked. The active involvement of US in the region has given rise to many paradoxes. The nuclear policies of both India and Pakistan now suffer from independence – dependence paradox while the deterrence equation in South Asia now implicitly depends on US intervention – a country which both fear in terms of potential threat to their nuclear programmes<sup>17</sup>. Both India and Pakistan tried to use US to advance their respective interests and by doing so, in fact ended up mortgaging their freedom of action to the whims of American policymakers who were pursuing their own agenda. On the whole, the American role has been critical in achieving escalation control during Indo-Pakistan crises, which is likely to continue in future as well at least till the physical presence of its forces in the region.

## **Cold Start Doctrine**

Indian Cold Start doctrine, unveiled in April 2004, is designed to position the Indian Army to conduct limited war against Pakistan, allowing swift retaliation before Pakistan could prepare militarily and before outsiders could intervene diplomatically. The Cold Start doctrine is plagued with a number of problems and begs a multitude of questions. How the political, geographical and force related objectives would be kept limited and limitations so imposed will be respected by the adversary. How in a limited war, the losing side can be expected to tailor his response strictly in accordance with the tenets of the concept and refrain from escalating the conflict? How a nuclear state like Pakistan can be expected to face a conventional defeat and the likely destruction of the state indifferently and not resort to the use of ultimate weapons which it painstakingly developed and maintained to render security to the state? These and many other relevant questions put a big question mark on the Cold Start Doctrine leading to a limited war under nuclear overhang.

## **Coercive Diplomacy**

India twice backed away from initiating the hostilities during Operation Parakram by taking refuge behind US dissuasive efforts to cover its weak resolve. Indian leadership also learnt a bitter lesson that between nuclear rivals, coercive diplomacy, military threats and nuclear brinkmanship produce limited results and coercion, as a strategy, has its obvious limits. However, a few strategists in India still believe that under nuclear shadow, a limited, controlled conflict using high – technology long range surgical strikes, is the only available option to implement a policy of coercive diplomacy. Such strategists obviously miss the point as to how a limited conflict can be controlled since the loser would naturally be tempted to seek reversal of its losses while the victor would be encouraged to maximize its gains. Both these possibilities would push the conflict up the escalation ladder with minimal chances of restraint.

## **Kashmir – Central to All Disputes**

Current shift in the focus notwithstanding, Kashmir remains central to all disputes between India and Pakistan<sup>18</sup>. It has either been the main theatre of Indo – Pakistan conflicts or the main cause of their bilateral crises over the years. While portraying the indigenous freedom struggle as foreign sponsored and supported militancy in Kashmir, India downplays the root causes of the conflict which include forcible occupation against the wishes of its people, blatant violation of UN Resolutions, and denial of basic human rights to its citizens. It has probably dawned upon the leadership of both countries that keeping it a zero-sum game has not and will not benefit anyone and by making compromises rather than maximalist rhetoric which becomes counterproductive, they can hope to see a solution to this chronic problem. However, any thought of making compromises pushes the leadership of both India and Pakistan into a paradoxical situation. The dilemma for them is how to make concessions and still be able to claim victory. Getting both sides to a win-win situation has proved to be an elusive objective and beyond the acumen of the policymakers of both countries for the past two generations. This, in the absence of any third party mediation/guidance, ultimately leads the whole process to a blind alley.

## **Nuclear Weapons Avert War But Do Not Make Peace**

The Indo – Pakistan crises under focus reveal that nuclear weapons did deter escalation to a general war but did not prevent Kargil Conflict as well as omnipresent sub conventional war between the two countries. The threat of a nuclear war also brings in outside powers with

their vested interests in the region. None of the crises transcended to nuclear domain which is certainly reflective of the responsible attitudes of both countries. Therefore, it seems unlikely, that either would use a nuclear weapon in a conventional war except as a last resort, when vital interests are perceived to be in jeopardy. The strategic stability driven instability, germinated at lower levels, yields a vitiated environment marked by a perpetual state of sub conventional conflict and expression of hostilities through other non-kinetic subtle means. Hence war certainly remains averted but achievement of peace also becomes an unrealizable dream.

## **The Role of Media**

The unprecedented role and clout acquired by media since Gulf War - 1 had an anticipated impact on perception management of public in South Asia during crises. The mushrooming of private television channels and cable networks in both countries has effectively superseded the state-controlled media in credibility and coverage. Kargil was South Asia's first war under the glare of media. Indian media orchestrated a brilliant campaign to highlight Pakistani culpability and shape domestic and international opinion in India's favour. Now a network of think tanks, independent scholars, non governmental organizations and a much better informed political community has arisen to challenge government policy on vital matters<sup>19</sup>. The practices of the yore which allowed concealing of the facts under the thick fog of concocted stories about the outcome of military operations may not now be possible under the sharp focus of media and embedded journalism has added even greater transparency to it. Media has played and will continue to play a predominant role in building the public opinion in support or otherwise of future crises/escalation control and taking the South Asian region towards dispute resolution and durable peace.

## **Conclusion**

Overt nuclearization of South Asia, though expected to bring a period of greater stability, has not deterred sub-conventional warfare or limited conventional war (1999 Kargil), escalation to the brink of war in 2001-2002 and the possibility of dangerous misadventures like thoughts of surgical strikes in the aftermath of the Mumbai terrorist attacks. Both countries applied pressure tactics, resorted to coercive diplomacy and manifested a perpetually hostile foreign policy towards each other but nothing has worked so far to ensure durable peace. Next time the situation may explode suddenly, much before the intervention of any third party, resulting into the destruction of all that we so lovingly cherish. Finding a peaceful settlement of all the contending issues, including and most importantly Kashmir, to the satisfaction of all the parties concerned would be a litmus test of the statesmanship of leaders of both the countries – *a real test in which failure is no more an option.*

<i>Researchers:</i>	<i>Brig Asim Munir, Cdr Faisal Shah PN, Lt Col Kshif Zafar and Dr Fida Wazir</i>
<i>Supervisor:</i>	<i>Brig Mahmood Sadiq</i>

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## EVOLUTION OF OPERATIONAL ART (1910 TO 1989)

*‘Wage war offensively, like Alexander (the Great), Hannibal, Caesar, Prince Eugene and Frederick (the Great); read and re-read the history of their campaigns and model yourself on them; as it is the only way to become a Great Captain and to master the secrets of the art’.*

(Napoleon Bonaparte)

### Introduction

There was a time when Kings used to lead their armies in the field and the connection of the battle front with the political strategist was most immediate and intimate. In that era of “Single Point Application,” the relationship between tactics and statecraft was most intimate. However, on emergence of modern states, their armies also grew with them, which increasingly removed the army actions from the direct orders of the King and the same connection became unacceptably stretched. It was at this juncture in the history of warfare that the idea of ‘*campaign*’ evolved to reduce this widening gap. The campaigns fought through an independent commander became a necessity for achieving desired war objectives. Thus the need arose to re-connect the tactical actions to the political purposes of war and a new concept started to evolve, which we now call the operational art of war.

The term “Operational Art” thus generally refers to the practice of military commanders and their staff for achieving operational success.

As *Sun-Tzu* explains, there are no formulas for successful practice of the art of war. Instead, one must create or seize the favourable situation in circumstances and in relation to the opponent at the time, allocating objectives to subordinates accordingly. The recognition or creation of this favourable situation is the expression of **operational art**<sup>1</sup>.

According to General Sir Rupert Smith:

*“The theatre director conducts his command of all forces, agencies and resources in a scheme of orchestrated actions of his design to produce the strategic goal. The artfulness of his design and the skill as a conductor are measured: first, by success in the face of the opponent; second, by achieving the strategic goal; and third, in the economy of resource in achievement”.*

As the character of war changes from total wars of the past to non-kinetic display of smart power in the present, the armies are mostly found fighting opponents amongst the people. The tactical battles are being won without any significant resistance, but; most ironically, such big armies (of multi-national composition) are still ending up losing the war at the strategic plane. It is thus quite essential to study the evolutionary process of operational art. So in this paper, an endeavour has been made, to start from the Great Wars with focus on German, Soviet, US, UK and Chinese application of operational art and take the reader through the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

### Aim

To analyze the evolution of operational art in the period from 1910 to 1989, with a view to draw pertinent conclusions.

### Scope

The paper will encompass following aspects:-

- Historical Perspective.
- The Two Great Wars (Period from 1910 to 1945).
- The Cold War Era (1946 to 1975).
- The Beginning of the End (of Cold War) - 1976 to 1989.
- Relevant Conclusions.

## Historical Perspective

To set the stage for subsequent evolutionary analysis, let's first observe the *origin* of operational warfare and practical manifestation of operational art in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

**The Stone Age of Campaigning.** During most part of the history, operational art did not exist<sup>2</sup>. However, this absence was not necessarily due to any lesser understanding of wars, campaigns and battles. Instead it can be largely attributed to the lack of technology, especially transport and communication. Therefore, commanders of that time could only exercise effective command over the forces that marched with them.

**Napoleonic Wars – The Dawn of Operational Art.** In the wars of 18th century, field armies seldom exceeded 50,000 men, however, it was Napoleon who attacked Prussia in 1805 with *1,70,000 troops*. As a result, the dimensions of battlefield also grew to a span of more than 60 kilometers<sup>3</sup> in the Franco-Prussian War. Napoleon brought about a revolution in the military affairs by forming '*the Grande Armee*', which introduced his new system of '*the Corps d' Armee*'. Each corps was commanded by a separate Marshal with relatively greater degree of independence; however, lack of appropriate technology still restricted Napoleon to converge on a single point of application.

## Great Military Thinkers and Operational Art

**Von Clausewitz (1780-1831)** and **Henry Jomini (1779 – 1869)** generally followed the traditional view that tactics was what happened on the battlefield, and strategy was everything that led to and from it. These two great theorists did not suggest the existence of an intermediate level of war between strategy and tactics, as in their context, the need for such a level did not exist. The Kings and emperors went to war themselves and directed its conduct for an acceptable outcome. *Strategy directed tactics with great immediacy and intimacy* and there was thus no need or role of another intervening level for operations or operational art, and so neither Clausewitz nor Jomini had suggested such a construct<sup>4</sup>.

**Helmuth Von Moltke.** The Industrial revolution by year 1850, besides escalating the war canvas, also brought in effective technological advancements, including railways and telegraph<sup>5</sup>, which greatly impacted operational art in its evolution. Moltke (*the elder*), while effectively utilising the railways, concentrated more than 4,50,000 men at the decisive point during the Franco-Prussian War (1871). Moltke quite implicitly recognized the fact that strategy has political content, while operations have a military basis<sup>6</sup>.

