

# BUREAUCRATIC SCHOOL POLICYMAKING AND ATTENDANT IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES: THE CASE OF PUNJAB PROVINCE

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## **Abstract**

*Reports on education by various commissions attest that school policymaking in the Punjab, as indeed, in Pakistan, has tended to be bureaucratic, ignoring input from teachers, parents and other members from targeted communities.<sup>1</sup> This article focuses on three policies in the Punjab, namely, upgradation of Municipal Committee schools; merger of schools and rationalization of staff; and public private partnership under the supervision of Punjab Education Foundation. Basing the study on official and semi-official documents and field work, it was found that the aspects ignored during bureaucratic policymaking surfaced at the point of implementation and caused injuries to individual persons as well as groups (i.e population clusters that come to lose educational facilities for their children). Litigation flourished and continues, demonstrating the need for participatory school education policymaking.*

**Keywords:** Bureaucracy, Education, Litigation, Implementation, Infrastructure

## **Introduction**

School policymaking is something very important in any country or state. Yet it has been treated in a bureaucratic ad-hoc manner in Pakistan in general, and in the Punjab Province, in particular. In the federal system of Pakistan, education has been a provincial subject but from time to time, there has been some sort of coordination on the part of the federal government. Even after the 2010 devolution of power, a forum for coordination has been created.

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Nevertheless, education has been a subject wherein major responsibility has been with the provinces. At provincial level, department of education has always been a very big department in terms of number of people employed, both in the administration and in the teaching services.

This article is concerned with bureaucratic school policymaking in the Punjab province. The bureaucratic policymaking tends to ignore other stakeholders, particularly the teachers. It thus leaves a great margin to policy implementers to modify policies, sometimes to the point of distortion of such policies and consequent litigation.

The article is divided into two major parts. The first one deals with the various phases of public policymaking process itself. It locates implementation phase in the process and brings out the complexity of the phase. The second part takes three policies relating to school education and illustrates how policies made without the participation of other stakeholders become problematic and subsequently implementation becomes distorted.

## I

### **Implementation of Policies: A Complex Phase**

Public policymaking may involve creating a new public policy or reforming an existing public policy. In any case, public policymaking is often seen in terms of cycle<sup>2</sup>. The cycle or process involves such phases as problem definition often accomplished during agenda setting, formulation of policy which means proposing alternative solutions and appraisal thereof, adoption (legislative enactment), implementation and evaluation, or assessing the impact of policy implementation.

Public problems can originate in endless ways and require different policy responses (such as regulations, subsidies, quotas, and laws) on the local, provincial or national level. The public problems arise in all aspects of society - economic, social, or political. In public policymaking, numerous individuals and interest groups compete and / or collaborate to influence

policy-makers to act in a particular way. Policy responses come from two major categories, namely, the legislative and executive bodies. Such responses can be challenged at various points in courts which have the final decision in matters disputed among aggrieved individuals / groups on the one hand, and relevant public authorities, on the other.

In the policy cycle, implementation has lately come to be seen as a very complex process and has emerged as a crucial field of research. Implementation literally means carrying out, accomplishing, fulfilling, producing or completing a given task. The founding fathers of implementation studies, Pressman and Wildavsky define implementation in terms of relationship to policy as laid down in official documents. According to them, policy implementation may be viewed as a process of interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to achieve them<sup>3</sup>. Policy implementation encompasses those actions by public and private individuals or groups that are directed at the achievement of objectives set forth in policy decisions. This includes both one-time efforts to transform decisions into operational terms and continuing efforts to achieve large and small changes necessary to carry out policy decisions<sup>4</sup>. That is, policy implementation refers to the connection between the expression of governmental intention and actual result<sup>5</sup>. As part of policy cycle, policy implementation concerns how governments put policies into effect<sup>6</sup>.