## Summary

To summarize, the historical overview, it was the Napoleonic campaigns and then Moltke's most innovative operational concepts in the Franco-Prussian War that set the stage for

operational art to evolve. Thus began a new era in the field of warfare, where the political strategist *without being present at the battlefield* was effectively connected to the tactician at the front. By year 1910, the industrial revolution, mass mobilization, expanded theatre of operations coupled with multiple point applications had triggered the beginning of operational art.

## PART - I THE TWO GREAT WARS (1914 TO 1945)

### World War – I (1914 - 1918)

WW I was fought by a coalition of nations in which the complete society and the nation's economy were mobilized for fighting a "*Total War*". Certain highlights of the evolutionary process of operational art are discussed in the following paragraphs:

#### Operational Art in Germany – WW I<sup>7</sup>

- In German operational thinking during WW-I, *frontal pressure* along with *envelopment* were the basic forms of manoeuvre aimed at achieving enemy's *encirclement leading to his ultimate destruction*.
- **Trench warfare** resulted into a gruelling form of warfare in which the defence held the advantage. There were no assailable flanks and the attacks, even if successful, often sustained severe casualties and thus had a **major impact on steering Germany towards the development of operational art**.
- **Free Operations** were conducted by German troops, aimed at facilitating ingenuity in tactical actions and adapting to local circumstances, while remaining within the overall framework of the stated goal. In March 1918; the Germans also resorted to specially trained *storm-troopers* across the trenches, in response to the Western stabilized front with focus on free operations concept.
- On the Eastern front, Russia was defeated by Germany in a number of battles, which subsequently came to be known as the *Battle of Tannenberg*. Through speedy movement of a single German corps by train, the Germans were able to sequentially concentrate superior troops ratio against two different Russian armies, which became the most distinct feature of the battle. This was an excellent example of leverage of the operational art factor of force deployment, in which the Germans were able to **maintain balance** against a numerically superior Russian Army.
- By November 1918, the Germans, despite being on enemy's soil, had to request for an armistice. They were not left with much choices thus **losing balance** and had also reached their **culminating point** by considerably losing the tempo of their operations.

#### Operational Art in Russia – WW I

- Russian training and regimental system could not produce an effective staff system or higher command structure, whereas they did have high-quality junior officers<sup>8</sup>.
- Successful Austro-Hungarian Offensive in the Battle of Kraśnik – 1914, is a case in point in which multiple operational problems occurred, especially ineffective command and control and the Russians also misjudged the Austrian concentration at Lemberg (in western Ukraine). The Austro-Hungarian 1<sup>st</sup> Army defeated the Russian Fourth Army by ensuring **balance** through better strategic positioning around Krasnik.

- The Russian Empire collapsed in March 1917, and Russia left the war prematurely after the Bolshevik Revolution later that year.

### Operational Art by USA – WW I

- American pre-war doctrine was written in vacuum and was developed for a generic foe<sup>9</sup>. *American ground operational doctrine* stressed on conducting offensive operations and massing overwhelming combat power at the decisive point, which was in sync with the attrition-based strategy of the Allies.<sup>10</sup>
- The American Command had only three months of experience at practicing operational art before the armistice ended the hostilities in November 1918. However, even in this short time, the US forces proved successful in number of battles, which took place towards the end of WW-I; Battle of St. Mihiel (September 1918) is a case in point<sup>11</sup>.
- The major problems which confronted the operations by US forces (AEF) were that senior commanders and staff lacked practical operational experience and consequently, were slow to perceive and respond to the changes in the situation, they fought the plan rather than the enemy, and coordination of fire and movement of large number of troops over vast expanses of space in the face of stiffening German resistance was a difficult proposition.<sup>12</sup>

### Operational Art in Britain – WW I

- The British, who had always relied on a strong navy and a small regular army, were forced to undertake a rapid expansion of their field army. This outpaced the rate of training of generals and staff officers ability to handle such a mammoth force.
- However, the British Expeditionary Forces under the command of General Douglas Haig were able to deliver in the Battle of Somme particularly when they first used tanks.
- **Battles of Hundred Days – 1918.** During the last stages of WW-1, the allies (British Empire) launched a series of attacks against the Germans, famously known as the Battles of 100 Days, which saw *inter-arm cooperation* at its peak. Tanks and infantry assaulted under the cover of a fast moving artillery barrage, while spotter planes directed friendly artillery fire and other aircrafts engaged enemy troops in ground attack role. The offensive, which commenced with the Battle of Amiens (August 1918) forced the German armies to retreat beyond the Hindenburg Line and finally ended with an armistice on 11 November 1918.

### Technological Advancements – WW 1

Few major developments, which impacted operational art during WW-1 included inventions of *machine guns, tanks, submarines* (German U-Boats) and the *wireless equipped aircrafts*. *Chemical warfare* was also one of the components of WW-1; however, the killing capacity was limited only to 4% of combat deaths.

**Inter War Years.** Inter war period was used by the militaries to further develop the operational art. Country wise summary of interwar period is given below.

## Germany

The Germans began to move their army from *Sitzkrieg* to *Blitzkrieg*. They developed from static mass and firepower to dynamic use of manoeuvrability and flexibility.<sup>13</sup>

## Russia

Russian modernization in the art of warfare can be credited to two names; Svechin and Tukhachevsky. However, the senseless purge undertaken by Stalin thereafter, adversely affected this transition and even the performance of Russian Army in the initial part of WW-II.

General Svechin in a series of lectures on strategy in 1923–24, for the first time coined the term operational art. He described operational art as,

*‘the bridge between tactics and strategy, the means by which the senior commander transformed a series of tactical successes into operational “bounds” linked together by the commander’s intent and plan and contributing to strategic success in a given theatre of military actions.’*<sup>14</sup>

The principles of operational art outlined in the 1936 Field Regulations bore Tukhachevsky’s imprint<sup>15</sup> (Mikhail Tukhachevsky 1893–1937), in which no aspect of technology associated with the conduct of deep operations escaped his attention (i.e. armour, mechanized infantry, aviation, artillery and rockets and even engineers and radio communications).

## United States

A great deal of effort went into extracting lessons from the AEF’s experiences in 1918. American operational art remained centered on the idea of applying as much combat power as possible to achieve a decision on the battlefield with emphasis on coordination between land and naval forces and the air elements of both.<sup>16</sup>

## Britain

The vivid experience of WW I was most influential in development of the thinking of *J.F.C Fuller* and *B.H Liddell-Hart*:

- **JFC Fuller.** By 1930s, *Fuller* had postulated that future wars would have high tempo of action, unpredictability of events and depth of the battlefield. He had realized that battles were likely to become more and more area operations and not merely positional ones.<sup>17</sup>
- **Liddell-Hart.** In his works, the stress was on movement and surprise. He sought strategic dislocation through mystification of the enemy.
- Both Fuller and Liddell-Hart converged upon similar concepts that anticipated the evolution of operational art.<sup>18</sup>

## World War - II (1939-1945)

**Operational Art in Germany – WW II.** Germany initiated WW II by invading Poland on 1 September 1939, with a mindset of certain victory. German units had no match as they **imbalanced** the system of Polish forces, who reached their **culminating point** by 6 October 1939. However, the invasion triggered a global conflict, the scale of which proved to exceed the German grasp of operational art.

- **Fall of France.** France had excellent defensive fortifications in the form of **Maginot Line** and better tanks than the German Panzers, but they lost to the German's Blitzkrieg. Some of the pertinent facets of this offensive were:-
  - **Blitzkrieg.** This operational method of the German Army along with the use of Luftwaffe was a revolution in warfare, which was most successfully applied by the German military to achieve its ambitions in Europe.
  - **Allied Strategic Errors<sup>19</sup>.** It's an old cliché that *generals like to re-fight the last war*. The disastrous errors of 1940 can only be seen in this light. One of the mistakes was over-reliance on the Maginot line and the other was the abandonment of prepared fortified positions by the Allies to resist the Germans in an open and unfamiliar territory, which set the scene for the great disaster.
  - The Germans were able to strike the French Centre of Gravity (COG) - Paris and made enemy's system of forces **imbalanced** by coaxing them into Belgium while exploiting the thinly held Ardennes and Stenay Gap, resulting into surrender of three fifth of France's territory to Germany<sup>20</sup>.
- **Operation Barbarossa.** Earlier successes with frontal pressure and deep penetration notwithstanding, the Germans could not hold on long enough to capitalize on their gains, thus falling short of their strategic aim. Hitler's decision of not getting Moscow but to go for Ukraine's resources diverted him from hitting the COG (Moscow), which led the Germans system of forces to be **imbalanced** subsequently. Despite heavy losses to Russians in men and material, the German forces could not take them to their **culminating point**<sup>21</sup> and thus the Germans were forced to surrender on 8 May 1945.
- Few other factors impacting the German operational art negatively during WW-II were grossly underestimated mobilization potential of the Red Army. German logistic weaknesses made it extremely difficult to sustain their mobility and armament industry had limited production.

**Operational Art in Russia – WW II.** It was not until 1943 that the Russians emerged with a much better version of operational art. They had quite correctly realized their weaknesses after their initial failures and had raised tank and mechanized corps to spearhead their offensive operations. A brief explanation of some of the major campaigns fought by the Red Army during WW-II is:-

- **Soviet Counter Offensive**

- **Stalingrad (Operation Uranus).** Russians were able to successfully maintain **balance** despite suffering more casualties than the Germans. Their actions led to the Germans losing their much desired *tempo of operations*<sup>22</sup>. The decisive victory demonstrated the Red Army's mastery of operational art.<sup>23</sup>
- **The Belorussian Offensive (Jun-Aug 1943).** The Soviets reinforced Germans' misperception by deliberately posturing offensively in the South, while secretly moving large mobile formations northward into Belorussia, inflicting devastating defeat on German Army Group Centre<sup>24</sup>.
- Germans being overextended, could not improve their defensive posture and were thus not in a state of **balance**; the Russians were able to correctly exploit this **imbalance**<sup>25</sup>.
- **Deep-Battle Theory**<sup>26</sup>. During the 1920s and 1930s, Soviet military theorists introduced the concept of deep battle, which was formally evolved in the Russian Field Manual in year 1936 by Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky. Salient contours of the theory included Deep Operations encompassed manoeuvre by multiple corps or army sized formations simultaneously, and it was not meant to deliver a victory in a single operation, but instead multiple operations conducted in parallel or successively.
- From Stalingrad to Berlin during 1943 to 1945, the Soviets perfected sequential and simultaneous operations. Stalin's marshals learned to command and control these operations in depth and breadth, while coordinating air support with armoured thrusts. These successes signify Russian operational art during WW-II<sup>27</sup>.

#### American Operational Art - WW II

- **Operation Overlord (Normandy Landing).** The Normandy landing was the largest seaborne invasion in the world history. Correct and timely application of allied forces **imbalanced** the German system of forces by executing a proficiently planned deception, efficiently executed joint operations coupled with airborne landings behind enemy lines ensuring achievement of simultaneous effects with great skill<sup>28</sup>. *Eisenhower*, against the expectations of many was able to integrate large and diverse military forces into a coherent fighting team. He was perhaps the first U.S. master of operational art for 'the machine age armies'.<sup>29</sup>
- **Battle of Bulge (Dec 1944 - Jan 1945) - General Patton.** Patton demonstrated a great deal of competence in massing and applying combined arms in a joint environment. Using the air force and organic field artillery in mutually supporting roles, he was able to use operational fires as a force enhancer to shape the battlefield.

- **Pacific Campaign / General MacArthur (1943-45).**<sup>30</sup> MacArthur's tri-  
phibious concept combined all service capabilities into an effective whole. The  
corner stone of the Allied success was the skilful implementation of  
MacArthur's operational vision and the cooperation among the air, naval and  
ground forces, which made the allies more effective than the Japanese.

**Britain.** The British approach to warfare is conditioned by the nation's history. Relatively secure on their mooted island, the British traditionally committed modest land forces to European wars in order to cement alliances and demonstrate commitment rather than to seek decisive victory in their own right. Salient aspects pertaining to the application of operational art during *North African Campaign (Jun 1940 - May 1943)* are:-

- **General Bernard Montgomery** (Eighth Army) delivered a decisive defeat to the Axis forces in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battle of El Alamein. The battle-hardened general, conscious that the mobile tank battle was Rommel's forte, unleashed the Battle of El Alamein as a *battle of attrition*, using his huge advantages in artillery, infantry and supplies.
- **Operation Torch (Nov 1942).** More than 2,30,000 troops surrendered to the Allies in Tunisia. Success of Operation Torch can be attributed to Joint British and American invasion plan (for the 1<sup>st</sup> time), successful amphibious landing, first large scale American airborne drop, which captured two airfields near Oran and sustained logistic support.

### Technological Advancements – WW II

Technology played a crucial role in determining the outcome of WW II. Some of the highlights include introduction of *anti-tank weapons* to counter German Blitzkrieg, the use of *Torpedoes* (both by naval and air platforms) and the effective use of *tanks*. In naval warfare, the *radars* were a great breakthrough in navigation and also the development of *Sonar*. *Aircraft carriers* were also very effective. Similarly in air force, the aircrafts became stronger, lighter and more efficient, which also allowed them to carry more weapons. In the category of bombers, the development of *pressurized pilot cabins* with enhanced munitions carrying capacity and range, made them most relevant. Finally, the advent and the very use of *atomic bomb* brought about a sea change in the warfare to follow. According to one of the notable US theorists (Herman Kahn):-

*“the use of the most lethal weapon in the human history, led to a continual decline of operational art (in the conventional plane) and the artist was envisioned to instead turn into a technician”.*

### Evolution of Naval Operational Art during the Great Wars

Surface ships were the principle weapons during WW-I, whereas German Navy being weaker came up with U-Boats. During WW-II, anti-submarine warfare got pronounced through use of radars, Sonars and torpedoes. Besides this, aircraft carriers and amphibious landings were also very useful.

## Employment of Air Power during the Great Wars

From the use of static balloons, air reconnaissance and limited support to land operations during WW I, it evolved into provision of close air support, strategic bombing, airborne operations and even use of air-launched torpedoes during WW II.

### PART II

#### THE COLD WAR ERA (1946 TO 1975)

Sequel to the advent of nuclear weapons, an important debate started having crucial implications for operational art in the period after WW-II. A new strategic environment had been created in which armed conflict had to be either avoided (through coercive diplomacy) or contained (by a limited war). This part covers the period from 1946 to 1975 and primarily focuses on the Chinese civil war, Korean War (1950-53) and the Vietnam War (1960-75).

#### The Chinese Civil War

Chinese civil war (of 1946-1949) was fought between the armies of the Nationalist government of China and Communist armies under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung. During this war, the military forces numbering in millions fought across the vast space of China in a struggle that ended with the Nationalist government taking refuge on the island province of Taiwan and the Communists establishing the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949<sup>31</sup>. Chairman Mao defeated the nationalist forces in **a series of sequential battles and engagements** by applying the operational art in three phases<sup>32</sup>:-

##### Phase 1

- A strategic withdrawal was conducted into the Chinese countryside, avoiding set piece battles with the numerically stronger and better equipped Nationalist forces, over-extending their lines of communication, and degrading their combat power.
- Mao's plan of strategic withdrawal protected his **COG (the Red Army)** from destruction (by avoiding pitched battles), while the **Nationalists' COG (which lied in their military forces)** was continuously degraded.

**Phase 2.** Extended lines of communication of dispersed Nationalist forces into isolated cities were subjected to persistent interdiction, which hastened their culminating point at *strategic* and *operational levels*, while the Red Army continued to grow stronger in the countryside.

**Phase 3.** Launching of the strategic offensive and forcing the Nationalists to retreat caused dispersion and isolation in their urban strongholds, rendering them unbalanced and vulnerable to destruction.

The entire communist command and control structure shared a common view of the desired end state of the civil war. Chairman Mao successfully "**developed and disseminated a unified and holistic approach in the design, execution and sustainment**" of the War, which ultimately led them to success.

The communists exploited the "close relationship between force deployment, campaign design and geography", through application of the idea of distributed deployment. Throughout the Chinese civil war the primary means of logistic support to the Red Army were the Chinese

peasants and their base areas. Secondary means included capturing Nationalist Army's supplies and equipment.

### **The Korean War (1950 – 53)**

It was in 1950, that the communist North Korea invaded anti-communist South Korea, and the United States immediately intervened in the conflict by sending combat troops to aid the South. The communists had captured more than 90 % of the Korean Peninsula. While the South Koreans were at the brink of defeat, a brilliant amphibious counterattack engineered by **General Douglas MacArthur** behind the enemy lines at **Inchon**, quickly drove the North Koreans back across the border. Now the Americans surged forward, driving North hoping to entirely liberate North Korea from the communist rule. But just as MacArthur declared victory to be at hand, he was caught completely off-guard by the Chinese advance of November 1950. An overwhelming number of Chinese soldiers unexpectedly poured into Korea, sending the Americans into a desperate retreat. Eventually the Americans were able to re-establish a defensive line, ironically located almost at the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel—the line that had divided North and South Korea before the war began. By early 1951, the fighting settled into an uneasy stalemate. Active combat involving UN forces in Korea ended in 1953 with the signing of a cease-fire<sup>33</sup>.

**MacArthur - Truman Rift**<sup>34</sup>. The American intervention in the Korean peninsula saved South Korea from a collapse, but efforts to go further, with an objective to roll back the communist North Korean regime, ended in defeat and bitter acrimony between the operational commander (Mac Arthur) and the political strategist (President Truman). And finally, Truman relieved Gen McArthur of his command over American forces in Korea.

The notion of balance was in favour of the UN forces till the Chinese counter offensive. However, thereafter, Chinese surprised advance critically imbalanced the US system of forces, which ultimately resulted in their retreat to 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel *and making them reach their culmination*. As a whole, the UN Forces' COG rested in their alliance, whereas on the other hand, with the involvement of the Chinese People's Army in November 1950, it became the Communists' COG.

### **The Vietnam War (1964 – 75)**

Vietnam War was fought between North Vietnam, supported by its communist allies and the government of South Vietnam, supported mainly by the US. During ten most brutal years of the Vietnam War (1965 – 75), USA clung into two fatal illusions: firstly, *it assumed that military might and superior firepower would win the war*, which it grossly underestimated and; secondly, *it misunderstood, the fierce nationalism that drove the Vietnamese resistance*.

American operational art although assumed that winning tactical battles would lead ultimately to winning wars and it also won almost all of them, however, still in the end those victories were not enough. The U.S. failed to achieve its strategic objectives. The reasons for this defeat in Vietnam were numerous and complicated, however, one of them was the failure of U.S. military to practice the operational art<sup>35</sup>.

**Phases of the War.** There were three basic phases of U.S. military's involvement in Vietnam:-

- The **first phase** ran from withdrawal of the French military in 1956 to employment of U.S. forces in late 1964 in support of South Vietnamese forces, (there was no employment of U.S. forces in a direct combat role).

- The *second phase* began with the decision to commit U.S. combat forces in 1965 and ran through the decision to begin withdrawal in 1968. (U.S. forces conducted the majority of combat operations in the theatre).
- The *third and last phase* was from the decision to begin the programme of Vietnamization in 1969 to the fall of Saigon in 1975.

**Significant Fault Lines in US Operational Art – Vietnam War.** During this prolonged war, a number of misjudgements became major fault lines of US Army's employment in Vietnam<sup>36</sup>, like:-

- *Absence of a Campaign Plan.* The integration of battles and engagements into an overall major operation or campaign was neither well planned nor executed. The strategy of attrition through repeated battles without any linkage ceded the initiative to the enemy and forced the U.S. to fight on the enemy's terms.
- The strategy of Military Assistance Command of Vietnam lacked an integrated plan to work with other elements of national power.
- There were visible cleavages between the political and military leadership, as Gen Westmoreland the operational commander had developed a serious rift with Ambassador Henry Lodge (a representative of President Johnson). The General lost sight of the strategic objective and thus failed to maintain subordination of the military mission to the political object.

For approximately fifteen years, the North Vietnamese fought against US and South Vietnam. After withdrawal of American combat troops in 1973, South Vietnam fell to the North in 1975 resulting into unification of Vietnam under the communist government in July 1976. *US Army had decisively failed to achieve its objectives and thus a nation accustomed to grand victories of the world wars suffered its first major defeat.*

### PART III

#### THE BEGINNING OF THE END (OF COLD WAR) - 1976 TO 1989

With the continuation of Cold War, no direct military action took place till late 70s. Then came the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (1979–1989), which was later converted into a proxy war between the two global powers, that ended up with the disintegration of USSR. The uni-polar world order thereafter saw the 1<sup>st</sup> and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Gulf Wars and the US / NATO invasion of Afghanistan, which continues to date. Most of the conflicts during this period were expressed through military coalitions, strategic force deployments, extensive aid to client states, espionage, massive propaganda campaigns, conventional / nuclear arms races and technological competitions.