The success of policy implementation depends critically on two broad factors; local capacity and will. Will is related to questions of motivation and commitment that reflect the implementer's assessment of two major things, namely, the value of a policy or the appropriateness of a strategy. Motivation or will is influenced by such factors as competing centres of authority, contending priorities or pressures and other aspects of socio-political milieu; they can profoundly influence an implementer's willingness. This emphasis on individual motivation and internal institutional conditions implies that external policy features, i.e. original policy goals and decisions come to have less and less influence on outcomes,

particularly at lower level in the institution<sup>7</sup>. The idea of policy compromise and modification is manifested in the behaviour of the street-level bureaucrats<sup>8</sup>. Lipsky (1980) propounds a theory of 'street-level bureaucracy'. The theory focuses on the discretionary decisions that each field worker or 'street-level bureaucrat' – as Lipsky prefers to call them—makes in

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delivering policies to the target populations or envisaged beneficiaries. This discretionary role in delivering services or enforcing regulations

makes street level bureaucrats essential actors in implementing public policies. At the same time, bureaucrats hold preferences about their personal condition – such as self-promotion, power, prestige, and financial reward – and about the policy in which they are engaged<sup>9</sup>. Some authors have characterized the work of street level bureaucrats into three categories<sup>10</sup>:

- Those who devote effort towards accomplishing policy goals.
- Those who shirk i.e. work towards non-policy goals.
- Those who commit sabotage, i.e. actively undermine policy goals.

In addition to complexity in implementation born of the behavior of street level bureaucrats, there is another complexity. According to Hill & Hupe, implementation inevitably takes different shapes and forms in different cultures and institutional settings<sup>11</sup>. There is voluminous literature on developing countries which demonstrates huge corruption in the public life of such countries, particularly in public bureaucracies. Transparency International organized its 9<sup>th</sup> Anti-Corruption conference in Durban in 2000 and among the 134 countries that participated, more than hundred could be characterized as developing countries. In a major study, published around that time under the auspices of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD) and the UN Development Program, there was focus on five countries and Pakistan was included in that list of five. The study highlighted the well-rootedness of corruption. It said<sup>12</sup>:

*Several mechanisms help to spread corruption and make it normal practice in these countries. Civil servants who refuse to toe the line are removed from office; similarly, businessmen who oppose it, are penalized vis-à-vis their competitors. Furthermore, an image of the state has grown up over the years according to which the civil service, far from being a body that exists to implement the rights of citizens – rights that mirror their duties – is first and foremost perceived as the least risky way of getting rich quickly. All of this helps to make corruption seem normal.*

Various levels of bureaucracy are more involved in deviance from public policy amounting to shirking (working toward non-policy goals) and outright sabotage (actively undermining policy goals). They are more true to Wilson's notions of self-promotion, power, prestige, financial reward, etc<sup>13</sup>.

## II

### **Implementation Issues in the Punjab**

In the Punjab, the undesirable behavior among street level bureaucrats in the Department of Education is slowly becoming a subject of research in the wake of emphasis on reform in the sector. An action-oriented research conducted by an academic on the subject throws some light on the highly negative role played by street level educational bureaucracy. The research was carried out with regard to teacher recruitment and retention in the Punjab, the sample included three districts, namely Attock, Lodhran and Rahim Yar Khan<sup>14</sup>. The three districts vary in size, rank, location, demographics and culture. The research found that the three districts had common problems related to the non-transparent implementation of policies. One teacher respondent went so far as to say; "The Education Department is even more corrupt than the police department" – a strong statement in Pakistan's context where the police department is generally considered to be extremely corrupt.

As such, educational bureaucracy in the Punjab bears the blameful characterization of street-level bureaucracy in that it indulges in the

modification of policies at the point of implementation. At the same time, it seeks financial rewards which lead to further distortion of policies and consequent litigation. To illustrate the situation, the study focuses on three major policies in school education; namely, upgradation of schools in the wake of devolution of power in 2001, policy of merger of schools and rationalisation of staff and the policy of public private partnership in the education sector.

### **Upgradation of MC Schools**

Prior to devolution in 2001, there were two streams of public sector schools in the Punjab - government schools functioning under School Education Department (SED) and Municipal Committee/Corporation (MC) Schools under the jurisdiction of Local Government and Community Development Department (LG&CD) of the provincial government. As such, there were two teaching staff cadres, namely SED cadre and MC cadre. However, after devolution education function of the defunct Municipal Corporations/ Committees was shifted to District Government with effect from 1 July, 2002. In this way, MC schools also came to be supervised by district education bureaucracy. Owing to the increased educational requirements of the cities/towns, a number of middle and primary schools of MC cadre were upgraded but the authorities could not design an upgradation plan that could be acceptable to all stakeholders. This upgradation increased opportunities of promotion for the SED cadre staff but rendered MC cadre shelter less and, indeed, began to be characterized as a “dying cadre”.