In this part, the emphasis would be to analyze the application and periodic evolution of operational art mainly focusing on:-

- Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.
- Introduction of Operational Level of War by US (1982 - 86).
- Operational Art in COIN and the World of the Future.

## Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (1979 to 1989)

At the onset of war, Soviet doctrine was deeply entrenched in a European warfare paradigm; large scale, conventional and mechanized, ideally suited to terrain and climatic conditions of Western Europe. It is hard to understand, why an army which was eminent in the development of operational art entered Afghanistan, so ill-equipped and unprepared<sup>37</sup>. Some of the salient draw backs were<sup>38</sup>:-

- Inadequate preparation, visualizing an unopposed march into Afghanistan.
- Composition of Motorised Rifle Divisions of 40th Army (mostly comprised of reservists with old equipment).
- Less preparation/mobilization time for ground divisions. (15 days for preparation and another 15 days for mobilization).
- Inability to use multiple supply lines due to lack of infrastructure.

**Soviet Strategy.** The Soviets followed **three main strategies** aimed at quelling the Afghan uprising:-

- **Intimidation.** Use of airborne / armoured ground attacks to deprive the local support.
- **Subversion.** Use of spies for bribing local tribes and guerrilla leaders in order to cease operations.
- **Military Raids / Ambushes.** Use of raids with air support to destroy guerrillas and limit their options.

**Grey Areas in Soviet Operational Art**<sup>39</sup>. Although the Soviets won most of the major battles, ultimately they got defeated by being plunged into a protracted anti-guerrilla war. Certain grey areas were:-

- **Terrain.** The terrain of Afghanistan was the primary obstacle to Soviet forces, due to major factors like inability to control or isolate the battlefield, tendency of compartmentalizing the Soviet military elements, limiting communications and command and control, and critical **logistic tail** absorbing combat troops for convoy escorts and related duties.
- **Time.** Soviets lost the time factor due to their inability to seize and hold the initiative; disrupt the enemy's observe, orientate, decide, and act (OODA) loop; create the element of surprise and fight a prolonged battle due to lack of preparedness.
- **Balance of Forces.** Soviets never **balanced** their forces effectively and could not deploy a proper force-to-space ratio to achieve a quick decisive victory or a negotiated settlement; evaluate the will and faith of Afghan fighters thus viewing it as a local war with limited objectives and synchronize air and ground forces against specific targets.
- **Freedom of Action for Afghan Fighters.** Soviets let the Afghan fighters to plan, prepare and execute any number of counter attacks, with complete freedom of manoeuvre and consistent choosing of time/place, concentration of

force and leverage to quickly disengage and withdraw into the mountains during critical stages.

- As a whole, the **Soviet Army's COG** lied in their **political will**, whereas on the other side it was with **Afghan fighters**. The Soviet commanders could not anticipate the actions of Afghan fighters due to lack of reliable intelligence, thus **limiting their balance** in the war. Similarly, by fighting a protracted war, the Soviets lost the operational tempo, their combat worth and logistic sustenance, thereby reaching an **unanticipated culmination**. Moreover, two third of Russian combat strength remained committed in escort duties, fortifications and static patrolling thus mostly remaining reactive without enhancing the **depth of operations**.

### **Introduction of Operational Level of War by US (1982 - 86)<sup>40</sup>**

With the continuation of Afghan War, in 1982 the **US Army published FM-100-5**, introducing the idea of “**operations**,” with **Air Land Battle concept** and in the 1986 version, the term “**operational art**.” The 1982 manual did not overlook the role of weapons of mass destruction, but it did reinforce the importance of war's **first grammar** to American operational art with statements such as ‘the object of all operations is to destroy the opposing force’.

The emphasis was even stronger in the 1986 edition, which declared that the “**essence of operational art**” was ‘the identification of the enemy's operational COG and the concentration of superior combat power against that point to achieve decisive success’. It also stressed the synchronization of mobility and firepower, not only across the forward line of friendly troops, but also throughout the depth of the battle area. This provided a way to integrate the various national doctrines of NATO members and develop Follow On Forces Attack (FOFA) concept.

**Widening of Gap – Politics and Warfare.** In the American/NATO usage of FM-100-5, quite specifically widened the gap between politics and warfare. The result has been a well-demonstrated ability to win battles that have not always contributed to strategic success, i.e. “a way of battle rather than a way of war.”

### **Operational Art in COIN**

The term “operational art” describes the use of military forces sequentially or simultaneously; in battles, campaigns or series of campaigns to achieve strategic aims. But, the result of operational art in a counterinsurgency campaign like those in Vietnam and Afghanistan is significantly different than a conventional campaign<sup>41</sup>.

In the context of COIN the form of war has changed from industrial war to war amongst people. Hence all institutions, their structures and processes which have evolved to conduct industrial war successfully are unsuited in the new paradigm of war amongst people. Operational art in counterinsurgency thus appears to be more impressionistic and mosaic with a complex series of tactical, operational, and strategic transitions. These transitions require the employment of political, diplomatic, economic and military elements sequentially and simultaneously<sup>42</sup>.

Each of these tactical transitions can take weeks and months. There is no well-defined time for the transition from clearing to holding or holding to building. Success in one transition sets the conditions for potential success in the next with unique requirements and difficulties. In

conceiving and executing a counterinsurgency campaign, cultural, historical and societal details of the host nation are vitally important. One of the principles for constant success is civil-military unity of purpose and coherency of action throughout a campaign<sup>43</sup>.

## **The World of the Future**

With the 9/11 attack, the role of NSAs got pronounced and the character of war transformed from being fought between the people (the conventional mode) to amongst the people (the 4GW). While most of the armed forces of the world were prepared for high-intensity, major conflicts, they now find themselves confronted with unforeseen threats such as suicide bombers, car bombs and IEDs. The search for solutions to these new challenges have led to a major change in the design of equipment deployed on the ground and has created a new relationship between industry and the military<sup>44</sup>. The new design will have little *to do with manoeuvre* but *more to do with information*.

## **PART IV**

### **RELEVANT CONCLUSIONS**

In this paper an endeavour has been made to understand the evolution of operational art from the period of the Great Wars to the end of Russo – Afghan War in year 1989. While the lessons of the Great Wars mostly focus on immediate results with greater reliance on destruction / annihilation of the adversary, the character of war during the later stages (of the period understudy) transformed into prolonged series of conflicts fought amongst the people. Salient conclusions relevant to the evolutionary process of operational art have been grouped into *Policy* and *Military realms*.

#### **Policy Realm**

*"A nation that makes distinction between its scholars and its warriors will have its laws made by cowards and its wars fought by fools."*

(Thucydides)

**Dividends of Positive Friction between Strategy and Operational Art.** While singleness of conception should be the desired outcome, the systemic effect of strategy and operational art can only be completed once they are interdependent entities. Their *positive friction*, while formulating a strategic direction would bring about much needed balance and refinement in the entire process.

**Subservience to Political Strategist.** Notwithstanding the requirement of the military commanders advising the Political Strategist on setting doable goals, the unwanted trend of operational art guiding the strategy, has always had negative implications on the outcome of the war [MacArthur – Truman Rift (Korean War - 1953)].

**Coherence in Operational Vision.** A close and intimate interplay between the strategist (the politicians) and the operational artist (the military commanders) is essential, which demands better understanding of each others' domains, including their respective capacities and limitations (Adolf Hitler's ambitions during Battle of Stalingrad – August 1942).

**Application of Mid-course Correction by Political Strategist.** The political strategist should be able to apply mid-course corrections to any campaign and for this; there is a need of an intimate relationship between the strategist and the operational commander. The operational reverses (if any) should also be absorbed by the strategist and necessary modifications applied there-to the stated goal (Vietnam War – 1973).

### **Military Realm – Conventional Domain**

**Evolution of Character of War.** While the nature of war remains constant (being an act of violence), the character of war kept changing throughout the evolutionary process of operational art, with *technology* being the sole driver. The evolution in the character of war can be summarised as under:-

#### **Pre-World War (19<sup>th</sup> Century)**

- Shift from Single Point to Multiple Point Application.
- Use of Railroads for simultaneous deployment and concentration at the decisive point.

#### **WW-1**

- Mass mobilization.
- Increased firepower with reduced manoeuvrability.
- Trench warfare.
- Inter-arm cooperation.
- Submarine Warfare.

#### **WW-2**

- Joint Warfare.
- Amphibious Operations.
- Manoeuvre (Blitzkrieg / Deep Battle Theory).
- Effective use of airpower (airborne landings / bombers).
- Use of Atomic Bomb - **Artist turned into a Technician.**
- Use of Radar.

#### **Cold War Era**

- Nuclear Deterrence.
- Limited War.
- Counter Insurgency Operations.
- The Proxy wars.

**Over Reliance on Strategic Means.** Operational artist has certain resources at his disposal for achieving laid down strategic objectives through conventional means. His operational plan should thus be self contained, without any looking back towards strategic means, which are at the disposal of the political strategist (Macarthur's assertion to Truman during the Korean War to bomb communist China).

**Exploitation of Fleeting Opportunities.** There is a need to avoid rigid adherence to the scheme of manoeuvre and instead exploit whatever opportunities are presented; the enemy should be fought with and not the plan (American Expeditionary Force – WW I).

**Sustained Logistic Support.** Logistic support and its continued sustenance during the subsequent period of war have a significant impact on application of operational art. An extremely motivated, well trained and well led army can even succumb to drying up of resources due to ineffective logistic planning [Operation Torch – North African Campaign (WW-II)].

### **Military Realm – Sub-Conventional Warfare**

Operational art in counterinsurgency is a complex series of tactical, operational and strategic transitions. These transitions require employment of military, political, economic and diplomatic forces in sequence and simultaneity. Each of these transitions can take weeks and months. There is no well-defined time for the transition from clearing to holding or holding to building. Timetables are helpful, but it is important not to declare prematurely that the transitions are complete. Salient conclusions in this regard are:-

**Shared Operational Vision.** The entire command and control structure should share a common view of the desired end state in any conflict. There is a need to develop and disseminate a unified and holistic approach in the design, execution and sustainment of the operation (Chinese Civil War – 1949).

**Campaign Planning – Operational Linkage.** The integration of battles and engagements into an overall major campaign is a must for planning as well as for execution. The strategy of attrition through repeated battles without any linkage cedes the initiative to the enemy, leaving the force to fight on the enemy's terms (Vietnam War – 1974).