The educational bureaucracies both at the district and provincial levels did not think about implementation problems which could erupt at the execution stage of the upgradation policy. The implementation virtually barred MC staff from promotion and from being appointed as head of MC Schools. The SED cadre teachers were appointed as heads of MC Schools, relegating the already working MC cadre heads to merely the positions of teachers. Frustrated from such unjust policy, the MC Cadre staff approached

LG & CD Department and put forward their grievances. Taking cognizance of the situation and the unfair treatment meted out to MC cadre teachers, LG&CD Department asked SED for clarification of the status of MC Schools and their Staff. In response, SED issued a notification/ directive dated 10 April 2010, to all District Coordination Officers (DCOs) stating; “MC Schools fall under the jurisdiction of LG & CD Department while Government Schools under the administrative control of SED. The seniority, promotion and rules of business of both departments are quite different and no employee of general (SED) cadre can be transferred to MC Schools”<sup>15</sup>. That rules of seniority and promotion in the two departments were different should have been discussed at the time of upgradation decision and input from teacher unions should have formed the basis of upgradation decision. This was not done, and implementation problems emerged.

At the top of this all, the new SED notification was not religiously followed by the street-level bureaucracy, and could not redress the grievances of the MC cadre. The situation came to be deemed so severe that LG&CD Department had to issue direction vide their circular number SOR (LG)5-9/2001-1 dated 25 September 2011, “fair treatment should be meted to all the employees of education cadre of the erstwhile local councils working in the education..... in station and redress their grievances”.

Ironically, such clear directions were not complied with and this street-level bureaucratic entangling in the affairs of MC Schools continued by both district and provincial educational bureaucracies. MC cadre employees having been disappointed from continued unfair treatment, started seeking relief from higher judiciary on case to case basis.

During research, the authors came across various MC cadre teachers who had filed their petitions in different Benches of Lahore High Court [field note]. First such petition came from a teacher in an MC School of district Pakpattan. The SED had nothing to defend its position and Deputy Secretary of the department placed the above mentioned notification of 10 April 2010 before the court and assured the court that grievance of the petitioner would be redressed. He categorically stated that any such

transfers made in the past were merely stopgap arrangement that had been discontinued<sup>16</sup>.

The second case filed in LHC Rawalpindi Bench Rawalpindi relates to MC Girls High School Talagang, District Chakwal. The court referred the matter to Secretary LG&CD Department with the direction to dispose of the appellant's appeal / representation within two weeks positively. The applicant had sought relief against the order of the DPI-SE, who had posted an SED cadre employee as principal of the said school whereas according to the instructions of the SED no such posting could be made. After hearing of the case, the Secretary LG&CD found the appeal valid and based on facts and directed the DCO Chakwal for issuance of necessary order. In his detailed announcement, the Secretary LG&CD Department wrote<sup>17</sup>:-

It is crystal clear that the posting of general (SED) cadre against MC cadre is contrary to the government instructions/rules. The posting of general cadre employees to MC Schools deprives the employees of MC cadre from their legitimate right of promotion and further prospects in future.

Besides others, copies of the decision were forwarded to the Secretary SED, the DCO Chakwal and DPI-SE. This disposal of the Intra-Court Appeal should have brought the story of bureaucratic entanglement to an end but it did not.

A more complex, rather intriguing, case of the bureaucratic muddle was seen in district Attock. MC cadre Headmistress (MCCH) of MC Girls School Attock filed a petition in the Lahore High Court Rawalpindi Bench against the appointment of a General cadre employee as Headmistress of MC School. The court sent the case to the Secretary LG&CD Department who in his decision dated 13 November 2012 directed DCO Attock to retain the MC cadre employee as headmistress in charge and relieve the General Cadre employee<sup>18</sup>. The decision was acted upon, slowly. After a lapse of seven weeks, Executive District Officer (Education) wrote a letter to DPI-SE suggesting transfer of General Cadre Headmistress (GCH) to some government school. DPI ordered transfer of the GCH on 22 February 2013,

after 99 days. This could be considered, a worst example of a 'sabotage' of policy, i.e. working to undermine policy goals.

The GCH, on her part, went to High Court seeking relief against the order of the DPI (SE). As she had concealed the history/facts pertaining to the transfer, the court granted stay against the transfer order and referred the matter to the DPI-SE for decision on merit. The DPI-SE, contradicting his own previously given decision, now allowed GCH to continue vide his new decision dated 20 May 2013 and without taking into consideration the decision of Secretary LG&CD Department or, for that matter, the policy of SED. This forced MCCH to again file a petition in the LHC Rawalpindi Bench and apprise the court about the facts. On knowing the facts concealed by the GCH and DPI-SE, the court stayed the operation of impugned order of the DPI-SE on 19 July 2013 and later on, gave final decision against the appointment of GCH. The GCH filed an appeal in the Supreme Court in December 2013. Supreme Court, on 14 February 2014, upheld the decision of LHC, requiring the authorities to appoint only MC cadre staff as headmistress in thirty days. The decision has been evaded in one way or the other and MCCH could not get her right.

Details of other litigation cases over the appointment of the Heads of the MC Schools made all over the Punjab clearly demonstrated the faulty policy designs prevailing in the province. But the more worrying dimension has been that the authorities of SED despite their admission in the courts, have not realized their mistakes/ entanglements. They have not yet taken any step to redress the grievances of MC Cadre employees. The policy makers and the decision-makers of the SED failed to make accountable those responsible for such policies that are forcing employees to go into litigation or strikes. It has become a general norm of the department that policies are made and implemented without the participation of the stakeholders and are amended or taken back only as a result of employees' strikes or courts' interventions.

## **Schools Merger and Staff Rationalization Policy**

The periodic conduct of rationalisation of teachers and schools by the Punjab Government reflects structural deficiencies whereby schools are constructed without ensuring appropriate Student: Teacher Ratios (STR), or recognition of ground realities that necessitate multi-grade teaching. Teacher preferences in posting further add to the imbalance at the school level. The trade-off between providing access and quality has resulted in a host of interventions such as the mosque school, the two-room school, and the fixing of the STR at 1:40, regardless of the number of the grades in a school. Thus every few years there is an imbalance in the STR, the situation is further aggravated by declining enrolments resulting from the poor quality of education available in the public schools<sup>9</sup>.

Rationalisation of teachers and staff in combination with school mergers was initially started in late 1990s and has been modified several times since then, every time without taking input from other stakeholders. Proper rationalization is a complicated exercise; on paper it appears simple to re-assign teachers from over-staffed low-enrolment schools to those with high enrolment facing teacher shortages. However, calculating the STR and the workload is a highly complex task for which the district bureaucracies are not adequately equipped. The policies were usually silent on merging of schools based on parity and equity considerations with no clear cut guidelines. The process of re-rationalisation and re-transfers currently underway reflects the deficiencies of the earlier policies.

There have been serious gaps in the planning and implementation framework devised for the two policies. Education Department was assumed to be sufficiently proficient in re-assigning teachers and merging schools as it was part of their routine work. Monitoring of the process and timely corrective measures were not taken was not undertaken. The software (excel sheet) provided to districts was insufficient to deal with the data of thousands of teachers and did not prove helpful in calculating the workload of teachers. The DCO office was expected to provide technical support to

the Education Departments; in most districts that did not happen and where the DCO office did intervene, it was largely to appropriate all records for unilateral decision making. There was no clear indication as to which STR data was to be used, the one provided by Program Monitoring & Implementation Unit or what the districts were supposed to calculate. Also, uniform implementation guidelines of the rationalization notifications did not consider the fact that districts are non-homogeneous. This resulted in creating disparities and inequities for students, teachers and communities. Similarly, schools are also subject to variations in site and location, in the condition and space provided by the infrastructure and the student body.

The emphasis on spreading resources and their better utilization greatly undermined the appropriate deployment of teachers based on their qualifications and subject specialty. Merger into same sex school as coeducational school was not a feasible policy option, led to problems in most situations. And merging schools at a distance acted against the benefits of children belonging to the poorest and far off areas.

Head teachers and teachers who are key to the success of education system and well-being of students, were not consulted regarding the rationalization policies which created resentment. There are several instances where they were not informed of where they were to be posted which led to many of them filing petitions against the policies. For example, a writ petition was filed in 2013 before the Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench) against notification issued by the School Education Department, Government of Punjab, namely, Notification no. SO (SE-III) 5-49/2013 dated 20-6-2013. Response from the School Education Department was<sup>20</sup>:

It is settled principle of law that our constitution is based on trichotomy and this court has only jurisdiction to interpret the law and has no jurisdiction to take on the role of the policy maker. In fact the petitioners challenged the policies of the respondent/ Government, therefore, writ petitions are not maintainable in view of the law laid down by the honourable Supreme Court in Zaman Ahmed's case (PLD 1975 SC 667) and 1978 SCMR 327.