**Reactionary Application of Force.** War favours the side which does not wait for adversary's application of force. If the major part of the combat strength remains committed in escort duties, fortifications and static patrolling, the force is liable to remain reactive and thus cannot enhance its depth of operations [Russian Invasion of Afghanistan (1979-89)].

### **Conclusion**

In this paper, the effort has been to highlight various perspectives on the evolution of operational art, with special focus on US, UK, German, Russian and Chinese ways of war. It certainly did not emerge all at once. Ideas developed, they were tested in wars, and new concepts were built upon them. Over time, the theory and practise of operational art adapted to accord with contemporary circumstances ensuring its continued relevance. Even at the sub-conventional front, where the war is now being fought amongst the people, its application remains most significant.

Operational art in the context of any developing country like Pakistan will remain vital, when realized as a methodology that enables effective planning and execution of the complete spectrum of operations. If our military leaders apply operational art in its full dimensions, functioning as true artists, they can definitely become an effective expression to any given strategic direction in the future.

Researchers: Lt Col Imran Naqvi TJ, Lt Col Kashif Azad, Gp Capt Yousaf and Brig Rowel  
(Sri Lanka)  
Supervisor: Brig Fayyaz Hussain Shah

## Endnotes

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## **4GW AND EMERGING CONTOURS OF 5GW POLITICAL – MILITARY DIMENSIONS AND IMPACT ON WORLD POLITICS**

### **Introduction**

Evolution in military affairs is an ongoing process; even though history of warfare is as old as humans themselves, many theorists believe that modern era has witnessed three watersheds in which change has been qualitative. The generations of warfare began with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the treaty that ended the Thirty Years' War. Previously, many different entities had fought wars using different means, not just armies and navies and outcome of war was decided on the battlefield while population at large usually remained out of the war.

The first generation of war (1648 – 1860) grew from the political, economic, and social structures that developed and not just invention of gun powder and muskets which existed in some shape earlier. Warfare however got a new lease when Europe transitioned from a feudal system to a system of nation-states ruled by monarchs<sup>1</sup>. Napoleon's armies took one and a half century to build after treaty of Westphalia and were a result of a developing political system as a result of seismic changes in the social structures of Europe like Renaissance and French Revolution. These two events built societies which generated enough wealth to sustain these mass armies for collective security.

Second generation of war (1860 – 1915) was a logical conclusion of the need to stop these mass armies. New weapons like machine gun were developed and were complimented by barbed wire, mines and trench warfare. Since all these changes required money, nation states developed an elaborate system to tax their masses in the name of collective security. Second generation of war hence grew out of the requirement to maintain integrity of nation states and was again supported by political and social systems. Finally, second generation war required an industrial society, better transportation means, good communications and the mass weapons and ammunition that only industrial societies could produce. To top it all, it required sacrifices from people which could only be provided by people through mass participation in armies.

Third generation warfare or manoeuvre warfare really started in 1915 and came to maturity in 1940. The political and social atmospheres of the opposing sides were critical to the difference in development<sup>2</sup>. German losses were seen more as a result of civilian rather than military incompetence. Mission type orders were instituted and manoeuvre warfare was applied to focus on destruction of the enemy's command and control and logistics as the fastest way to destroy his will.

The term of Fourth generation warfare as argued by its proponents uses all the shifts from a mechanical to an information/electronic society, the blurring of lines between war and politics while assuming that the state is now more accountable to international system and is thus losing its monopoly on violence. Fifth generation warfare as its proponents propose will result from the continued shift of political and social loyalties to causes rather than nations. 5GW according to its proponents will be the war of information era and will use the strengths of global integration through internet and unrestricted access across nation states both in digital and physical worlds.

### **Aim**

To carry out an in-depth study of the concept of fourth generation warfare and evolving concept of fifth generation warfare as a result of social and political changes around the globe with a view to understanding its implications on the strategic choices and operational art.

### Scope

- Theoretical overview of fourth and fifth generation warfare.
- Evolving character of war as a result of politico – military changes.
- Recommendations.

## THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF 4<sup>TH</sup> AND 5<sup>TH</sup> GENERATION OF WARFARE

### Theoretical Overview

**Fourth Generation Warfare.** Fourth generation warfare was first proposed by William S. Lind in 1989<sup>3</sup> and was later seconded by Colonel Thomas Hammes in 2004. Fourth generation warfare was defined as war between a country and non-state actors while also admitting that 4GW tactics are not necessarily new. The four elements that were believed to have carried over into fourth generation of warfare from the earlier generations are:

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- *Mission orders* that allowed maintaining a necessary level of flexibility through small enabled groups under a unified direction.
- Reduced importance of *centralized logistics to support high tempo operations*. Living off the land remains the key in 4GW.
- Reduced importance of fire power while at the same time increasing value of manoeuvre. Small, agile and highly manoeuvrable forces will remain hallmark of 4GW.
- Purpose of 4GW was hence cited to collapse an enemy internally rather than ensuring his complete physical destruction, identification and targeting centre of gravity remains the key.

**Implications of the Concept.** As a consequence of the elements as mentioned above, complete society became the object of war thus blurring the line between battlefield violence and safe zones thus reducing gaps between war and politics and conflict and peace. One more addition was made by declaring this war as non-Trinitarian thus focusing on the argument that nation states are no longer relevant as they are losing their monopoly on violence.

**Shifts as a Result of 4GW.** The proponents also cited few major shifts in the warfare<sup>4</sup>, firstly, as a result of the rise of mass media thus shifting focus of insurgents to strategic communications campaigns instead of kinetic actions supported by guerrilla and terrorist operations. Secondly, rise of USA as sole super power was also thought to be forcing an organizational shift on its enemies and allies alike. Thirdly, a shift in participants was observed as highly diverse armed groups that make up a modern insurgency would have widely differing motivations while operating in one country. Finally, shift was observed in obscuring of fronts and increased exposures of rear areas and base of operations. Centre of gravity was hence cited to be shifting from the most mobile elements to popular will.

## Weaknesses of the Concept

**Over Blown Concept.** The first reading of 4GW literature confronts one with a sense of doom for conventional forces and the nation state as complete societies are cited as object of war. Terrorism, a threat to which 4GW often refers, also seems overblown as it overestimates terrorists' strength and thus fails to understand problems in transforming battlefield victories into political success as witnessed in Iraq. It is to be understood that nation states are relevant and so do conventional military forces as they are required to deter aggression from nation states besides keeping in check escalation potential of terrorists thereby reducing anarchy within societies. Increased anarchies in nation states may have fatal consequences for the global security and peace thus returning to a pre-Westphalian world.

**Myth of New Wars.** Fourth generation warfare proponents have created myth of new wars but the reasons are murky as evolution of theory mainly remains the result of efforts to justify defeats of western styled armies in Vietnam and Afghanistan. As nothing in existing material at that time justified these defeats, fourth generation theorists first created generations of warfare model while not understanding that evolution of warfare is in fact synthesis of forms<sup>5</sup> and hence cannot be broken into neat lines. It was concluded incorrectly that western armed forces were still unprepared to deal with changing nature of war, while not realizing that had nature of war changed, it could be anything than war. They also forgot that changes in character have also been more contextual rather than fundamental.

**Understanding Evolving Nature of Society.** In order to comprehend changing character of warfare, developing an understanding of the evolving social and political systems remains a requirement as collapse of nation states had been the basic assumption of the proponents of fourth generation warfare, an equally fatal mistake as calling Clausewitz a prophet of total war. Following merit consideration:-

- Changes in generations of warfare were not result of a sudden transformation.
- Changes in warfare occurred as a result of developments in the societies. Technology alone has brought no significant change.
- There have been significant political changes since the end of World War II and number of states has increased from 51 in 1945 to 194 now with theoretically same importance in international system.
- Rise in the number of stateless actors to include both transnational and sub-national elements that influence the international scene is another change which is eroding state sovereignty.
- As the inter-state wars receded due to their global unacceptability and economic costs, states and non-state actors resorted to low intensity conflicts to further their political aims.
- 4GW theorists' also visualised contemporary terrorist groups as self-sufficient since conflicts will be waged outside the nation-state framework. However, as we have already seen in Swat and FATA, that is hardly the case as while the State of Pakistan was fighting these groups, they were also being supported by few states, states thus remain relevant in fighting or supporting these groups.

- In nutshell, the “end of nation state” approach is too deterministic giving an impression that it is an inescapable process.

**Weak Understanding of Clausewitzian Trinity.** One more addition was made by declaring this war as non-Trinitarian by viewing the trinity as loose interface among the government, military and the people while ignoring the trinity of basic hostility (drives the desire for conflict), chance and uncertainty or non-rationality (makes war unpredictable and resistant to prescriptive solutions), and the purpose (element of subordination or rationality)<sup>6</sup>. Going over the history of disturbances in Swat and FATA, Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Sharia Muhammadi (TNSM) was supported by people in 1994 and was thus able to create some sort of trinity. But as government promises remained unfulfilled, basic hostility increased and TNSM decided to include TTP Swat Chapter as its armed group. Inclusion of TTS gave birth to chance and friction and this friction widened as TTS misused its power thus resulting into loss of support and breaking trinity. Trinity thus remains central to war fighting and till the time State of Pakistan failed in establishing trinity of people, armed forces and government no worthwhile operations were possible.

**Use of Transnational Bases.** Super-terrorists of the future were also thought not to have a “traditional” national base or identity, but rather a “non-national or transnational one, such as an ideology or a religion”<sup>7</sup>. However, historically, this has also been a norm rather than exception<sup>8</sup>. Indeed, it characterizes many sub conventional conflicts now in Pakistan and Afghanistan where religion was and is still being used to hide the actual agenda. Although, we may disagree with the final end state these groups desire or long for.

**Attacking the Will of Enemy.** Attacking the will of the enemy was cited as the main objective of the changing character of war. Incidentally, this has also been a standard norm in the history and the only difference now is that through access to media and communication means, certain leverage to their adversary’s political will is being enjoyed by states and non states<sup>9</sup>. Attacks in urban areas of Pakistan by TTP, Al Qaeda and all other host of affiliates of Al Qaeda were aimed at attacking the will of the government and people of Pakistan while attacks on LEAs were aimed at breaking their will. Debates still resonate in the media where government and armed forces are routinely asked to negotiate and reconcile with these groups after each attack.

**Implosion Rather than Integration.** Implosion of state was also identified as one the objectives while not realizing that states still remain important to all terrorist organizations as they wield power over societies within states. Even though initially subversion of an existing order is anticipated, ultimately integration is sought even by insurgents. Post-1996 Afghanistan after Taliban take over stands as a stark example. Implosion followed by integration was also tried in Swat and SWA but failed when TTS and TTP failed to manage the chaos. Hamas and Hezbollah are two more interesting examples as they are now part of the very societies they wish to control<sup>10</sup>.

**Over Emphasizing Use of Technology.** Technologies such as directed energy weapons and robotics were envisioned to be used by future terrorists. Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistani groups inside Pakistan fought with most basic of the weapons and almost no technology. Vietcongs in Vietnam and Afghans in 80s fought

with even more primitive weapons but were still able to dissuade the designs of much larger and better equipped 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> generation armies.

### **Fifth Generation Warfare**

**Theoretical Aspects.** Even though 4GW framework is rather new, some observers are now talking about 5GW. The proponents of 5<sup>th</sup> GW assume that as US in particular and other states world over in general develop robust capabilities to deal with 4<sup>th</sup> GW conflict, insurgents or terrorists will disperse to establish smaller networks supported by states or at their own for ideological reasons, loyalties of people will hence shift from nation states to causes<sup>11</sup>. In the words of William S. Lind, there were only three generations in the field of warfare since modern era and the fourth denotes an end to this generation of warfare model. Above notwithstanding, 5GW proponents' first assumption of changing loyalties to ideas rather than nation-states has been proven partially right during Arab spring. The second assumption regarding wide spread attacks as a result of advancement in bio and nano technologies is still inconclusive even though two WMD attacks one each in New York and Tokyo have been observed. Third assumption regarding nets and jets war is also inconclusive as there is a growing realization of making internet and social media more accountable and transparent and stricter immigration controls and imposition of curbs on air travel.

**Irrelevance of Earlier Generations of Warfare.** In order to ascertain whether some new technology or idea constitutes a generational shift or otherwise, it has to be seen that can it make older generations of warfare irrelevant? Following the notion that war's outcome is usually determined by superiority in equipment could be deadly as technology is seldom the determining factor as amply highlighted throughout the history. While it is true that tools can augment concepts, the core concepts do not change and arguably dictate the development and implementation of said tools. Over emphasis of fifth generation theorists on technology hence might not bring a new generation of warfare.

**Fifth Generation Warfare as Information Warfare.** Naming Fifth Generation Warfare as "*Information Warfare*" would mean an oversimplification, this representing only one of the aspects. In order to ascertain that whether warfare has transformed into 5GW, following signs are worth consideration:-

**Technological** advancement represented by the evolution of cyberspace especially the Internet and tremendous improvements in nano and bio technologies.

**The Possibility** of processing a large number of data in cyberspace.

**The use of Information** to strengthen and increase the abilities of force.

**Persuasion powers** of media thus making it more powerful than ever at international level.

**Finally,** fundamental shift in societies wherein they develop new concepts of war fighting to overpower 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> generation armies.

### **EVOLVING CHARACTER OF WAR AS A RESULT OF POLITICO – MILITARY CHANGES**

## **Evolution of Warfare**

While warfare has certainly evolved over the centuries and will continue to do so in times to come, its nature has remained unaffected, the changes in its character have also been more contextual i.e. the weapons used by warring parties, objectives, doctrines and concepts of adversaries<sup>12</sup>. Developing better understanding about evolving character of warfare in general and 4GW in particular will thus require better insight into the human nature.

## **Understanding Human Nature**

We humans fight because there are limited resources and in order to satisfy our desires we have to diminish adversary's capacity for independent action. Human goal thus remains to survive, survive on own terms and in turn improve our capacity for independent action. Life by implication is thus conflict, survival, and conquest. Variety in responses, rapidity in actions, harmonizing efforts and exercising initiative thus seem to be key qualities that permit one to shape and adapt to an ever-changing environment<sup>13</sup>.

## **Reasons for War**

So if war and conflict is eternal to human beings, in order to comprehend the future wars, it is important to understand why nations and societies go to war. States and non-states go to war<sup>14</sup> for:-

**States.** Fear, honour and interests; policy (Politik): cost/benefit calculations and failure of diplomacy depending on the criticality of issue.

### **Non-States (and sometimes States)**

- Grievances, objectives, glory of individuals/status in tribe.
- Obtaining the spoils of war: booty, slaves, territory, women, which override and complicate any pursuit of tribal/community "policy".
- Obtaining prisoners for religious or culinary reasons.
- Doctrinal differences.
- Other "will of God" reasons.
- Justice: avenge perceived wrongs; community honor (e.g. Trojan War).
- Assist an ally (WW I and to some extent WWII).

**Everybody.** Existence, either as a group (insurgency) or as a state.

## **Probability of Conventional Wars**

Off late probability of conventional wars has decreased in countries and societies<sup>15</sup> which are more integrated with global systems as a result of factors like complex interdependence, non-affordability of economic costs of a war, advent of nuclear weapons and argument that results necessary to succeed in current or future conflicts have not been achieved throughout history by use of force alone. But since expression of interests remains important to states and societies especially when stakes are high, states and non-states are increasingly

engaging in proxies. It is also considered that as unipolar world gives in to a multipolar world, interstate wars could return<sup>16</sup>.

### **Reasons for Future Wars**

Future wars in the framework of 4GW could still be fought for pure political reasons, like the wars in medieval Europe<sup>17</sup> or classic insurgencies or primarily for economic reasons<sup>18</sup>. But since proxies will gain prominence and as these are fought for political, social and strategic contexts instead of military technology, efficacy of military solutions will continue to be questioned.

### **Future Warriors**

Future fourth generation warriors will be super empowered individuals able to fight independently<sup>19</sup> in small groups. These warriors will not only understand the tactical, operational and strategic aspects very well but will also have improved understanding of social contexts<sup>20</sup> as we are already observing in the case of many banned organizations in Pakistan.

### **Understanding Changing Character of Insurgencies**

**Difference between Terrorism and Insurgency.** 4GW is also called an evolved form of insurgency and as future wars will focus around proxies which can take shape of either insurgencies or terrorism, it is important to understand difference between terrorism and insurgency to develop matching responses. Appropriate responses to the two phenomena are very different:-

- The difference lies in organization and use of terror as insurgencies combine political agendas with violence while terrorists may pursue any higher goals, but in this case violence substitutes rather than complements the declared objectives<sup>21</sup>.
- In today's world, counter insurgent represents radical change, as insurgent after controlling a certain segment of society fights to preserve the status quo. Pakistan's campaign in Waziristan and Swat did exactly the same.
- Insurgencies are characterized by large overt organizations while terrorist organizations are characterized by smaller overt groups or networks.
- Terrorists now have transnational reach and affiliates and are hence able to unleash appalling attacks that will over shadow even attacks of 9/11.
- Insurgencies are more complex as they combine ideology with hard core ideologues as leaders and unsatisfied citizens acting as foot soldiers. Insurgencies thus present both political and military challenges and can only be defeated through ideas. Al-Qaeda is a case in point as Salafist theology forms its bedrock and through its ideology it attracts the Muslim population besides justifying use of terror.

**Future Insurgencies.** Future insurgencies will differ significantly from those of the 1960s<sup>22</sup> as:-

- Historically, insurgencies were limited to a certain area; however future insurgencies will have transnational character like Al Qaeda<sup>23</sup>.

- Increased fusion as a result of technology will allow national and transnational actors to swarm a state from within besides isolating it from international support<sup>24</sup>.
- A number of insurgent groups with entirely different motives will co-exist in a geographical zone in a marriage of convenience<sup>25</sup>.
- Power of narratives can be judged from the fact that a single narrative can nullify or seriously question intentions and thus put additional constraints and restraints over use of force and political liberty of action thereby outweighing progress as was observed time and again in SWA and Swat.
- In history, insurgents were the initiators but now local armed forces can be portrayed as initiators through use of narratives and manipulation of media thus by implication projecting insurgents as victim instead of monster.
- In the classic insurgencies, insurgent was dependant on population however; present and future insurgents may be wealthier thus changing the economic relationship between insurgent and population.
- Insurgent tactics and weapons like IEDs, remote control bombs and sniping etc will simultaneously target security forces and the population thus weaning away the population besides raising questions about efficacy of some classical tactics like patrolling etc.

**Future of Fourth Generation Warfare.** 4GW can then take the shape of either ‘compound<sup>26</sup> or hybrid wars’. 1971 India – Pakistan war in now Bangladesh and Vietnam War<sup>27</sup> are examples of *compound wars* in which irregular forces attacked weak areas while opposing conventional forces took advantage of resultant dispersion to concentrate. But in Compound Wars, forces lacked required fusion thus allowed the opponent to regroup and protract the conflict.

**Possibility of Transition to Fifth Generation Warfare.** Future warriors will not be contend with compound wars and as technologies improve, might focus on lesser but more lethal attacks. Future warriors hence can either transit to 5<sup>th</sup> GW or more complex hybrid wars. Evolution into 5GW seems distant as access to bio and nano technologies remains elusive for non-state actors, controls on air travel are further tightened and sea mode of travel comes under focus as a result of creation and operationalization of proliferation security initiative (PSI). The options of future terrorist while so limited might see him waging ‘open source warfare’<sup>28</sup> in which networks of peers rather than the hierarchies will be relied upon. Multiple, smaller attacks are becoming a rational choice and already we can witness this in attacks on pipelines across Balochistan which caused losses worth millions. Even possession of bio and nano technologies thus might not fundamentally change character of war into 5GW in the absence of any durable war fighting idea and this new threat might also unfold as advanced form of Hybrid war.

**Transition to Hybrid Wars.** Few important characteristics of Hybrid Wars or Sub conventional wars (SCW)<sup>29</sup> will be as under:-

- Fusion of conventional and unconventional capabilities due to technology may be even more complex while also improving adaptation and learning.

- Blurring and blending of lethality of state conflict with the protracted nature of irregular warfare will be witnessed<sup>30</sup>.
- Non-state actors will not be the main repository of hybrid challenges as under pressure, states can also shift conventional units to fight irregularly<sup>31</sup>.
- Future warriors will aim at controlling escalation by generating irrational responses.
- In future conflicts, bridging of physical and societal terrains through use of information technology will allow states and non-state actors to use all possible methods to destabilize an existing order.

**Hybrid Wars in Recent History.** Hezbollah can be termed as the first model of hybrid force (2006 Lebanon War) against Israeli Defence Force. It proved to be disciplined, professionally trained, and able to operate in distributed cells throughout all types of terrain.