In the view of the department, the petitioners had challenged vires of the policy which was deemed purely a prerogative of the Government and the respondents being public functionaries were bound to implement the policies of the Government issued from time to time claimed bureaucratically, to be in public interest. It was further submitted that the respondents were not empowered to amend or change the policy because in that behalf Government had sole prerogative<sup>21</sup>. The petitioners rebutted the arguments saying that the impugned policy had been launched without inviting any objections/suggestions from the public-at-large or, indeed, from the teachers. The policy was likely to affect hundreds of teachers and that could deprive the students to get quality education. During the hearing at the High Court, the parties agreed to implement the policies after evolving a consensus on the subject<sup>22</sup>.

Studies conducted on the implementation highlight details of failure of bureaucratic educational policies. The Cambridge Review, a consulting firm that undertakes evaluation of implementation of educational policies, highlighted a completely failed merger and rationalisation plan of District Okara. The plans initially suggested by the District Education Department took ground realities into consideration but such plans for school merger and rationalisation were substantially changed by the District Monitoring Officer and then the EDO Finance & Planning. Resultantly, more than half of the schools in the belt adjacent to the River Sutlej were affected and caused resentment among parents and teachers. The need for re-adjustment created opportunities for nepotism and political interference. Shelter less schools with adequate enrolment were merged into other schools, resulting in dropout in spite of shifting into the government school building. About 40 percent of girls dropped out when girls' schools were merged with boys, or the girls had to attend distant schools. The DMO was later reported to put blame on the District education department for collection of incorrect data that caused closure of some schools due to shifting of staff<sup>23</sup>.

Similarly, an unthoughtful merger took place in Dera Ghazi Khan district where, acting on the school merger policy, a Government Girls

Primary School situated in the middle of a community of 10,000, was merged with a school situated half a kilometer away. However, in this seemingly small distance lay a railway line between the two places. Parents of children refused to send their children to the recipient school. They did not want to risk lives of the children by allowing them to cross the railway line. Individual parents raised their voices, to no effect. Most of them then got together in a procession to the district headquarters chanting slogans against the Education Department. The DCO, coming to know of a march towards his office, held a meeting with representatives of parents and cancelled the merger.

### **Public Private Partnership in the Punjab**

The third policy which has led to problems relates to Public Private Partnership in the Punjab. The origin of Public Private Partnership goes back mainly to the World Bank report published in 1997, titled, "The State in a Changing World". In the report, the Bank advised states to assume the role of facilitators and enablers, and not providers of education<sup>24</sup>. Under the advice and encouragement of the World Bank, the government of Punjab introduced the following models of partnership in education through Punjab Education Foundation (PEF):-

- **Foundation Assisted Schools (FAS)**. FAS is the programme under which low-fee private schools are assisted by the PEF on a per-child subsidy basis. The programme was inceptioned in 2005 with the ordinary outreach in 6 districts and later extended to all 36 districts of Punjab having around 3500 partner schools, catering to the needs of around 1.77 million students.<sup>25</sup>
- **Education Voucher Scheme (EVS)**. A voucher is given to the student to utilize it for his/her fee at a low fee private school. The scheme was launched in 2006 to benefit children belonging to less affluent and underprivileged areas. The age group of EVS beneficiary is 5-16 years. EVS was introduced in all 36 districts and approximately 5 lakh children are registered and benefitting in more than 1665 EVS partner schools.<sup>26</sup>

- **New School Programme.** New School Programme (NSP) was launched as a pilot project in 2008 to engage private sector entrepreneurs in order to establish schools in areas where there was access gap as government or private schools were unavailable. Currently, the programme has 2126 schools in 36 districts of the Punjab.<sup>27</sup>
- **Public School Support Programme.** PEF has initiated Public School Support Program (PSSP) to improve quality of education in low performing public schools through involvement of private sector. Through this program, PEF is outsourcing operational management of under-performing schools to the private sector and since its launch in December 2015, around 5000 schools have been outsourced to the private sector in three phases.<sup>28</sup>

The real nature and scope of PPP has also been subject of debate with skepticism about issues like nature of “partnership”, partnership turning into privatization and matters of equity and access. With the exception of Education Voucher Scheme, PPP programmes are being termed as government’s purchase of education services.