**Emerging Global Trends.** It will now be correct to look at emerging global trends to decide on the reasons and context in which future wars will be fought:-

- Perhaps the most dangerous trend is the growing unilateralism in international affairs to impose their kind of order by coalition of willing.
- Advancement of Globalization and Technology, have inadvertently provided the means to export terror and extremism around the world<sup>32</sup>.
- In addition to radicalism, looming population trends warn of a growing instability in several less-developed countries due to demand – supply mismatch<sup>33</sup>.
- Safe havens in nation-states will provide sanctuaries thus further complicating the issues besides increasing problems for weaker nation states.
- Competition over resources coupled with climate change and natural disasters is also fuelling the potential for conflict.
- Proliferation or increased access to all forms of WMD might result into sanctioning pre-emptive or even preventive military operations.
- Violent extremist groups and their ideology also present a global challenge<sup>34</sup>.
- Weak and failing states also threaten global security<sup>35</sup>.

### **Conclusions from the Study**

- Nature of war essentially remains constant, while character of warfare is evolving towards more synergy thus resulting into more dispersion and lethality.
- Changes in generations of warfare are overlapping as each developed over the conflicts that preceded it and as a result of changes in society rather than technology alone.
- Clausewitzian trinity still remains applicable as any violence without a political cause is simple criminality. The more lethal mistake is in treating all ongoing sub-conventional conflicts as fundamental extremism or only terrorism thus resulting into a vortex of senseless violence bordering on madness.

- Conflict remains part of the human nature. Even though tug of war will continue over control of scarce resources, probability of conventional state on state conflict except in complete asymmetric conditions remains low.
- Proxies will remain rational choice in immediate future and will be either sponsored by states for political reasons or will be waged by independent non-state actors for both political and apolitical reasons. Media and IGOs would be used to legalize these proxies under the garb of R2P by coalition of the willing for extracting economic or political concessions.
- Future wars are likely to be primarily Hybrid or Sub conventional wars with transnational character and as people become objects, employment of militaries in political conflicts will always remain questionable, at least initially.
- Increasing technological gap between west and rest of the world will force future warriors who will be super empowered individuals to transform into loosely knit small groups not following any rigid hierarchical organizations. Technology will help in integration of these groups besides improving upon their operational fusion.
- Open source warriors represent the most dangerous trend and their financing by rival opportunistic states might make them even more lethal.
- Control over WMD technologies will remain a cherished dream for future warriors. Narratives will thus become more important than weapons for changing loyalties within the states.
- Increased awareness on part of nation states coupled with promulgation of laws and better implementation measures in tackling with fourth generation warriors might result in morphing of future warriors into societies like Hamas and Hezbollah besides reducing their liberty of action.
- The future warriors are also likely to adopt non-hierarchical network structures with no rigid organization, working on the concept nizam, la tanzim (system, not organization). This phrase actually encapsulates character of future war. Failure of LTTE in Sri Lanka while overly depending on development of 2nd / 3rd generational structure is a lesson which will guide the path of future insurgent organizations.
- Even though nation states seem to be in retreat but it is also visible that they have reconciled with the changing environment. We now today are living in an era of shared sovereignty in which all kinds of non-state actors whether violent or non-violent are asserting to share state's powers. Trend suggests developing of regional instead of global alliances.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **Developing International Environment and Implications on Nation States**

In the light of waning US influence, economic problems of Euro zone and emerging centers of a multi-polar world, a world with G – zero needs to be foreseen. As a result, many regional powers might emerge and world as a consequence might turn out to be a more chaotic place with many more wars. Fighting wars through proxies armed with better weapons and tactics coupled with traditional wars is thus considered possible. Future armies will thus have to

be ready to fight both traditional and non-traditional wars within a theatre at one time. This might call for a better adaptive army conversant in both forms of the war with almost equal prowess.

### **Recommendations at National Level**

**Clear Strategic Direction to Prevent and Fight the Future Wars.** Effective governance with responsive state administration and management systems including strategic intelligence capability remains central in deterring the future conflicts through statecraft. Needless to say a clear strategic direction manifested through strategic framework of Deterrence, Development and Dialogue should be followed as cornerstone policy to prevent the conflict in the first place.

**Political Ownership of the Conflict.** Political government has to take over ownership of the conflicts as these cannot be managed without adopting a whole of the nation approach. Creating trinity of people, government and armed forces will remain critical in fighting future conflicts and is not possible without ownership of the political government.

**Creating Enabling Environment for Developing Fully Empowered Societies.** Under developed feudal – tribal societies with poor socio – economic conditions and weak state controls remain prone to future insurgent wars. Only the empowered societies which are adequately educated can effectively challenge the narrative of future warriors. Devolution of governmental powers to people no longer remains an option but has become a necessity.

**Revamping Legal Systems to Fight 4<sup>th</sup> Generation Wars.** Terrorism uses freedom and openness provided by a free society, against it. The only answer lies in the effective and vibrant constitutional reforms especially in laws of evidence and managing witness protection programmes etc. besides enacting and implementing cybercrime laws and laws for effective management of media.

**Inter – Agency Cooperation.** Extremism cannot be eliminated through local action against extremist pockets; the requirement is to address the root causes. If ‘will’ or ‘attitudes’ of the people is to be transformed then actions and reactions of the all elements of national power will have to be aimed at denying breeding grounds for these grievances through effective management, better integration and by adopting people centric policies.

**Reforms for Capacity Building of LEAs.** In most of the developing countries LEAs lack requisite capability, capacity and integration to fight future wars owing to a host of reasons. Police reforms should remain the starting point and be followed by civil armed forces to improve recruiting, development of better hierarchical structures and training to fight cybercrimes.

**Inter – State Cooperation.** Future warriors are likely to exploit black holes in international law and discords between nation states to operate beyond national boundaries and closer to seam to avoid stringent laws and effective LEAs in one state thus bringing into light requirement of integrating efforts globally and in particular with neighbours and regional countries to deal with these threats. This is easier said than done.

**Capacity Building to Fight 5GW and Open Source Warfare.** Creating cyber and space commands at national and armed forces level to fight cybercrimes, while at the same time, exercising control over proliferation of bio and nano technologies and developing national capacity by integrating human and technical elements to protect vital services against hacking remains vital to fight 5GW. Finally, legislating and then implementing laws against attack on vital assets like pipelines and grid stations and creating mechanisms to provide comprehensive security to them should also be pursued.

## **Recommendations at Army Level**

**Changes in Military Culture.** Earlier generations of war seemed obsessed with order on the battlefield thus turning militaries into well oiled machines while countering terrorism forces a change. Difference between the nature of the modern battlefield and the traditional military culture can be addressed by redefining military cultures by accepting that initiative is more important than obedience.

**Ability to Adapt and Learn.** Use of information technology will improve adaptation of insurgents while also giving them ability to quickly share techniques and lessons learnt from one geographical zone to another. As David Kilcullen puts it in '*Accidental Guerrilla*', unless we adapt to today's protean adversary and the merging modes of human conflict, "we are destined to maintain and upgrade our high-end, industrial age square pegs and be condemned for trying to force them into contemporary and increasingly complex round holes."

**Adaptive Campaigning.** Armies may not be able to dominate all aspects of future war but their role might be a bit toned in support of other elements of national power. As armies shrink in size and the complexity of intra state problems increases in size and context, militaries will have to carefully articulate their actions for more enduring results in support of the governmental departments. This is referred to as adaptive campaigning.

**Information Operations and Strategic Communication.** Strategic communications is an up-and-coming tool in the adaptive campaigning process and can be used for affecting changes in societal behaviour by understanding and responding to the thinking of population at large. Information operations aim at wining the psychological contest with real and potential enemies. A Whole of Government approach is required for development of Information Action objectives and Strategic Communication themes by developing credible narratives.

**Impact on Tactics and Operational Art in Fourth Generation Operational Art.** Principal notions of operational art apply in 4GW, although context is somewhat changed.

**Reduced Emphasis on Operational Art.** In fourth generation the first change would be that a campaign framework may be largely provided to the operational commander for implementation. In this context, Operational Art is likely to be a little more circumscribed than envisaged and might involve orchestration of tactical actions, through one or more lines of operation, to ultimately achieve the directed strategic accepted enduring conditions.

**Blending of Tactical and Strategic Levels.** As the opponent's political infrastructure and civilian society become battlefield targets, blending of tactical and strategic levels will be witnessed. In future wars, spaces will remain important for the operational art and an operational commander will have to aim at denying critical spaces like population centres etc.

**Force Multipliers.** Availability of actionable intelligence both through technical and non-technical means at right time is the best force multiplier. Availability of helicopters for quick transportation of troops to take action on intelligence is also a critical requirement.

**Mission Oriented Orders.** Changing nature of battlefield demands shifting of focus from situation and enemy to process and method. Initiative is now more important than obedience and it all depends on self-discipline, not imposed discipline.

**Force Protection.** The contemporary and future battle space is characterized by a lack of identifiable fronts, flanks or rear areas, by the proliferation of highly lethal weapons, by the presence of a variety of combatant groups- each with their own capabilities and the need for the armed forces to establish a persistent, pervasive and proportionate presence in population centers. Force Protection should now be sought to both conserve the force and contribute to the achievement of the mission.

**Population Protection.** In intra state wars, military operations cannot be conducted unless they are owned by the local government and population. Militaries will thus be required initially to perform some policing tasks in the absence of local law enforcing agencies. Conversely it may lead to a security vacuum that could be exploited by insurgents. Population Protection operations thus need to be dovetailed in training and planning.

**Importance of New Technologies.** With modern surveillance and fire power means a small group of soldiers can now create effects on the battlefield as produced by a second generation brigade. Nano and artificial intelligence technologies can significantly alter tactics.

**Winning a 4GW Conflict.** 4GW wars are fought in societal contexts and hence won or lost in the moral sphere. Winning at the tactical and physical levels might not result in victories at operational and strategic levels. Armies were considered stronger parties historically owing to their firepower and command over the technology but owing to restraints on utility of means are now weaker parties in 4GW.

## **Conclusion**

While armies have to win future wars on the battlefield they may have to be lost on the table. As West destroyed states in Afghanistan and Iraq it created a happy hunting ground for modern day empowered warriors. More mistakes were committed by dismissing choice of the people thus resulting into present sorry state of affairs. Fighting has to be aimed at creating peace and thus has to be civilized as was educated by Islam. Finally, in the panel's view, 4GW is an evolving, interesting yet imperfect concept as it twists history and defies trinity in a bid to create something new and does not stand the test of being a "**Strategic Theory**". Global order is already transitioning from unipolarity to multi-polarity and possibility of conventional conflicts over control of resources cannot be altogether ruled out. As nation states are marginalized even

further, more lethal hybrid wars with or without state support and possibly with the use of 5GW means like bio and nano technologies are foreseen. Future threats are complex and menacing thus asking us to shun old mindsets and develop empowered social and political structures to deal with them more effectively.

<i>Researchers:</i>	<i>Lt Col Kashif Mughal, Lt Col Asim Rahim, Lt Col Kashfi and Col Purwantoro (Indonesia)</i>
<i>Supervisor:</i>	<i>Brig Babar Iftikhar</i>

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## **PART – 4**

### **VIEWS**

- Human Security

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## HUMAN SECURITY AND PAKISTAN'S COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL SECURITY

*(By Brig Najeeb Ahmad)*

The concept of human security as a subject of political science has emerged from the expanded notion of human development. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) decided in 1989 to broaden the discourse about a nation's development framework by including human development performance alongside economic growth. Mahbub ul Haq, the renowned Pakistani economist, was the main proponent of this idea along with Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen from India. The Human Development Report was initiated in 1990 and became a focal point for current thoughts and issues in development economics from a human centric point of view. In order to formalize this newly introduced yardstick, an elaborate set of indices called Human Development Index (HDI) was introduced. As the debate about human face of economic development enlarged, UNDP Report on Human Development 1994 introduced the concept of 'Human Security', initiating an extensive intellectual, political and diplomatic discourse ever since that is going on at a healthy pace, at least intellectually.

This article will discuss various facets of the global human security debate and find its place in Pakistan's comprehensive national security paradigm.

Mahbub ul Haq argued that as various developing countries strive for economic well being, despite nearly similar conditions of natural resources and investments, countries with better human resource and enterprise fared much ahead in terms of economic growth<sup>1</sup>. He resented the development economists' obsession with the Gross National Product (GNP) as a measurement of progress, rather suggesting five invigorative concepts for all development plans, which he otherwise considered to be monotonous and out of sync with the humans who are supposed to benefit from it. 1) A human balance sheet; their quality, profile, distribution and trends. 2) Benchmarked plan targets in terms of basic human needs rather than production and consumption. 3) Integrated production and distribution objectives, given equal emphasis. 4) A decentralized human development strategy with community participation, aimed at self-reliance. 5) A comprehensive set of social indicators to monitor plan progress. However, this needed a shift in the national policy framework from a greater role of market mechanism and less government intervention to more government presence, particularly in education and health. As Churchill said in the midst of Second World War, "there is no finer investment than putting milk in babies", Mahbub ul Haq argued that people should be recognized as means as well as the ends of development. Failure of OPEC countries to develop in real terms, with few exceptions, despite windfall oil and gas gains, can be attributed to the missing human capital; the much needed human institutions and skills.

The 1994 Human Development Report continued the human security debate by dilating on the increased prospects of intra nation conflicts and daily insecurities of life. The report discussed human security's universality, interdependence, significance of prevention rather than intervention and its people centered character.<sup>2</sup> According to the report, two main aspects of human security are: first, 'safety from chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression', second, 'protection from sudden and hurtful disruption'. It also differentiated human development from human security by describing the former as being aimed at widening the

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people's choices and the latter as being meant to ensure safe and free exercise of these choices with relative confidence in their endurance. Describing human security as an 'integrative concept', rather than the 'defensive concept' of 'territorial or military security', the report propounded a 'transition from the narrow concept of national security to the all-encompassing concept of human security'. Armaments as a means to security were to be relegated in favour of 'security through sustainable human development'. Seven main categories of human security, ie, economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political were expounded. The negative impact of defence spending on development, the 'guns versus butter' dilemma, is believed to have resulted from the logic of 'balance of terror'. This empowers the military-industrial complex in the west and direct political role of militaries in the east, besides putting 'military considerations firmly in the driver's seat', leading to furthering the belief that security is actually military security.

Freedom from want and freedom from fear were the two important precepts that evoked a general agreement at the 2000 UN Millennium Summit, which among other actions, led to an independent

Commission for Human Security, co chaired by Amartya Sen. In one of its landmark reports, the commission pleaded international community for effecting a paradigm shift, from state to people, because of the 'dramatic' shift in the security debate since its inception in 17<sup>th</sup> century when state was accepted as ultimate provider of security to its citizens<sup>3</sup>. It cannot be denied that in present times many states fail to do that, rather, they can even be hostile towards their own population, at times directly and at others through neglect, mismanagement or misappropriation. Hence people deserve to be the focus of security rather than the state. It highlighted the complementary nature of human security vis-à-vis state security, human rights and human development, seeking to forge interconnectivity between individual, state and the global world through institutional policies. Kofi Annan, the then UN Secretary General explained that human security includes human rights, *good governance*, access to education and health care and personal actualization leading to poverty reduction, economic growth and conflict prevention. He described freedom from want, freedom from fear and a healthy environment as 'interrelated building blocks of human, and therefore national, security'. The commission also gave a definition of human security: 'to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment'. It did not distinguish freedom from fear and freedom from want for the individuals. The report emphasized on 'empowerment' whereby people can identify and implement solutions to the myriad insecurities of their daily lives.

In adopting the human security approach, whether a radical departure from the traditional security paradigm is suggested or a gradual one, the main argument remains the protection and empowerment of people<sup>4</sup>. Liotta and Owen argue against the faith placed in the realist school of thought to provide security, whereas it actually failed in doing so, as the ordinary people kept suffering from disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, terrorism, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards. Traditional security failed to protect the individual. Emma Rothschild sees four important changes coming about in the concept of security, beginning with the state. 1) Being brought down to the individual. 2) Being brought up to international or supranational environment. 3) Being broadened from a focus on the military to include the environment, society and economy. 4) Being diffused to include local governments, international agreements, NGOs, public opinion, natural disasters and financial markets as sources of responsibility.<sup>5</sup>

In the west, the idea of human security, as expounded in aforementioned reports, replacing or augmenting national security per se, is evolving. Canada, Japan and Norway are perhaps few of its active proponents in the developed world, who adopted the notion while expanding their national security concept ‘comprehensively’. Canada and Norway advocated freedom from fear as the domain requiring more attention<sup>6</sup>, which is often criticized as the narrow definition. There prevails an inevitable east-west divide in perception of human security. Asia hosts some of the original thinkers of this idea, yet some Asian Governments view it as a ploy for ‘human rights promotion and humanitarian intervention’ and others consider it an old idea, with many Asian countries having already developed their own concepts of ‘comprehensive’ national security. Japan, interestingly, appears to stick to its Asian values when it differs from the Canadian approach in declaring that it does not consider freedom from want to be less critical than freedom from fear<sup>5</sup>. Ideally, both should get equal attention, but a preference between them will remain a dilemma for human security.

An important reason for assigning the “security” suffix to humans or individuals rather than states lies in the semantic value of this term which provides greater meaning to an idea since factors at state level carrying this denotation tend to be viewed much more seriously. Barnett and others term security a “speech act” ‘that raises the profile of a problem’<sup>7</sup>. Securitization implies a change of status for a risk ‘from a problem that is able to be dealt with through mainstream institutions to one requiring extraordinary measures’. Absence of democracy may accentuate peoples’ insecurities on the pretext of national security as perceived by the security elite, and even in democracies the same pretext can be used to induce fear, like the Patriot Act in USA. So the fundamental questions remain: Whose security and security from what? These questions lead the debate for the need to change the referents of security. It is resisted by the mainstream, state centered, security community due to the salience that they accord to the fundamental ‘imperatives of national security’.

Cunha’s adaption of Buzan’s five spatial levels for analysis of security in International Relations are important to identify the disadvantage of reducing the referent to individual level in the human security debate<sup>8</sup>:

<u>Spatial Level</u>	<u>Examples</u>
International Systems	Economic, financial, aerospace, maritime systems, etc
International Subsystems	Regions with distinct social dynamics like geographical Europe or political EU
Political Units	States, nations, organized religions, etc
Subunits	Political parties, states’ bureaucracies, pressure groups, interest groups, etc
Individual	Human beings considered individually, with or without significance as political actors

Traditional security generally focuses on first two levels, wherein, realism places great emphasis on militaries in its approach to world politics while liberalism emphasizes on economic interdependence and prevalence of democracy in international society to explain the

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phenomenon of war and peace. It is argued that because human security aims to place the analysis at the individual level while widening the threat spectrum, it results in twofold disadvantage; lack of focus on collective political units and failure in identification of those vulnerabilities that need to be ‘securitized’. Thus, in Cunha’s opinion, challenge lies in connecting Human Security (of the individual) with National Security (of the State) without trampling over Traditional Security Studies.

Intellectually, Pakistan has made some progress in steering its national security discourse towards a comprehensive framework. As an example, a nongovernmental panel of Pakistan Ex-Servicemen Association led by Admiral (Retd) Fasih Bokhari suggested a national security policy for Pakistan, Peace at Home and Peace Abroad, in October 2011. After criticizing earlier manner of defining national security in Pakistan as “the integrity of the national territory and its institutions” as given by Morgenthau in *Politics among Nations*, they argued that secure nations have tended to accept Arnold Wolfers “absence of threats to acquired values” as a more wholesome classification. This definition, the panel argued, “emphasizes values that enable us to overcome risk from poverty, hunger, and from poor and unequal educational and job opportunities”. It emphasized freedom from risk of internal and external threats to values and highlighted the dangers emanating from absence of a well defined ‘common identity or purpose’.

This concept has obviously been under intense debate in our strategic discourse since long and cannot be termed as conclusive. Our strategic culture remained tilted towards the realist, state security paradigm, owing to legacies of insecurity. Over the course of our history, this led to abysmal neglect of the human security paradigm to a degree that the state has become more insecure from within than from without.

Pakistan’s national security approach stands at strategic crossroads. However, rather than seeing it as ‘either-or’ dilemma, it will be useful to adopt an integrative approach, but with priority to human security. External threats need to be managed by way of diplomacy, deterrence, co-opting approaches and getting mainstreamed in a globalized world by reinvigorating our core values. We need to focus on good governance as the single most important precept of human security. The ‘guns versus butter’ dilemma is not as serious for us as the irony of poor administration of potential resources versus requirement of their humane utilization. We ought to focus upon building the much needed human institutions and skills through human empowerment. Thucydides’ trinity of fear, honour and interest needs to be rationalized in the national security calculus for better economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security of individuals in Pakistan, within safe internal and external frontiers.

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