Government authorities argue that the PPP initiative is aimed at improving the quality of education in low performing public schools. They claim that it is a noncommercial, non-profit programme with the aim to provide free of cost quality education in existing public schools through involvement of private sector. The chief minister himself owns the outsourcing plan and wishes to implement it despite opposition from many circles including teachers. The officials of SED believe that schools under the PSSP are performing better, citing increase in enrolment of students from 309,909 to 497,255, and increase in recruitment of teachers from 7,337 to 19,726.

The supporters of partnership programmes refer to certain reports to validate their claims but research on the topic gives no strong evidence about their success. The research evidence cited in favour of Punjab experiences is mainly based on project reports prepared by the project implementation teams. Third party evaluations have been conducted to

meet the requirement of donors and not for the purpose of finding out the true picture. The reports quoted in support of success claims are sponsored by the donor agencies, encouraging PPP initiatives.

Teachers and educationists in the field are of the view that instead of transforming education system, the government is throwing its burden on others by outsourcing the schools. They believe that private vendors/contractors are interested only in financial benefits in the initiatives. They emphasize that the government should not elude its responsibility and

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should allocate more resources, reform curricula and restructure management in order to improve the system. The PEF initiatives have agitated teachers who consider it a move towards gradually ending the public school infrastructure. Field survey shows that private entrepreneurs employ less qualified teachers and pay them poorly as compared to the teachers in public sector schools. Enrolment has gone up but no signs of improvement in the quality of education. The teachers of public sector schools seem to be uncertain about their schools and job security.

The claims of quality look empty when the matter is dug into more deeply. As per the report of English daily *The Express Tribune*, only 271 out of the total 626 NGO-run schools (43%) could pass the quality test conducted by the PEF itself<sup>29</sup>. The dilemma of fake results in the government run schools has also been made public by a report of US based government-funded policy forum, Wilson Center. The report attributes the occurrences of fake figures in result to the “regime of fear” of Chief Minister, pressurizing the school officials to invent figures to elude the wrath<sup>30</sup>. The government is more focused on quantity of enrolment rather than quality and has thus established a low baseline. PEC results in the recent exams show that private schools under PPP have not shown any substantial difference in the quality of education<sup>31</sup>.

Another argument put forward in support of PPP is the notion of equity but the ground realities present an opposite picture. Low cost private schools being promoted by donors can lead to positive outcome on limited scale. There are around 13 million children still out of school in Punjab. PEF initiatives may be supplementing the efforts but are in no way alternative to the government efforts. The selective enrolment in these schools to show better results and the tendency of private schools to adopt their own curricula will further undermine the claims of equity<sup>32</sup>. Thus, the reports of positive effects of PPP on access to education are mainly sponsored by the World Bank and other donor agencies and reality is quite different from these reports.

## **Conclusion**

In the federal system of Pakistan, school policies are largely the responsibility of provincial governments, particularly since the 18<sup>th</sup> constitutional amendment in 2010. Punjab government has tended to rely on bureaucracy for school policymaking to the exclusion of other relevant stakeholders, namely the teachers and the community. Such practices make for several lacunas which are exacerbated at the parts of street-level bureaucracy, i.e. the actual implementers. School policies acquire further undesirable features owing to wide spread corruption both in the school education sector and the district bureaucracy who oversees the school sector.

This study takes three school education policies instituted in the province to illustrate how bureaucratic non-participatory school policymaking resulted in several problems at the implementation stage. For example, the bureaucratic policy to upgrade the Municipal Committee (MC) schools in the wake of devolution of powers to District government led to injuries to rights of promotion of teachers; to inter-departmental feuds regarding jurisdictions; and above all, litigation and invocation of superior courts. Similarly, the policy of rationalization of teaching staff was made by educational bureaucracy at the provincial level without input from field

administration or teacher unions. Implementation of the policy created confusion among teachers who received contradictory orders of transfers and postings. Cultural aspect of having separate schools for boys and girls was not taken care of in several instances, causing dropout of the female students.

Another policy envisaged to reform schools and enhance their performance adopted public private partnership in the education sector. Again, the policy has been prepared by the provincial education bureaucracy without input from teachers and the community. The reforms initiative has agitated the teachers who believe that this move will end the public school infrastructure. The entrepreneurs look at schools in terms of money making and are not likely to take civic or moral aspects of school education into account.

Thus, the bureaucratic school policymaking in the Punjab province has not been effective. Rather, it has led to considerable problems in implementation, often impairing rights of individuals and groups. For rectification, it were the courts that had to intervene. Such situation leads to a lot of wastage of time and unnecessary disruption at the societal level.

## NOTES

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